‘Not On My Watch’: The Bush Administration and US Foreign Policy over Darfur, 2003-2008

The crisis in Darfur saw the emergence of the most powerful grassroots advocacy campaign in recent US history and elicited unprecedented language from US leaders who, for the first time, accused a state of perpetrating an on-going genocide. This should have pushed Washington to take stronger measures to stop the violence and given it far more leverage over Sudan. Yet US diplomacy was remarkably ineffective. The US only marginally moderated the violence, had difficulty coordinating its policy with its allies, and failed to broker an effective peace agreement or force Sudan’s timely acceptance of a more robust peacekeeping force. These failures pose something of a puzzle given Darfur’s extraordinarily high profile in US politics and diplomacy. In examining discourse in the politics of the Darfur crisis, I argue that American diplomacy was characterized by carelessness with the truth and a misrepresentation of US aims and values in pandering to advocacy groups, the media and voters, with detrimental effects on the search for a political solution. This discursive strategy obstructed other communicative processes that were unfolding as Washington argued with its allies and bargained with the Sudanese government and rebel groups. It also undermined the efforts of advocacy groups.