Funding, governance, and control contestations in a multilateral organizational setting

The main research question in this article centers on how changes in the African Development Bank (AfDB) power distribution influence the funding, governance, and operations of the Bank. The study specifically explores how the power-play between external and internal members of a regional multilateral development bank influences the funding capacity and governance quality. Using the case of the AfDB, the article chronicles the persistent changes in power distribution from the original attempt at a multipolar structure that excluded non-regional membership. It exposes the inherent risks of an effort by economically weak members to relegate the influence of the stronger state members on issues of governance and control. Although African countries constitute the majority shareholders, their influence is restrained by the pivotal role of the non-African members in providing the needed funding resources and credit rating reputation to the Bank. The article concludes that resolving the persistent crisis of governance and financial sustainability requires rebalancing the shareholding structure, moderating the protection principle of the non-Africans, and mitigating the influence of political considerations in critical areas of governance and operations.