Introduction

For some British observers of the war in Iraq, the reportage, the conduct of the combatants and the (il)legal framework of the conflict have awoken the spectre of another war fought in the name of civilization and liberation from barbarism; the counter-insurgency campaign unleashed against the Mau Mau rebels of central Kenya during the 1950s. There has been little that could have been described as farcical in this repetition of history, with the dishonourable exception of much of the press coverage. However, buried beneath the reporting of embedded journalists and the phalanx of talking heads safely ensconced in Baghdad there is another seam of journalism that offers much to those interested in reconstructing the internal debates of societies caught up in such events elsewhere in today’s troubled world and in the past. The words of Iraqis, attempting to come to terms with the terror and uncertainty that has invaded their daily lives, have been all too infrequently recorded, certainly in the British media. Yet when allowed an opportunity to speak, they offer an unprecedented insight into the interpretation of events as seen from a section of society often ignored by those interested only in the essentialized categories of rebel or collaborator, traitor or patriot, good or evil. Ali Fadhil’s recent published and broadcasted reports from Falluja offered such a unique perspective. Fadhil visited the city shortly after its conquest by American and Iraqi government forces and found raw bitterness and anger. In one apartment outside of the city, Fadhil found four families who had fled from the fighting and began to ask them about the destruction they had witnessed. One man interviewed blamed neither the Americans nor their Iraqi allies: ‘The mujahideen and the clerics are responsible for the
destruction that happened to our city; no one will ever forgive them for that.’ One of his colleagues agreed, describing the religious leaders as ‘bloody bastards’ who ‘are busy painting some bloody mad picture of heaven and martyrs and the victory of the mujahideen.’ He continued: ‘And, of course, the kids believe every word those clerics say. They’re young and naïve, and they forget that this is a war against the might of the machine of the American army. So they let those kids die like this and our city gets blown up with the wind.’ Their temporary host disagreed, pointing the finger instead at the actions of the American forces and their appointed government in Baghdad: ‘Why are you blaming them [the clerics]?’ he asked. ‘Why don’t you blame the Americans and Allawi?’ Allawi and the members of the Iraqi army used in the assault on Falluja were found to be the most virulently derided of the city’s conquerors. They were, as one ambulance driver described them, ‘sons of dogs.’

This summary of evidence is not intended for any more substantive purpose than to offer an example of the diversity of explanatory paradigms people deploy when attempting to understand events as traumatic as the battle for Falluja. However, this dialogue is often missed by contemporary observers, deliberately ignored by official chroniclers and, sometimes, eroded with time within social memory, only to be later uniformly recalled in homogenised oral testimony. This paper is then a contribution to attempts to recreate the debates similar to those that took place in that apartment near Falluja, but in a very different geographical and temporal setting: 1950s’ Kenya. Between 1952 and 1960, Kenya was governed by its British colonial masters under a State of Emergency. The more than one million members of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru groups of Central Province found themselves engulfed by both an anti-colonial struggle and a civil war amongst themselves. Factions within internal politics, known in the parlance of the times as loyalists, appropriated the discourse of collaboration. Loyalists supported the colonial military response against their rivals, who constituted Mau Mau’s insurgents. Mau Mau’s rebels, their loyalist opponents and the colonial security forces trapped the general population and one another into a bloody maze of moral debates with no exit path.
The clarity and simplicity of colonial statistics belie the complexity of the war. During the military phase of the Emergency, which lasted up to the end of 1956, 11,500 Mau Mau fighters were said to have been killed. 170 African members of the official armed forces were killed and 1,800 African loyalists lost their lives. In contrast, only 32 European settlers were murdered, less than the number killed in Nairobi traffic accidents in the same period. A further 63 European combatants died in combat. The false claims to clinical accuracy by these statistics obscure a war of hidden mass graves, of bodies disposed in pit latrines and undiscovered casualties on both sides. The deaths of thousands in detention camps and during the punitive villagisation process, both integral parts of the counter-insurgency campaign, were ignored in this exercise in creative colonial arithmetic. Equally misleading are the neatly defined categories used in the statistical analysis. There is an implication of a neat division among the population between Mau Mau and loyalist; rebel or collaborator. This inscription of such distinct allegiances on to the people of central Kenya does not stand up to close historical scrutiny, and the limitations of such a paradigm have been long recognised. However, a number of scholars have adopted the rigid analytical categories of Mau Mau and loyalist with little understanding of the inherent weaknesses of such identities. Furthermore, the potential for communities and individuals to inhabit for as long possible the “in-between world”, to borrow from the title of a recent novel about Kenya’s Asians, has been frequently been ignored. So too the plurality of identity and modes of thought that were demonstrated by constant fluctuations in allegiance and movement between camps. A retrospective and mistaken cleavage of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru society has become fixed in academic and popular accounts of the war; the result of a colonial discourse which attempted to allocate permanent moral categories to hazy and temporary allegiances that subsequently became reversed in nationalist historiographies and adopted by several academics.

The actions of one group are particularly in need of closer examination; members of the Home Guard, a volunteer Kikuyu, Embu and Meru paramilitary group organised by the colonial regime to fight Mau Mau. Following its foundation in late 1952, the Home Guard was the principle enemy and target of Mau Mau, making up the bulk of the
insurgency’s victims and inflicting the majority of Mau Mau’s casualties. However, loyalists and the Home Guard have been neglected within the vast secondary literature related to the insurgency. Lauded in the colonial record, loyalists are now derided by many in Kenya as a consequence of what the Cold War historian Gaddis has described as ‘the all too human tendency to attribute behaviour one dislikes to the nature of those who indulge in it, and to neglect the circumstances – including one’s own behaviour – that might have brought it about.’

Like many other groups of colonial collaborators, loyalists’ motives have been ridiculed, portrayed as those of colonial quislings protecting the interests of the white man. Home Guards were frequently nicknamed “Black Europeans” or “tie-ties,” a reference to the European style of dress adopted by African elites and Christians. The novelist Ngugi described the Home Guard as ‘running-dogs’ for the British army. Reflecting broader academic assumptions of the nature of African collaboration with the European colonial powers, such terminology crept into historical accounts of the Home Guard. Its members’ motivations have been frequently identified as the unconscious products of colonial divide and rule tactics, or, alternatively, those of an easily classifiable conservative interest group, located by beguiling simple socio-economic analyses with very limited supporting evidence. A linear association between allegiances during the rebellion and differing class-based experiences of the colonial political economy during the post-1945 era of agricultural development and soil conservation endures. Yet, as this exploration of a particularly bloody case will demonstrate, such conclusions, like so many generalisations about loyalists and the nature of the central Kenyan civil war, are misleading.

**The Chuka Massacre**

Accounts of atrocities by the Home Guard are rightly a central component of the Kenyan popular memory of the 1950s, but this should not mean that the organisation’s own casualties should be sidelined in historical accounts of the war. Some scholars of the Mau Mau rebellion would do well to heed Ogot’s admonition: virtue is not the exclusive preserve of any historical faction. Nor is the use of the analytical categories of victim and perpetrator of violence necessarily helpful to understand such complex historical contexts. Events at Chuka, in the southern extremity of Meru district, during mid-June
1953 force us to re-examine many of the assumptions made about loyalists. In comparison to the Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Fort Hall and Nyeri, the history of the war in Meru district, and neighbouring Embu, has been largely neglected. While the number of Mau Mau fighters and supporters from Meru killed is not recorded, at least 233 loyalists lost their lives during the war in the district, 13 per cent of the official total loyalist fatalities. Meru was no sideshow. The war arrived on the eastern slopes of Mount Kenya later than it did in the Kikuyu districts, where an escalation of hostilities was obvious from late December 1952. Until mid-June, Chuka and the surrounding area remained comparatively peaceful. This was despite concerns about the presence of increasing numbers of Mau Mau fighters in the nearby forest reserve and the destabilising effect of mass repatriations from Nairobi of migrant workers suspected of rebellious tendencies. Furthermore, Kamunchuluh was correct to consider the local population’s allegiances in the light of long-standing resentment towards the government as a consequence of the implementation of deeply unpopular soil conservation measures dating back to the late 1940s. The local chief, Petro Njeru, was praised by the authorities for his support of mandatory terracing after his appointment in 1945, generally an indicator of an enthusiasm which invoked the ire of local communities engaged in the forced labour necessary to construct and maintain the terraces on hillside landholdings. Such developments partly explain the context for later support for Mau Mau in the Chuka area, but do not adequately account for a dramatic shift in local allegiances. In the weeks leading up the events of June 1953, demonstrations of Mau Mau support among the local population of Chuka were minimal. Meru’s district commissioner was primarily concerned not with rebel activities, but instead with the size of the Home Guard in the district, feeling it too large to be effectively organised and impacting negatively upon local economies by diverting the labour force away from their salaried work. The loyalty of the Chief Petro’s Home Guard was not in question and the unit was highly praised for their performance in support of military operations against Mau Mau fighters in the forests in the first two weeks of June. Of greater concern were internecine tensions between Chief Petro’s unit and the Home Guard in a neighbouring area. This was soon to change.
On Monday, June 15 1953, several platoons of the 5th King’s African Rifles (hereafter KAR) began an operation against Mau Mau units in the Mount Kenya forest above the Embu/Meru district boundary, near the town of Chuka. As normal, the military and Provincial Administration liased closely and the district commissioners of Embu and Meru, all relevant district officers and chiefs were aware of the planned operation.34 While the forests themselves were left to the army, the Home Guard were expected to patrol the forest edge to prevent Mau Mau fighters fleeing the operation escaping into the Native Reserve. For the first two and a half days, the operation went well and the Home Guard made a number arrests.35 Events took a significant turn for the worse at around 2 o’clock on the Wednesday afternoon, 17 June. A group of Chief Petro’s Home Guard were on patrol, as normal, 100 metres from the forest edge. While there, they were approached by the KAR soldiers, ordered to lay down their bows and arrows and to put their hands up. The Home Guard were made to lie on the ground and were beaten with rifle butts by the soldiers. One of the Home Guard, the local headman M’Mathai, was ordered by the KAR to fetch beer. Sensibly M’Mathai did not return, and neither did another Home Guard sent to find him. It was a decision that would save both of their lives. After the KAR took some honey from a nearby village, another Home Guard, M’Bioki, was sent to get maize and sugar cane. He was told his colleagues would be killed if he did not return. M’Bioki hurriedly returned as ordered. At some stage in the afternoon, the captured Home Guards were taken into the nearby forest. At around 6.30pm, shots were heard by Chief Petro, who was at his camp nearby. Petro recalled that ‘There was a lot of fire but it was all over in flash.’ Almost immediately after Petro had heard the shots, another of his headmen, Joel, arrived to report rumours from Chuka town that a second group of Home Guards ‘had been seized by the K.A.R.’36

Petro reported the capture of his Home Guard to the local district officer, Collins, who immediately attempted to contact European KAR officers to find out what had happened. Collins would not receive a reply until the following day. Whilst proceeding to the town of Chuka to investigate the rumours reported by Headman Joel, Collins made a macabre discovery:
on the way [I] met the two returning platoons [of KAR]. They confirmed that they had killed 22 in the forest. I again asked them if they were Home Guard, and they said “No.” I noticed that some of the askaris were carrying hands for identification purposes.

Collins continued his journey and, upon his arrival in Chuka, ‘found the township in a state of excitement.’ Chief Karawa told the district officer ‘that he believed some of his Home Guard had been shot at a place about a mile away from a Coffee Factory.’ Two separate groups of Home Guard were now missing, and Collins was greatly concerned. He sent a car of Home Guard from Chuka to investigate the second incident. They soon found the bodies of 12 Home Guards which ‘were badly cut about.’ The corpses were ‘lying close together in a little clearing. They had been shot and bayonet.' The following morning, the European officer of the KAR finally responded to Collins’ attempts to contact him. The army officer claimed that ‘we [the KAR] haven’t run into any H[ome]G[uard] at all’, while in the forest. However, he did write that his platoons ‘have killed 22 in the past two days but these were all in or on the forest boundary and ran when challenged.’ The army officer was claiming that all those killed by his men had been Mau Mau fighters. Yet 12 of the 22 had already been identified as belonging the Home Guard. The next day, 19 June, the remaining 10 casualties were finally accounted for when Petro identified the bodies of his missing Home Guards. Petro wrote that ‘I do not remember seeing any bullet wounds. What I remember most was bayonet wounds.’ Despite the urgings of the Meru district commissioner, and rapidly spreading rumours, the government refused to issue a public statement and the whole affair remained secret.

On 22 June, less than a week after the killings, a hurriedly convened military inquiry opened in Embu town. Based upon witnesses’ testimony given at the enquiry, it appears that the most likely immediate cause of the massacre was a dispute over food supplied by Chief Petro the day before the killings. Petro recalled being asked to provide three goats for the KAR troops, but only gave the soldiers ‘one goat, sugar cane, maize and bananas’, as well as a chicken. Parsons has shown that disputes over diet of the African troops in the KAR were a frequent source of unrest in the ranks. Although
rations for African soldiers were often more nutritious than average African diets outside of the armed forces, quality and quantity were racially differentiated throughout the colonial period, which resulted in discontent. During the counter-insurgency campaign against Mau Mau, the African soldiery were understandably unhappy after being given the same brands of canned meat as those used to feed dogs.\textsuperscript{45} The supply of food was then a long-standing source of contention that, in this case, intermingled with a long history of friction between the KAR and local populations in the areas in which the soldiers served. The KAR’s soldiery had a long history of conflict with civil authorities, both when on- and off-duty. Viewed with suspicion as outsiders in the communities in which they were based, resistant to attempts by police and chiefs to enforce control when away from their own officers and powerful in their own right because of their social status, members of the KAR had proved a consistent problem for men such as Chief Petro in the past.\textsuperscript{46} Petro’s refusal to provide what the KAR considered to be a reasonable request for three goats was likely interpreted as a demonstration of disrespect and as a continuation of the fractious history of relations between the soldiers and the local representatives of the colonial administration. During the war against Mau Mau, such tensions were further exacerbated by an unclear chain of command during military operations, particularly in areas such as Chuka which bordered the forest reserve. The forest reserves of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares were generally restricted to military personnel. The populated areas outside of the forests, the so-called native reserves, were administered by the usual peacetime civil authorities, albeit greatly expanded to cope with the demands of the counter-insurgency campaign. The Home Guard were under the control of the colonial government, represented locally by district commissioners, district officers and chiefs. Although governed under a state of emergency, martial law was never declared in Kenya in the 1950s. The potential for confusion and dispute between military personnel and members of the Home Guard was heightened during military operations taking place on the boundaries between the native and forest reserve, such as that during which the deaths at Chuka occurred. As discussed above, the role of the Home Guard at Chuka was to patrol just outside the boundary of the forest to prevent Mau Mau fighters fleeing while the soldiers were searching the forest itself. The military and civil spheres of influence overlapped and questions of sub-ordinance by whom to
who arose, and were informed by the much longer history of tension between the two arms of the colonial state. As a consequence of the sensitivity of the issue of food supply to the KAR, it seems highly probable that the dispute over goats became the context for the resurfacing of such tensions, particularly given the nature of the war against Mau Mau, where the chains of command of army, police and Home Guard were often blurred and contested.

At the inquiry, the evidence of Chief Petro and various European officials laid the blame for the deaths of the Home Guard squarely at the feet of the KAR. The findings were never released, not even to the senior Provincial Administration officials concerned. However, shortly after the inquiry concluded, General Erksine, the senior army officer in Kenya, wrote in a letter to the senior official responsible for the Home Guard that ‘investigations have satisfied me that whoever is to blame, it is not any of the persons killed.’ The Meru district commissioner went further, declaring in correspondence that he believed the Home Guard to have been ‘murdered.’ In accordance with Meru custom, the government agreed to pay compensation to the relatives of those killed. At a public meeting in Chuka on 4 August, the Meru district commissioner gave the families of each of the 21 identified victims Shs.2000/- each. One victim was, it appears, never identified. Every local administrative official was united in their horror at events in Chuka, condemned unequivocally the actions of the KAR and supported the rapid payment of compensation to the victims’ families. They demonstrated no sympathy for the armed forces, and apparently empathised little with their European counterparts in the army. While no doubt such sentiments were substantially motivated by basic humanity, the Administration was determined to minimise the strategic impact of the massacre. Urging rapid payment of compensation to the relatives of the victims, one official wrote that ‘I cannot over-emphasise the disastrous effect which these killings have had amongst our supporters in the Meru District and the urgent need for taking any step that is likely to restore the situation.’ In less strategically important places and periods during the war, compensation to loyalists for loss of property or life took substantially more than six weeks to be processed. On two occasions in July and August 1953, British troops looted shops at Gatura market in Fort Hall district. Despite acknowledgements of guilt by the
local commanding officer and the fact that the shops looted were owned by loyalists, it still took until March 1956 before compensation was paid.\textsuperscript{53} Some of the relatives of loyalists killed by Mau Mau during the earliest years of the war in Nyeri had to wait eight years for their claims to be processed.\textsuperscript{54} As far as the government and the military were concerned, the payment of compensation closed the matter. Significantly, the names of the Chuka victims were not included in a later roll of honour of Meru’s loyalist fatalities.\textsuperscript{55} The Attorney General decided not to proceed with any prosecutions, due to lack of evidence.\textsuperscript{56}

As suggested by the haste in which compensation was paid, the people of Chuka were far less willing to forget the events of mid-June 1953. The massacre had a decisive effect on the direction of the war in the surrounding area. Despite widespread unrest elsewhere, from 1945 Chuka had been a relative bastion of stability and, through service in the Home Guard, showed signs of strong support for the government in the first months of the Emergency. In the very week of the massacre, it was reported that the Home Guard in the area ‘have undoubtedly got their tails up’ and had proved highly effective during the same military operation against Mau Mau that culminated in the deaths of the 22.\textsuperscript{57} A week later, the Home Guard ‘had ceased to exist’ in the area. Besides those killed, the negative effect upon the morale of the remainder of its members had been terminal. It was not just the local Home Guard unit that had been decimated by the massacre or solely the families that survived their husbands, sons, fathers and brothers who attempted to make sense of the tragedy. The very fabric of social life in the local community was destroyed. The locality was reported to be ‘in a state of alarm and anger.’ Chuka town’s thriving weekly market, normally attended by between 400 and 500 people, attracted just four people in the aftermath of the killings. Chief Petro was reported to be spending his days sitting ‘under a tree mumbling to himself’.\textsuperscript{58} Despite previously being notable for its loyalty, in the months following the deaths, support for Mau Mau surged around Chuka. By mid-November, 40 percent of the Home Guard’s members were thought to be Mau Mau sympathisers.\textsuperscript{59} Government agricultural instructors had to cease work in the area due to fear of attack from Mau Mau fighters.\textsuperscript{60} While the year of 1954 was later described as one ‘of real progress’ in the campaign against Mau Mau, Chuka remained a
stubborn stronghold of support for the insurgency. It would continue to be so until the last days of the military campaign.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{Chuka as part of the Mau Mau war}

The purpose of this account is not to narrate and solve a ghoulish historical murder mystery, but instead to relate the events around Chuka in mid-1953 to established themes in the historiography of the Mau Mau period and other similar fratricidal conflicts elsewhere. The points of departure from this very local and personal event to the broader meta-narratives are many, not least the rather grim insight provided by evidence presented to the inquiry into the conduct of the war by the imperial armed forces. As we saw above in the accounts of the killings, the victims’ hands had been removed by their murderers. The Home Guard had been killed with bayonets in cold blood at close quarters while under arrest and unarmed. Yet nobody involved in the case appears to have been surprised that such activities had been carried out by colonial forces, suggesting that while the victims of this particular incident may have been exceptional, the manner in which the KAR acted was not. While such issues are important, they have been developed at length elsewhere.\textsuperscript{62} Instead, the remainder of this paper will examine what the deaths, or, more precisely, the subsequent reaction by the local population of Chuka, tell us about the doubtful permeability of allegiances and identities during the Mau Mau war.

The killings at Chuka occurred in the midst of the fiercest phase of fighting in the Mau Mau war. From Christmas 1952 until the middle of 1954, the Home Guard and the forest fighters of Mau Mau engaged one another in a series of often brief but bloody skirmishes across Central Province. These were often triggered by attacks on the Home Guard posts by insurgents looking for arms and supplies.\textsuperscript{63} An official history of loyalists, written in the immediate aftermath of the war, represented such small-scale battles in terms of an honest, reliable Home Guard living in constant fear of attack, bravely repelling the invading Mau Mau hordes that periodically descended from the forests.\textsuperscript{64} Joining the Home Guard was for loyalists, in the words of one European officer, ‘the only reasonable alternative to losing their lives.’\textsuperscript{65} Mau Mau’s chroniclers too presented this phase of the
war in similar terms. Attacks by the insurgents on Home Guard posts were heroic efforts, carried out under the cover of darkness against clearly identifiable and unambiguous enemies.\textsuperscript{66} The reality was somewhat different - the division between the two sides was never so stark. In certain places, the Home Guard acted as peacekeepers, for example at Tumutumu in Nyeri.\textsuperscript{67} Evidence from Kiambu has shown that the Home Guard could be far less violent than legend suggests, at times refusing to fight Mau Mau units, no doubt partly at times through fear.\textsuperscript{68} Two similar events in December 1953 illustrated the lack of conviction some Home Guard members had for their role in the frontline in the war against Mau Mau. In the first case, a police patrol decided to call on a guard post at Gakoi to check that all was well. Mistaking the police for an attacking Mau Mau unit, the Home Guard in the post tried to escape ‘and it was only with difficulty that the patrol managed to persuade the inhabitants they were, in fact, bona fide police.’\textsuperscript{69} The following week in Gatundu, again in Kiambu, a Home Guard patrol fled after stumbling upon a group of six Mau Mau fighters: ‘Apparently before doing this they had a short discussion with the gang on the subject of arms and ammunition. When they found that the gang was in possession of fire-arms they took to their holes, remaining concealed until the gang had gone its merry way …’\textsuperscript{70} In battle, the Home Guard did not live up to their mythical reputation as the brave defenders of their families or Christian values.\textsuperscript{71} More significantly, Home Guard posts were often lost to what was termed “treachery” by colonial officials. In Mathira in north-eastern Nyeri, two guard posts were destroyed in 1953 in this way, leading to an overhaul of the Home Guard there later the same year.\textsuperscript{72} At midnight on the night of 18 May 1954 a Mau Mau unit attacked a Home Guard post at Mukuuni, Meru. During a subsequent court case it was described how ‘a minority of the Home Guard manning the post were Mau Mau sympathisers’, who then ‘set upon what may be called the loyal element’, killing three Home Guards and injuring four more. 10 further Home Guard deserted the post in the aftermath of the attack.\textsuperscript{73} The archival record from 1953 and early 1954 contains repeated example of Home Guard units giving assistance to Mau Mau groups and subverting government actions and policies. At Gituaru in Kiambu, members of the Home Guard took the profits of a beer-brewing enterprise to imprisoned Mau Mau activists.\textsuperscript{74} In Embu during November 1953, the Home Guard participated in an attack a lorry carrying Mau Mau suspects rounded up
during screening, freed its cargo and then abducted and killed a Tribal Policeman escorting the detainees.\textsuperscript{75} Again during November 1953, a Home Guard unit in Muhito, Nyeri refused to cut down an illegally planted maize crop after local women had disobeyed an order to do so.\textsuperscript{76} Mathira in Nyeri and Ndia in Embu were identified as the two divisions in Central Province where the Home Guard were most likely to sympathise with Mau Mau, but evidence from elsewhere, as we have seen, suggests this was no localised phenomenon.\textsuperscript{77}

These events were repeated time after time across Central Province during the 18 month “hot” war, and considered by some sections of European society in Kenya as evidence of the dubious merit of dependence upon loyalists in the fight against Mau Mau. Many shared the views of one government report in which it was asked ‘Are there any loyal Kikuyu?’\textsuperscript{78} Some settlers, in particular, tended to reply in the negative. Loyalism had to be proven by deeds\textsuperscript{79} and no loyalist considered above suspicion of harbouring sympathies for Mau Mau. Harry Thuku, for example, was one of Mau Mau’s most strident Kikuyu critics, but became the subject of baseless attempts by the European political body, the Electors’ Union, to have him jailed for being ‘one of the co-founders of this menace.’\textsuperscript{80} Disloyal and treacherous Home Guard, in the words of one leading missionary, ‘embarrass Government and the populace.’\textsuperscript{81} Loyal Africans were considered ‘not capable of forming [Home Guard] units and they must be formed, trained and led by British personnel.’\textsuperscript{82} Instead, young European officers, many of them sons of settlers, were appointed to the position of District Officer. They assumed day-to-day operational command of the Home Guard, but becoming embroiled in some of the most despicable episodes in the war against Mau Mau.\textsuperscript{83} The mistrust of loyalists by the Administration, and the presumed need for close supervision, was expressed in the lexicon of racial paternalism. The district commissioner in Nyeri claimed that the Home Guard ‘look upon us as their advisers, and in fact as their “father and mother.”’\textsuperscript{84} The Home Guard were, it was felt, children whose tendency to misbehave required constant attention.
Senior figures within Mau Mau have since frequently claimed that the duplicitous behaviour of the Home Guard which attracted the scorn of European society was the consequence of deliberate tactics of infiltration. Field Marshall Musa Mwariama, for example, wrote that during Mau Mau oath ceremonies in Naro Moru ‘oathers would be selected to become infiltrators on the homeguards, to be informing on the movement of the homeguards or other government forces. If certain houses of Mau Mau suspects were to be burned down, our infiltrators would forewarn the would be victims to remove valuable property from the houses.’85 Mau Mau sympathisers within the ranks of the Home Guard were well known, and this knowledge could save their lives in the event of capture by insurgents.86 Deceit, deception and double agents were an ever present part of the tactics of both sides, the most famous example being the notorious so-called “pseudo-gangs” of former forest fighters used by the security forces in the latter years of the military struggle to infiltrate the rebel units in the Aberdares and Mt Kenya forest. But Mau Mau had its own pseudo-gangs. In Nairobi, Mau Mau fighters disguised themselves as Home Guard, drank in loyalist bars in the African locations of the city and then enticed loyalists back to their homes with the promise of more beer before killing them.87 However, it seems unlikely that the presence of large numbers of Mau Mau sympathisers within the ranks of the Home Guard was part of a grand strategy by the movement’s military leaders. Claims made about the distinctive social background of the Home Guard do not stand up to scrutiny of the full range of available evidence. These were not exclusively the rich, the most senior or the Christians, though undoubtedly these groups were represented in the Guard.88 Recruitment methods were often indiscriminate and resulted in a Home Guard that represented a cross-section of society. In Chogoria, Meru, one informant suggested that those considered likely Mau Mau sympathisers were forced to join the Home Guard so as to be under the constant gaze of the Administration.89 Chogoria does not appear to have been the only place where Home Guard members were press-ganged. In Kangema, Fort Hall, it was estimated that only 10 percent of recruits who joined the Home Guard were motivated principally by their hatred of Mau Mau. In certain locations it was believed that a majority had been forced to join by the local headmen.90 A senior police officer was correct to consider that ‘the feelings of the local Kikuyu population, the larger percentage of whom favour the objects of the Mau Mau
leaders though perhaps not their methods, are bound in my opinion, to have a certain influence on some members of the Kikuyu [Home] Guard, who are after all members of that population. ¹⁹¹ If we are to understand the behaviour of the Home Guard, it is clearly necessary to do so in the terms by which they attempted to come to terms with the maelstrom which engulfed central Kenya.

_Loyalism and wiathi_

In 1953, the war appeared in the balance. It was a curious localised conflict based upon historic grievances in which one Home Guard post could house a Mau Mau unit the night before the insurgents attacked another guard post in a neighbouring location. ⁹² The decisive blow would not be struck by the colonial security forces until April of the following year, when supply lines to the forest fighters were dried up. Until then, the Home Guard controlled the daylight hours, and Mau Mau the night. ⁹³ The population, trapped between the two, avoided irreversible public declarations of allegiance that often proved fatal if misjudged. Such decisions could not be delayed indefinitely. As the violence encroached upon the lives of an ever growing number of homes, the middle ground occupied by the majority between the two extremes of the internal Kikuyu struggle shrank. Both Mau Mau and the colonial government demanded unequivocal support. As Lonsdale has argued, when the moment for decisions finally arrived, too often, as at Chuka, in the immediate aftermath of bloodshed, the people of central Kenya relied upon the concept of *wiathi*, self-mastery, to inform their choice between loyalism and Mau Mau. Once achieved, *wiathi*, defined by Lonsdale as ‘the contested understanding of how to attain the moral maturity of working for oneself,’ ⁹⁴ would allow for the ownership of land, the employment of labour others, to marry, to process through various social strata, for social reproduction and dignity in death. The attainment of *wiathi* intertwined gender relations, the conflicting demands of age-set and clan lineages and the tortured process of class formation. Excluded from the means of achieving self-mastery within the colonial political economy by settler farmers, colonial administrators and land-hungry Kikuyu patrons, the quest for *wiathi* led many of Mau Mau’s malcontents to choose the forests. ⁹⁵ Others decided to remain behind.
Like their siblings and children who chose Mau Mau, members of the Home Guard understood their decision to support the counter-insurgency as a tool which would aid them in their quest for *wiathi*. Loyalty opened a new path. Among loyalists, it was frequently argued that Mau Mau threatened the collective attainment of *wiathi*. Conservative understandings of *wiathi* demanded respect for the apparently natural leaders of society; the wealthy, the senior elders and educated. Mau Mau showed no such respect. Instead, the rebels demanded power and influence out of turn, and demonstrated little affinity for the self-discipline required to labour for *wiathi*. Deshon Waweru wrote that Mau Mau supporters ’use force as they please and at the same time eat and spend what they have not worked for. What sort of goodness can we expect from such?’ It was Mau Mau’s frustration of the attempts by others to achieve *wiathi* by burning schools and attacking loyalists employed in public service that enraged Francis Gatheru: ‘What is the idea of setting the schools on fire and burn them down? What is the object of killing such people like teachers, Government servants and the people who work in the Hospitals and very many other people who are very useful in the country?’ Loyalist critiques of Mau Mau returned again and again to the issues of indiscipline, disrespect and impatience. The forest fighters could never shake off the accusations of vagrancy, delinquency and hooliganism. They were, one teacher wrote, like the youths who lingered around ‘the markets and towns in this district without doing any work.’ Ultimately, in an agricultural community, *wiathi* required access to land, *githaka*. Yet all could see how the land of, first, Mau Mau’s leaders and, latterly, its rank and file were confiscated by the government. Even relations of Mau Mau supporters, such as Wangai Gathiru from Tetu in Nyeri, whose son was in the forest, found their land confiscated. Developments in the nature of the counter-insurgency campaign encouraged loyalists to retrospectively erase from their accounts of the war the dilemmas so many had faced before choosing to support the government. By 1954, there was no longer anything to be gained from ambiguity. Simion Mbugua, an 18 year old Home Guard based at the Karagara guard post in Embu, wrote in October of that year:

I have been feeling very sorry for a long time to see the evils which have been done in our country by Mau Mau terrorists. I wonder, don’t you see that there is no profit which Mau
Mau terrorists have brought in our country. How do you come to agree to take Mau Mau oath and then to obey such laws as killing your rulers, women and small children? 

The surrendering of the complexity of the early months of the war promised great benefits for some loyalists. Exemption from taxes imposed to pay for the vast military campaign against the insurgents, payment of school fees, immunity from collective punitive confiscations of livestock, relaxations of stringent movement restrictions, a monopoly on local trading concerns, exclusive access to transport licences and cash crops, a reserved electoral roll, assistance in finding employment and, most importantly, land grants were all to come for many who supported the government during the campaign against Mau Mau. Yet rewards would not begin to be accrued by most until late in 1954. When that time came, the nature and character of loyalism changed significantly. However, in mid-1953, the potential for economic and political gain existed only as promises in the words of local administrators. Until those pledges were fulfilled, the Home Guard remained unpaid, although able to enjoy the ill-gotten gains of new income streams based on corruption and extortion. Central Province’s provincial commissioner, for example, announced in July 1953 that he hoped ‘Members and leaders of the Kikuyu Guard will form the foundation and loyal element on which we will seek to build during the reconstruction period.’ At that time, however, the Home Guard was still in its infancy, poorly equipped and in many areas left isolated in remote guard posts stretching across the ridges of Central Province, vulnerable to attack by Mau Mau.

Even in areas such as Chuka, where the Home Guard at first enjoyed a degree of popular support, its members found themselves alongside the wider population at the mercy of a colonial state pursuing a particularly indiscriminate and violent counter-insurgency campaign. This new route to *wiaihi* was far from clear, obscured by the fog of war, moral debates and the desire to survive. Self-survival was necessary for self-mastery. It was this ill-defined reality that explains why so many Home Guard members were Mau Mau activists, why so many Mau Mau supporters would at later points join the war against the rebels and why the majority of the population avoided for as long as possible making concrete decisions over which faction to support in a war that tore families...
asunder. Instead, they occupied the “in between world.” It would take events such as Chuka, repeated across central Kenya in different forms and with alternative casts of actors during the 1950s, to root allegiances firmly in localities. For the people of Chuka, *wiathi* through loyalty demanded too a high price in the lives of its husbands, sons and fathers, killed because of a petty dispute over goat meat. They instead turned to the radicals of Mau Mau. For loyalists elsewhere, the price was not so extortionate. They did not have the misfortune to inadvertently anger a passing army patrol, be attacked by a Mau Mau unit or indiscriminately rounded up during a sweeping operation in Nairobi. Their choices were far easier, but their final decision no less valid. To represent the war in central Kenya as one between the “running dogs” of colonial rule and the righteous liberators of Mau Mau is to misunderstand the causes and significance of the conflict and its continuing impact upon political debates.

**Conclusion**

This paper has been a study of a war as a process – not an event. Mau Mau’s historiography had its Rankean moment of high historicity. Attempts to identify the causes in the unequal distribution of political and economic resources in colonial Kenya may have explained the context in which discontent emerged in the period prior to Mau Mau.\(^{106}\) However, as the authors of those accounts were only too aware, to determine with any certainty from the historical record particular sections of society which would follow Mau Mau and which would take the path of loyalism was a futile exercise. The labels of Mau Mau and loyalist have constantly evolved in response to the events of the period since 1952 up to the present. Too many scholars have fallen into the trap of assuming the appellations of particular moments since the war ended can necessarily be traced to its prehistory. Individuals who are now considered to have been loyalist cannot be assumed to have never supported the Mau Mau movement. Likewise, some of those who have since claimed the title of freedom fighter would be uncomfortable with sustained scrutiny of their words and actions across the entire period of the Emergency. The people of Chuka could be said to have been loyalist one week, and Mau Mau the next. These are terms with very particular etymologies that need to be handled with care, as Kershaw found during her anthropological fieldwork in Kiambu in 1956:
Mau Mau was not necessarily bad, Home Guards not necessarily good. Whatever a man or woman had become seemed logical, given the situation. For those who knew enough, becoming a Home Guard might be a rational thing to do, but so might taking an oath … Situations changed constantly: the Mau Mau members became a Home Guard, the Home Guard took an oath. Both belonged to the same kin-group and there was little to differentiate them.

Six years later, Kershaw found that “Loyalist” became pejorative, equated with “collaborator” if not “Quisling.” Home Guards were likely to be depicted as wealthy and exploitative; Kikuyu who had opposed the British in general became “patriots.” 107 Between 1956 and 1962, the labels of Home Guard and Mau Mau became increasingly politically relevant as detainees began to return to their homes following their incarceration for suspected Mau Mau. The return of the radical element, embittered by their harsh treatment in Britain’s gulag, to local communities, contorted and reignited local political debates once again. The nature of the war and its settlement, in particular land confiscations and reallocations, ensured that Mau Mau and Home Guard would remain in the lexicon of Kenyan politics until the present day, constantly relevant but relentlessly altering in meaning.

While under interrogation following his capture during June 1954, one unnamed Mau Mau supporter gave a succinct analysis of the complexity of allegiances during the war. He told his police interviewers that the majority of the Home Guard ‘have taken the Mau Mau oath and they look upon the Home Guard as a better way of achieving the objects of Mau Mau’.108 During the war against Mau Mau, loyalist and Mau Mau were not prefabricated identities assumed by readily discernable sections of society. Instead, the terms represent the boundaries of a moral debate between which the vast majority of central Kenya constantly fluctuated, using the twin desires for wiathi and survival to inform their movements. As the case of Chuka shows, the journey from Home Guard to Mau Mau may not have taken a long time to complete, but it was certainly arduous.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the African Studies Association’s annual meeting, New Orleans, November 2004.


11 M.G. Vassanji, *The In-Between World of Vikram Lall* (Edinburgh, 2004).

12 With the honourable exceptions of John Lonsdale, Bruce Berman and, more recently, Derek Peterson.


This event was fictionalised in E. Mbabu, *From Home Guard to Mau Mau* (Nairobi, 1996), pp.6-11.


See correspondence in KNA DC/MRU/2/1/2 for more details. Note that these statistics are certainly incomplete as the deaths detailed in this paper are not included in the figure of 233 fatalities.


KNA VQ/1/30, DC Meru to PC Central, 13 May 1953.

United Kingdom National Archives, formerly Public Record Office (UKNA) WO 276/392, Meru District Intelligence Summary for week ending 18 June 1953, p.2.

KNA VQ/1/30, DC Meru to PC Central, 13 May 1953.


KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, telegram, DC Meru to Chief Native Commissioner & PC Central Province, 16 July 1953.


KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, ‘Statement by Mr. D.T. Collins, District Officer (Meru Guard),’ 22 June 1953.

KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, ‘Statement by Mr. D.T. Collins, District Officer (Meru Guard),’ 22 June 1953.


The deceased were: M’Baruthi Mugira; M’Bioiki Mugira; Benjamin Mutegi; M’Baini M’Tthara; Daniel Gaiounge; M’Renjeu M’Mchani; Nkanato M’Rambu; Alfred M’Ruaria Mutethia; M’Rithaa Kiamku; M’Bauni Mburugo; Bore Kibiro; Njeru Nyamu; Njagi Kibata; Borana Nderi; Mhuba Muthita; Mhuba Kigundu; Muchiri Mucheke; Nkiriia Kathumbe; M’Reri M’Riria; M’Bioiki Murage and Kange Mutegi. One further victim was never identified. All but three were married and left behind a total of 40 children. Three of their wives were pregnant at the time of the massacre (KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, A.C. Small, DC Meru, ‘Statement of Payment of Compensation to Relatives of Meru Guard Killed by Security Forces at Chuka on 17th and 18th June, 1953’, pp.1-3. Attempts to locate the families of the victims during fieldwork proved unsuccessful.

KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, ‘Statement by Chief Petro Njeru,’ p.2


KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, M.E. Aronson, DO Embu to DC Meru, 22 June 1953.


48 KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, General Sir G. Erskine to Chief Native Commissioner & Member for African Affairs, 14 July 1953.

49 KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, telegram, DC Meru to Chief Native Commissioner & PC Central, 16 July 1953.

50 KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, Acting Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary, Compensations Committee, Treasury, 17 July 1953, p.2.


52 KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, Acting Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary, Compensation Committee, Treasury, 17 July 1953, p.1.

53 See correspondence in KNA MAA/7/208.

54 See correspondence in KNA VP/6/2.

55 See correspondence in KNA DC/MRU/2/1/2.

56 KNA DC/MRU/2/11/98, Illegible to DO2, 23 July 1953.


59 UKNA WO 276/392, Meru District Intelligence Summary for week ending 19 November 1953, p.2.

60 KNA DC/MRU/2/2/3, District Agricultural Officer, ‘Safari Report – Chuka and Mwimbi’, 3-5 November 1953.


65 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, History of the Loyalists, p.43.


69 UKNA WO 276/388, Kiambu District Intelligence Summary for the week ending 12 December 1953, p.3.

70 UKNA WO 276/388, Kiambu District Intelligence Summary for the week ending 19 December 1953, p.2.


72 UKNA CO 822/692, E. Baring to Oliver Lyttelton, 30 December 1953, pp.2-3.


74 UKNA WO 276/388, Kiambu District Intelligence Summary for the week ending 15 August 1953, p.2.

75 UKNA WO 276/394, Embu District Intelligence Summary for the week ending 19 November 1953, p.4.

76 UKNA WO 276/393, Chairman, Minutes of the Nyeri District Intelligence Committee Meeting, 13 November 1953, p.2.

77 KNA ARC(MAA) 2/5/307 II, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Provincial Special Branch to PC Central, 17 August 1953.


80 RHL Mss Afr s 596, box 38 A(1), Canon W.J. Rampley to Lt. General N.M.S. Irwin, 2 August 1954, p.1. See also other correspondence in this file relating to Thuku.


82 KNA ARC(MAA) 2/5/309, Provincial Director, Kikuyu Home Guard, ‘A Guide to Officers Commanding Kikuyu Home Guards in the Rift Valley Province,’ no date, appendix to Provincial Director,

83 See for example UKNA CO 822/499 for correspondence relating to prosecution of Brian Hayward and several Home Guards in Tanganyika for beating suspects during screening of Kikuyu labour working on farms near Arusha.

84 KNA VQ/1/30, DC Nyeri to PC Central, 4 July 1953.


86 RHL Mss Afr s 1534, Anon., ‘A Book of Forest History or War in the Forest and Attacks Here and There’ 22 December 1953, p.6.

87 M. Mathu, The Urban Guerilla: The Story of Mohamed Mathu (Richmond, 1974), p.56.

88 KNA ARC(MAA) 2/5/307 II, J.D. Campbell, ‘Survey of K.G. Position, Githunguri Division, Kiambu Division as on 14th August, 1953.’

89 Stephen Murocha, interview with the author, Chogoria, South Meru, 15 September 2003.

90 KNA ARC(MAA) 2/5/307 II, DO Kangema to DC Fort Hall, 23 August 1953.

91 KNA ARC(MAA) 2/5/307 II, B. Ruck, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Provincial Special Branch to PC Central, 17 August 1953, pp.1-2.

92 UKNA WO 276/388, Kiambu District Intelligence Summary for the week ending 25 April 1953, pp.2-3.


96 KNA AHC/9/24, Parmenas Njeru Jacob to Editor, Kayu ka Embu, 15 September 1954.

97 KNA AHC/9/23, Deshon Waweru to Editor, Uhoro wa Nyeri, 3 November 1954.

98 KNA AHC/9/23, Francis M. Gatheru to Editor, Uhoro wa Nyeri, 3 December 1954.

99 KNA AHC/9/25, Bernard Ngari Harrison, Kegonge Intermediate School to Editor, Kayu ka Embu, 15 November 1955.


101 DO North Tetu to DC Nyeri, 21 June 1954.

102 Simion Mbugua to Editor, Kayu ka Embu, 17 October 1954.

103 See for example, KNA WC/CM/1/2, Minutes of the 10th meeting of the War Council, 10 May 1955, p.2-4 for land grants and assisted employment; correspondence in KNA DC/NKU/2/25/48, PC/NKU/2/15/69, PC/NKU/2/1/78 & PC/NKU/2/15/65 relating to exemption from movement restrictions;
KNA WC/CM/1/1 Anon., ‘Discipline and Communal Punishments: Fort Hall District’, attached to Minister for African Affairs, ‘Intensification and Relaxation of Punitive Measures’, 5 January 1955 for loyalist immunity from communal punishments; KNA VQ/1/31, PC Central to Chief Native Commissioner, 4 December 1953 for details of payment of school fees for children of Home Guard and loyalist exemption from special tax; KNA VQ/1/31, PC Central to Sir F. Crawford, 10 October 1953 for issue of wattle permits to loyalists; KNA VQ/1/32, DC Embu to PC Central, 19 February 1954 for grants of land to loyalists. Many more examples of all of the above can be cited.

104 See for just one example of many, KNA VQ/1/51, DC Kiambu to PC Central, 26 June 1954.

105 KNA VQ/1/31, ‘Extract from the Provincial Commissioner, Nyeri’s Memorandum on “Future Administration of the Kikuyu Districts”’, 31 July 1953.


108 Quoted in VQ/1/51, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Provincial Special Branch to PC Central Province, 19 June 1954.