Donor support of opposition parties in Namibia. How foreign support for parties effects democracy in a new democracy.

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Introduction:

Questions have emerged in academic and political discussions about the relevance and effectiveness of foreign donor support of opposition parties in democracies that emerged or re-emerged since the Cold War. They concern the effects of foreign support on political systems and democracy itself. Finally, trying gauge how effective support is on particular countries?

In a global historical context, political party support has been a favoured instrument of European and North American governments in foreign policy. Forms of support vary, the more visible and noticeable normally being military assistance to countries like South Vietnam, Taiwan and Guatemala. During the Cold War this support was deemed necessary to block the spread of Communism. During that period democracy and support of parties normally took a back seat for to blocking Communism; thus, Western nations tolerated and supported regimes like Chile, Indonesia and Zaire, even if these supported governments were immoral and authoritarian in nature.

The historical record reveals support of parties, not as opportunism or self-interest, but rather as a political response by a social movement in Western countries ranging from organizations opposing Apartheid affiliated to the solidarity movement. This broad movement was an outlet for society to express its distaste on global issues like nuclear proliferation and more regional or isolated topic like the Vietnam War, civil wars, human rights advocacy and immoral rule, such as minority white rule in Southern Rhodesia and the Apartheid systems guaranteeing continued white rule in South Africa and Namibia.
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The solidarity movement lobbied their governments to combat these immoralities. Support depended on the situation. The north-south\(^1\) of character support for the anti-Apartheid movements saw governments fund and support liberation movements, and use their standings in global institutions to lobby worldwide support for these movements.

With independence came new questions, for these solidarity-based donors asked whether the shared historic political connections still existed, or whether they should be adjusted to accommodate the notion of opposition in these newly independent countries. Donors acknowledged that since the end of the Cold War the political party has become a granted factor in democracies. In an era when democracy is seen as the only moral form of power, much more international support has supported the functioning of political parties in order to create or maintain the possibility of campaigning on being an effective alternative power. But what if political parties cannot meet this standard? Should foreigners support parties which fall short of democratic standards or which suffer from ineffectiveness? If so, how useful is such support?

This paper will examine the effects of donor support of opposition parties on Namibian democracy. But this central research question elicits other crucial questions:

- How does the international community justify its support of opposition parties around the world?
- What are the prevailing conditions of a political system which lead donors to support opposition parties?

These questions are applicable to many variables, e.g., case studies, which can refer to states and political parties. Thus this paper will examine one particular case variable, Namibia, and the political parties operating there. Adding the variable Namibia to the discussion gives rise to further questions:

- What is the state of opposition parties in Namibia?
- What forms of support have Namibian parties received and from whom?
- Crucially how have Namibian parties reacted to support?

**Theoretical parameters:**

Donor support of opposition parties falls mainly under the scholarly discipline of political science, with great relevance in development studies. Within these two disciplines, this topic of support of opposition parties falls into the broader debate of democratisation, intervention, social movements and political parties/groupings. Vibrant foundations in both liberal and Marxist thought, a debate that is ever more crucial in any study of African politics, lend further credence and relevance to these theoretical points.

Democratic theory has evolved to represent the liberal definitions of the ultimate and sole legitimate rule over any nation state. Liberal democracy refers to a democratic rule that upholds the sanctity of liberal ideas of freedoms such as freedom of press, assembly, movement and multi-party elections, characteristics which alleged illiberals ignore. The implanting of these liberal agendas would ultimately enable the transition from authoritarian regimes to ones established through democratic choice, or more simply put, through democratisation.

Democracy thus has moved from a potential mode of governance to the only universally recognised form of rule. In addition definitions and theoretical parameters have shifted from being understood as an authority to being increasingly recognised as a system of thought equating to a way of political life in which means liberal democratisfreedoms are supposed to be harnessed and exercised by a national people, or in other words a democratic society.

The transformation of democracy into the lone accepted mode of rule has been remarkable, because it is perceived in Africa as being a foreign transplant and not an indigenous mode of government. Thus scholarship mainly concentrates on the interaction of democracy with the post-colonial political space, including how society interacts with the reality this political system provides. Though scholars still debate the merits of democracy on the continent, Western analysis advocates democratic regimes as the only legitimate forms of rule, and does not consider other alternatives from the past such as single-party states or other forms of governance that fall short of democratic standards, which might provide better state delivery of authority in Africa.

In particular relation to Africa, Marxists observe that democratisation as a foreign imposition has great implications for societal dynamics that in turn potentially threaten
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democratic rule. By empahsing societal factionalism, that high lights tribal or ethnic divisions along with socio-economic factors usually described through inequality and debate ont neo-patrimonial networks. This leads some democratic discussions to moves towards inter tribal relations and ethnic politics clouding the idealist merits of a liberal democracy.

This paper forms an argument around the definition of democracy as a series of rules and laws enacted by the state to ensure the decisions of leaders are upheld in the public domain. This is representative of contemporary literature on African democracy\textsuperscript{2}. This definition is suitable because it provides a legal platform that defines the prevailing capacity of states’ acceptance of popular choice. Also, political parties interact with the national legal frameworks, so that they are a crucial indicator of the health of a liberal political system. Ultimately their relevancy to this paper uses democracy as a political process in which political parties participate. Hence the debate is centred around the political party makes the social dynamic irrelevant, because this paper looks at the behaviour of these parties and democratic climate and not their influences on society.

Intervention, the act of outside interfering under particular circumstances, has echoed a common Marxist critique of the donor relationship. This term evokes an imperialism of political ideals superimposed through abusing poorer countries’ need for aid and capital. Interventions, especially through aid agendas, are normally seen as top-down, north–to-south relationships, which in turn are generally viewed as unequal and hierarchical in nature through dependence on funds and support.

Since the end of the Cold War the support-and-intervention paradigm has been the prominent in theory. But during the Cold War, interventions were seen differently, when the world was increasingly characterized by ideological lines between countries. A network of support benefited groups and parties defending moral and liberal democracy and the search universal justice and rights in immoral authoritarian countries. Campaigning by European publics for social and global justice influenced the actions of their own governments to take a stand and to act on these global issues.

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The “North-South direction” character of solidarity support was a critical factor in the success of many African liberation movements. Like other Southern African anti-Apartheid movements, Namibian groups received support from European governments and political parties, with the only real condition being that these liberation movements make progress in their struggle against white rule. The condition permitted the European partners to campaign for these groups’ broader global legitimacy. Ultimately the relationship was not immutable, because the anti-Apartheid cause was the key to this support. After independence the relationship became bilateral, and the former solidarity based relationship seemingly disappeared with Apartheid in Namibia. Or has it?

Lastly, this project tackles the difference between opposition forces since the initiation of the Namibian liberation politics. As will be seen, there is a rather rich history of oppositional politics in Namibian political history since 1959. Some of these opposition parties were not seen as a liberation groups, which were seen as using varying forms of passive (campaigning) or aggressive (armed action) politics to achieve the end of South African rule. This paper defines parties a having an adequate organisation and hierarchy, and an active civil or peaceful political agenda, even if there is also a prominent military component. This distinction is significant for the paper, because one of the central themes of this paper is the successful transition of liberation parties to legitimate political parties acting on the Namibian power scene and representing an independent emancipated society which enjoys the very liberal characteristics of democracy.

The international imperative for Namibian existence:

Foreign influences have been a prominent component in effecting change in Namibia from the initial German canonicalization, through the South African rule until independence. In addition this continued foreign predominance ultimately decided the political space and opportunity for varying degrees of opposition through violence and

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3 Kössler, Reinhardt and Melber, Henning ‘The West German Solidarity movement with the liberation straggles in Southern Africa: A (self-)critical retrospective’ Engels, Ulf and
cohesion. They permanently transformed Namibian (South West African) social and economic conditions.

Initially during German rule and the first decades of the South African mandate, Namibian political groups grew from labour unions or groupings connected with existing groups in South Africa. With the advent of Apartheid, oppositional activity increased. Groupings like the predecessors of the South West Africa People’s Organisations (hereafter SWAPO), the Owambo People’s Congress founded by Namibian stevedores at the port of Cape Town, the Owambo People’s Organisation, as well as Herero political formations like the Marxist-oriented South West Africa Union (hereafter SWANU) and a more conservative break-away National Unity Democratic Organisation (hereafter NUDO) appeared. Each of these parties interacted with the ruling South African authorities differently. NUDO engaged with South African-supported political organization, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (hereafter DTA), which was seen as a party supposedly both to help legitimize South African rule and at the same time to become a viable political alternative to SWAPO.

Both SWAPO and SWANU were created in order to counter the prevailing South African authority in reaction to the political environment of Apartheid policies. Where SWANU sought a peaceful solution to the Namibian issue, SWAPO pressed on with a military solution against the South African security establishment. Both parties saw the need to create international contacts to gain for themselves international recognition as the legitimate representatives of the Namibian people.

SWANU initially had an extensive network of officials lobbying for support in countries like United States, Sweden and the Soviet Union, but their connections and relations would suffer because of SWANU’s favourable relations with China.\(^4\) Crucially, that the South African authorities allowed SWANU to operate within Namibia provided the party space to work with the South African authorities to find alternative solutions, while remaining relatively independent from the South African political machinery.

Arrest warrants for SWAPO’s president, Sam Nujoma, and the resulting narrowed political space in Namibia caused SWAPO to be structured as a party in exile. SWAPO found immediate support with leftist African regimes, which permitted it to set up its first

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\(^4\) Hopwood, Graham “Guide to Namibian Politics” Namibian Institute for Democracy, Windhoek, 2008
headquarters in Dar es Salaam, the capital of then–Tanganyika, under the protection of President Julius Nyerere. Other left-leaning African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt also took up SWAPO’s cause. Their support was vital for SWAPO’s gaining the recognition of the Organisation of African Unity (hereafter OAU) in 1965.

Very early on, SWAPO saw benefits of gaining additional support beyond the African continent. Therefore, SWAPO sent officials to many European capitals on both sides of the Iron Curtain and a strong contingent of party officials to New York, where SWAPO maintained a permanent delegation at the United Nations, in order to campaign for the world body’s recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people on the global political level. This recognition ultimately came with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

Resolution 435 represented a change in world opinion toward the Namibian conflict. Gone was the post-World War I ideal of mandates and trusteeships that awarded South Africa control of the former German South West Africa. But ultimately it was a public relations victory for both SWAPO and the global solidarity movement that campaigned against the Apartheid system. The solidarity movement’s success was due to the strong involvement of European political parties which campaigned on issues with their publics. Such concerned support made parties take sides on decisive issues held within in the solidarity movement (such as nuclear proliferation and disgust over the US-led Vietnam War) such as the Apartheid movement.

This proved invaluable for European governments, because most European parties found the Apartheid system morally reprehensible. This allowed parties that had already created political foundations to help anti-Apartheid movements to initiate contact with liberations movements like SWAPO and the African National Congress in ways governments could not.

West Germany’s political foundations (Stiftungen) were quite involved in the anti-Apartheid movement, in both West Germany and the Southern African region. Although, these party foundations appeared to be independent of official government policy, many of their funds originated from the German taxpayer. This mask allowed the German
government to support solidarity-based initiatives without a perceived stress in bilateral relations.

Other European governments also engaged with SWAPO and other anti-Apartheid movements. Probably the most visible in their support of the end of white rule in southern Africa was Sweden under the Social Democratic government. High-ranking Social Democratic officials like the late Olof Palme were prominent and vocal in their support. Along with moral and propaganda support, Sweden’s government provided assistance in logistics and essential services for SWAPO refugee camps, freeing up resources and manpower to allow SWAPO’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (hereafter PLAN) to pursue liberation.

Crucially, Sweden and its fellow Nordic countries of Norway and Finland actively campaigned, lobbied and promoted Namibian liberation with the international community in relevant international organisations like the United Nations as well as with other governments essential in setting global opinion like the US, UK and the USSR. They sought to legitimise SWAPO as the rightful authority in Namibia.

Judging the success of political support for SWAPO is dependent on the ultimate results and interests of European governments’ interests in an independent Namibia. By meeting the concerns of their public, who had mobilized into a social movement advocating a message against global injustice and a search of a moral conclusion, like the end of Apartheid, the halting of hostilities in Vietnam, influced greatly politicians of western governments. Though it has been argued that the solidarity movement was the key to Namibia achieving independence, in fact the political parties were key to enabling allowing interaction between SWAPO officials and European publics. In addition they were fundamental in contacts and lobbying global support for liberations movements like SWAPO. In other words European political parties provided access between the solidarity movement and liberation parties and most importantly European political parties.

The global connections between European and Namibian movements shifted after independence in 1990. For Namibia, the anti-Apartheid solidarity support from the behalf of the European public ended, and the search for justice and moral rule had finally
been achieved, and the active European members simply moved on in life to other pursuits or careers\(^5\) that were not necessary concerned with Namibia.

As for political parties, the relationship had changed as well. The circumstance and labels changed. For ruling parties in Europe, relations were not based on compassion through a north-south dynamic or support a liberation party, but rather based on prevailing interest and bilateral government-to-government relations. For political party foundations the north-south dynamic was still relevant, but the nature for support shifted from support of a liberation struggle to improving a democratic system that they had been influential in creating. For the first time political party foundations were able to have representatives on the ground in Namibia, as opposed to offering support from a distance during the liberation struggle, and able to target their activities to affect a larger proportion of society, both directly and indirectly through their support of Namibian political parties.

Unfortunately Namibian politics have been increasingly characterised by the emergence of a gerontocracy, whose long-serving members manoeuvre to stay in power or rise politically. When the path is blocked, politicians searched elsewhere for political power in outside avenues such as in the formation of own political parties. Thus far, these parties are not able to contest SWAPO’s dominance; instead their campaigning is to be the official opposition. But even competition within the opposition space is problematic, because the differences among the parties are very unclear, as is evident in the lack of difference in party manifestos, the only visible differences are who these parties represent, such as ethnic groups and or regional or racial/tribal demographics.

Ultimately the once active support for Namibian parties has faded, due to the dominant nature of the SWAPO party in political life and culture in Namibia. Any support of other parties has been vilified as subversive to not only SWAPO but also the state, thus determining the line between the state and SWAPO is becoming increasingly difficult.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Kössler, Reinhardt and Melber, Henning ‘The West German Solidarity movement with the liberation stragglers in Southern Africa: A (self-)critical retrospective’s Engels, Ulf and

Hence it is easy to concur with André du Pisani and William Lindeke when they write:

“The international community, while providing some support to civil society processes and groups... Opposition parties are largely off limits for such support. International support for democratic institutions, practices, and values can be seen as support for the choices of SWAPO at independence.”

Although donors including some political party foundations are highly involved in supporting civil society organisations such as the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Namibian Institute for Democracy and the Namibian Society for Human Rights, they are discretely concerned about the strength of Namibian political parties and the democratic culture of this southern African country.

But to say that the parties remain off limits to foreign support would not be an exact assertion. As this paper will show, foreign support of opposition parties is an extension of the solidarity movement to post-independence foreign connections but with re-defined parameters, emphasizing the creation of a strong and capable opposition in a Namibian political system characterised by dominance of a single party that the public has created and consistently validated through free elections.

Crucially, this paper will ask and look at how the contemporary relationship between political parties in both Europe and in Namibian and its effects on democracy in Namibia.

In order to do so, the argument will be centred on one central thematic line ‘Donor support of opposition parties in Namibia’. Each chapter has a central premise around this topical line. The first chapter will look at donor support, most crucially the argument accounts for the promotion and support of democracy, which emphasises and debates historical and contemporary trends of support, not only democracy but also in addressing paradigms surrounding supporting political parties. Ultimately this chapter asks why donors support political parties.

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The second chapter will concentrate on the domestic circumstances prevailing in many political system parties in Africa and especially Namibia, namely the emergence of single party dominance in African democracies that emerged in the post-Cold-War Africa. This chapter thus examines the actual and potential weaknesses of the Namibian domestic political system, and asks what effects donor support of opposition parties would have in the domestic arena. In this section a fundamental question will be the domestic condition of the present political space in Africa and ever more crucially certain important fundamental characteristics of African political parties that test the current Eurocentric theoretical parameters of political party theory.

The third chapter provides a history of both significant political parties currently prevailing in Namibia and the personalities behind these parties. The wonderment behind Namibian politics is found in the history of parties, and how the gerontocracy that has emerged is fundamental not only to the creation of political parties, in which personalities constantly search for power, but also create highly personalised parties in general. Crucially the third chapter shows how SWAPO gained its dominance.

The fourth chapter looks at elections and the prevailing electoral systems. This chapter shows that SWAPO’s emergence as the dominant party was not through the use of state resources but through popular consent. In addition this chapter looks at a potential difference in political climate if there were a different electoral system. This will highlight that the current electoral system is most suitable for the opposition, and is the most ideal one for the donors to support, because it provides greater access to political parties.

The fifth and final chapter sums up the entire argument of the effects on democracy through donor support of opposition parties, where both the actual support and the potential effects that this has on Namibian partners.

This paper emphasizes the international dynamics of Namibian independence and the difficulty the ruling party SWAPO had in adjusting to contemporary post-independence political party. This paper and this argument highlight many of the crucial and central issues prevailing in the Namibian political culture. Thus this paper not only provides a broader debate of supporting opposition parties, but a critique of opposition parties themselves.
The conclusions of this paper are based on six months’ fieldwork conducted in Namibia. This involved three months of archival research sifting through newspapers covering predetermined relevant dates that were high points in the oppositional culture in Namibia, and key moments of international cooperation between international groups and parties inside Namibia. An affiliation at the Institute of Public Policy Research, without a doubt one of the most respected think tanks in Namibia, provided contacts which facilitated follow-up interviews with members of the Namibian opposition and European representatives of political party organisations in both Namibia and Sweden.
1. Democratic Support:

To begin this exploration of the effects of foreign support of opposition parties in any country, it is important to explore the reasoning and circumstance of support for democratic projects and political parties. This chapter diagnostically explores the features of the international donors’ motives for supporting democracy, and the emergence of opposition parties to be the weakest democratic institution in post-third-wave democracies. John Haberson, Thomas Carothers and Inge Amundsen have advanced the analysis of foreign assistance of democracy, because they ask fundamental questions about foreign support.

As we will see below, all three authors maintain that democratisation as a political discourse emerged at the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980’s., Hence at the start of the 1990’s a plethora of democratic transitions in most regions of the world transformed previously undemocratic authoritarian regimes into democratic systems. In academic scholarship a surge of academic writings introduced post-Cold-War paradigms, such as foreign support of opposition parties. The authors differ in their approaches, explanations, and questions of motives and reasons for foreign supported opposition.

The first author, John Haberson, examines the effects of democratisation on domestic democratic systems, and the political economic rationale behind multilateral institutions. The second author, Thomas Carothers, shows how support for democracy is an essential project for many countries, but his main focus is the United States. Carothers second article investigates why donors support opposition parties. Lastly, Inge Amundsen examines the possible effects of supporting political parties on the political party culture of the target country.
John Haberson,\textsuperscript{8} questions the legitimacy of foreign-assisted democratic transitions towards theories of democracy and democratisation, and how they are implemented through development policy initiated by the World Bank. Concluding that measuring the outcomes of foreign-assisted democracy in Africa is difficult, he finds that there has been no effective coherent donor strategy which translates to a weak theoretical reality for analyzing or measuring the success and understanding of democratic assistance.

Haberson traces the origins of modern foreign-assisted democratisation to the World Bank in the 1960’s. At this time the Bank created a strategy that benefits of democratic culture for labour in the newly independent markets. Instead of providing a political spin, the Bank rationalised the benefits of democracy in economic terms. Under McNamara\textsuperscript{9} the Bank observed that labour in post-independence economies was more efficient with fewer materials available, than their counterparts in more technologically advanced industrial countries. In order to maximise the full economic potential, it was widely believed, that in a more participatory political climate this marginalised labour sector would take more initiative in deciding the direction of its economic activity, ultimately raising workers out of poverty. On this basis a political economy of democracy was formulated. This development potential caused the United States government to re-write its democratisation policy.

Before the advent of structural adjustment in the 1980’s, the World Bank supported civil society programs that were seen not only to boost the democratic culture, but also to make political actors aware of domestic political conditions. In the 1980’s, while continuing support civil society NGO’s, the Bank took a more invasive stance in democratisation assistance. Haberson indicates that there was room in the new economically oriented structural adjustment aid regime for a democratisation agenda than in the prior World Bank thinking. Haberson notes that structural adjustment came at an interesting time during the intensification of the Cold War on the African continent. Those countries who subscribed to the Bank’s program saw the implementation of free-


\textsuperscript{9} Robert McNamara, was Secretary of Defence during the Kennedy administration and was widely seen as the main architect behind the Vietnam War. He resigned and was made head of the World Bank.
market principles, which meant that the state had to step back from the market by
privatising state assets and lifting economic regulations. This new economic reality
allowed civil servants to benefit from access to a secondary economy.

Haberson questions whether there was any clear correlation between pressures of
economic liberalisation and democratisation. He asks what the international and
domestic pressures were for democratisation. He argues that, while there were clear
international and domestic economic pressures for liberalization, the same could not be
said for democratisation, because even though there were some domestic pressure, there
were no clear benefits on international level from democratisation.

With this in mind, Haberson mentions several possible motives for foreign
interest in democratisation. First, Haberson argues that the Democratic Peace theory
played a possible role. This traditional hypothesis designed for the North American and
European reality posits that democratic regimes never go to war with each other; instead
democracies negotiate problems and issues between themselves. War and conflict would
happen when one of the parties is undemocratic and irrational in nature. But Haberson
questions whether future democratic regimes will always refrain from conflict.

A second axis of theory, political mobilization or organisation that could effect
and maintain the two previous systems, such as government institutions and independent
think tanks. But Haberson acknowledges that this parallel theory was not designed for
African states but rather more for Southern European or South or Central American
middle income countries. According to Haberson this is due to the lack of organisational
capacities and financial constraints inhibiting these countries’ fiscal autonomy.
Accordingly Haberson stresses stronger institutional organisations are supposed to
reinforce the democratic ideas, and thus economic development is supposed to increase
and attract foreign investment.

The third theoretical reason for external support, Haberson claims, is to enhance
the potential negotiating fability of political parties. According to Haberson, political
parties need to be indispensable partners in any democratic transitions. Political parties
need to counter the power of old regime, which could maintain power through an
affective resistance to a democratic transition. Thus foreign support effects a more
democratic transition where there is a shift in power away from the national old guard.
Haberson stresses that these reasons for support were not specifically designed for European and American realities rather than African ones. Haberson argues that if you were to support an opposition organisation a suitable level of socioeconomic development would need to be reached in order for a self-sustainability of these institutions. This presents a critical question: If the state has adequately placated society through economic development and sustainable growth, does an interest exist in society supporting political parties and organisations?

Haberson describes the assisted democratisations projects as being an ever-changing component of US and Bank policy, accommodating the Carter policies of human rights through democracy. For the most part, he asserts that the current image of direct support for democratic institutions is credited to the George Herbert Walker Bush and Clinton Administrations. The attitude was that democracy is American identity in the global arena and that democratic achievements would parallel economic progress. Thus Washington and donors proposed a series of democratic objectives: free and fair elections, enhanced and strengthened government institutions; where intelligent representation and state service could be provided to the public, an enhanced civil society, leadership or executive accountability, transparent and law steadfast government apparatus and lastly democratic values. This factor according to Haberson is aimed towards the institutions that engage with political authority of the state like political parties or leaders. This is more aimed at institutions of civil societies and media. Haberson acknowledges that there are significant ambiguities in pursuing all of these objectives. And the problems are not confined to one sector such as human deficiencies, organisational shortcomings. Thus he argues that a more nuanced approach in structural capacity building must be a critical concern in foreign-assisted implementation.

Haberson maintains that the effectiveness of US and Bank policy in Africa had to be analyzed with two key factors. First, in order to look at the political capacities and the effectiveness of this support to the national democratic political context; second, the ways that the created democratic institutions are able to work independent and react accordingly during democratic activities and contests.

Haberson argues that that in order to judge implementation has to be achieved through an agreement on how development pathways go forward between policymakers.
and academia because they run parallel to one another. Haberson argues that there are great flaws in with both policy makers and academics, if there are greater interconnections between both become more objective. On the ground these policies are implemented by aid agencies with a democratic agenda. Haberson maintains that these agendas are not the sole domain of the United States, but that other countries like the United Kingdom also have democratic agenda at their aid missions. However, each country’s different objectives in different parts in Africa, Haberson asserts, can be seen in the expenditures by fiscal year.

The first Failing to contextualise political realities in African countries, has resulted in organisations failure to understand why democratic institutions. And unfortunately the existing policy does not conform to the existing theory. The second crucial failure to contextualise African realities is that political leaders are not as enthusiastic as donors are. Governments which are not necessary open to the democratic ideas also reflect their opinions on society, thus stifling or hindering the ultimate success of democratic projects.

Ultimately, the rather open-ended debate of foreign-assisted democracy questions the theoretical boundaries of political science. More importantly Haberson claims the gap between policy and scholarship does not provide objective perspectives for policy makers in decision making. And lastly and most crucially is the difficulty of measuring successes.

By providing an argument based on the premise of political economy of democracy, it does not explain the classic Cold War paradigm of why certain undemocratic regimes were courted by Washington, a prominent variable in Haberson’s argument. Thomas Carothers\textsuperscript{10} fills this void in Haberson’s argument. He argues that United States policy for democracy was opportunistic in nature, or in other words democracy would be supported if it advanced American interests.

Carothers critically analyzes democratic foreign assistance in general, although his analysis is heavily concentrated on US efforts. This is evident in his concise account of US efforts overseas. He claims that since World War II there has been a clear

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initiative in spreading democracy around the world, in particularly since the Kennedy administration.

Democratisation was not the defining element of in US foreign policy. The programmes were defined by where the United States government saw an opportunity or gain for US interests. This meant that if democracy could not maintain capitalist systems, the US was equally keen on supporting pro-capitalist, anti-Communist authoritarian regimes.

Carothers, maintains a highly politically centred account does place some onus on economic reasons, but this was through American institutes, labour unions and think tanks both domestically and abroad, in their attempts to promote capitalist economics and mobilisations or energisation of labour policies that bring marginalised productive groups into political representations, in order to lift them out of poverty.

Throughout his piece, Carothers is very careful to stress the extreme difficulty of measuring the influences of US democratic assistance. But Carothers maintains that the US was not responsible for the third wave of democracy. Because even though there was some pressure applied to the undemocratic regimes that were supported by the US, other regimes that were affiliated to Soviet and Communist bloc regimes had brewing social pressures for democratic reforms. He maintains that many of former communist regimes transitions came about from social pressures within the countries triggered by the change in the bi-polar world order.

Ultimately Carothers views foreign-assisted democratisation as a positive force, because eventually it created a more peaceful and less conflict-ridden world. He does acknowledge the activities of other countries’ policies and the institutions which have democratic agendas. He maintains the importance of the US’ retaining central role in democratic assistance, although he stresses the risks of the installation of democratic regimes through military means.¹¹ He emphasizes the need to improve current programs, in order to measure the results of such support. Until now measuring any success or effectiveness of such assistance has been enormously difficult.

¹¹ This work was published before the Iraq war, were one of the justifications by the Bush administration was to bring democracy to Iraq

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For this paper one has to ask whether a democratic system that appears to work for a country needs improvements from the outside.

One issue that Carothers mentions only in passing throughout his analysis is political party assistance in support of democracy overseas. He instead targets political party support in a later publication where he asserts that the political parties already nationally active are one of the main problems new democracies face in achieving formidable and efficient systems.12

In this book Carothers clearly analyzes why political parties need to be funded. He examines first fundamental problems and characteristics of political parties in new recently transitioned democracies and then the reaction of opposition party leaders to their own party problems.

Carothers describes political parties in all regions of the world as institutions based around the egos and personalities of their leaders, who use the parties as personal vehicles for their own personal political advancement. In many cases, the leaders are thoroughly corrupt and otherwise socially and politically questionable.

Carothers recognises an emerging phenomenon called “Electoralist from the state syndrome”. This term describes the short lengths of time that young politicians have to create a political party which is immediately thrown into electoral campaigning instead of establishing itself in civil society. Consequently, these parties’ first contests in electoral elections produce negative results. In addition party electoral failures could also indicate a questionable rule of law, systems of increasing presidential power, and increasing poverty. But here, as throughout the book, he cannot equate the issues of the new democracies with those of the more established mass parties in Europe and North America.

The second part of Carothers analysis starts by introducing the donor actors from both Europe and North America. Here he present the German Stiftungen (foundations), the American institutes, Swedish centres and democratic advocacy organisations like the American National Endowment for Democracy, and democratic programs of the United Nations Development Program and Organisation for economic cooperation in Europe, in

addition what he calls supraparty organisations found in United Kingdom Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the Dutch Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Norwegian Centre for Democracy and Finnish Demos. All of these organisations are affiliated to their respected country, the legislatures of which allocate to parties funds in proportion to their representation in their respective national legislatures.

Carothers asks what party aid is. He maintains that direct support is difficult to examine, but the overall goal is to stimulate party reform in order to improve effectiveness, like through campaign support, instead he maintains the most common form of party support, such as election aid, support of civil society, legislative capacity building,

With these activities in mind, Carothers proposed overall objectives for foreign assistance to a political party. First a formidable party structure with a transparent and capable party administration. There should be an efficient internal democratic system in which the party leader and other senior party persons are elected by democratic elections and not appointed. Carothers asserts an ideal outcome for donors is a capable, elaborate party leadership that can analyse and critique issues and policies on the nation agenda in the broader political debate. Parties should be able to create a party ideological standpoint that avoids ideological extremes. The emergence and utilisation of capabilities which allow for an effective alternative authority in either the legislative and executive branches of government, or a national presence for opposition parties around the country at all levels of representation. The creation of a formidable, credible and independent wealthy membership, who have connections and ability access to the party leadership and administration. Fostering a good efficient youth program, to introduce and provide experience and access to the up and coming political authority.

Like his last publication, Carothers said that improvements need to be made in donor support of political parties, because political parties are the weakest link in the chain in a democracy, because they fall short on adequate representation in the political system. And the objectives above are clear, but are they feasible to each and every country? Can donors actually sell these objectives to political parties in Africa?

Carothers analysis takes political parties as a variable, and that donor support will target just them. He does not necessarily concern himself with the space in which parties
have to work. And fails to address the relationships between parties in an environment in which fiscal, material and intellectual donor activity and capital are present. Inge Amundsen\textsuperscript{13} fills this void by studying the effects of donor support of opposition parties on the political party culture within countries. He provides three theoretical problems: \textit{intervention}, \textit{fragmentation} and \textit{polarisation}.

\textit{Intervention} means concern expressed whether party decisions are credible and free of any pressure or foreign influence. \textit{Fragmentation}, refers to a where disproportionate amount of support or support in general fragments the political party culture by providing financial or other types of incentives that allows receiving parties greater ability and access to resources that other parties might not have. \textit{Polarisation} refers to enhances political and social distances between parties along ideological divides.

The problems that Amundsen present are perceived theoretical paradigms, that Amundsen acknowledges would happen at domestic democratic cultures. As it is very apparent he does not see necessarily see donor-recipient relationship as a power one (except intervention). Instead he views the debate of foreign support of opposition parties as not centred on the transnational connections between political parties. Like Carothers, Amundsen expresses concern about support at the macro-level but the real concern in the national political party scene

Like Carothers, Amundsen introduces the donors, but unlike Carothers, he provides a more detailed account of each political party foundation or institute and its parent political party. Crucially Amundsen provides lists of countries in which the individual institutes or foundations are active. Though not stating the obvious, Amundsen shows how extensive and global the support of opposition parties, he lists organisations and the countries that they are active in, it is clear that many of these organisations have interests in different regions of the world.

\textbf{Conclusion:}

The three authors analysed above provide key theoretical descriptions of foreign-assisted democracy.

\textsuperscript{13} Amundsen, Inge \textit{“Donor Support to Political Parties Status and Principles”} CMI, Bergen, 2007
Haberson\textsuperscript{14} provided a reasoning of foreign-assisted democracy along the lines of a political economic rationale. But ultimately one has to ask, whether there is a strong correlation between labour participation in politics and the nature of democracy prevailing in a particular country. More importantly, can Haberson’s account fully conform to every new democratic regime?

Carothers\textsuperscript{15} provides one crucial question to this debate: What interest do foreign countries have in improving democracies overseas? Or in this paper’s case, what motives would the international donor community have in improving Namibian democracy? Carothers’ second publication asserting that political parties are the weakest link in democracy’s chain due to lack of party delivery in the democratic process.\textsuperscript{16} His assertion that supporting political parties strengthens the democratic culture and process in countries, and by providing a detail list of donor objectives, provides the background reasoning of support for opposition parties. He opens himself up to critical analysis of support activities around the world. For the most part how feasible are the donor objectives? How can these assisted objectives correlate to the local say Namibian reality? Crucially how effective are these programs at the party level?

Amundsen\textsuperscript{17} looked at a local political party space in where there is active foreign support. Whereas for Carothers and Haberson the main concern is on the donors, Amundsen maintains that the real debate should be focused on the recipient’s domestic environment. The most crucial question from his work is how the problems Amundsen sees apply to particular countries like Namibia. Lastly, are the problems he presents necessarily problems for a Namibian reality?

Amundsen is correct that ultimately the debate about foreign support of opposition parties does not necessarily place the donors at the centre. But one must take into account the possible motives for supporting political parties which we saw above,
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such as the strengthening of democratic fundamentals in recipient countries. This then assumes a less than ideal democratic political system prevailing in recipient countries.
2.) Political systems and parties:

**Prevailing African democratic conditions**

The last chapter introduced the core questions of modes and reasoning behind international support of opposition parties. It also raised a question that centred about the national and domestic conditions prevailing in the new democracies, thereby explaining the ambiguities that both future authors and donors might encounter, crucially observing political systems.

The last decade of the 20th century saw a series of democratic transitions in Africa and other parts of the world. Commonly known as the \textit{third wave} of democracy, the transitions not only presented an apparent new democratic political reality to African publics, but they also ushered in a new field of research, namely examining the quality of democracy. As we will see below Nicolas van de Walle examines a new trend emerging since 1990, that of dominant single party rule.

This chapter will examine three authors covering two essential features of democratic studies in Africa. The first we will look at in Nicolas van de Walle's article on single party dominance and the resulting presidentialism in 5 Africa since the wave of democratisation. The second article is by Gero Erdmann, who argues that African political parties are distinct from those in European and North American democracies. Finally, a forthcoming article by Andre du Pisani and William Lindeke on Namibian political parties foreshadowing the following chapters will be examined in the light of the van de Walle and Erdmann articles.
Nicolas van de Walle extracted from a quantitative overview key trends from African democratic contests. His salient observation is that parties voted into power in the first multiparty elections after 1990 were still in power and maintained their control through use of state resources. Most emerging political systems are dominated by a single party, while an overwhelmed, weak opposition consists of numerous feeble parties. A third conclusion is that party cleavages evolved along ethnic lines.

Democratisation and the subsequent transitions brought to power a new political authority riding the wave of popular support through democratic contests. Van de Walle indicates that most of these parties have retained power since their emergence into power. A majority in the legislature and victory of the same parties' presidential candidate is the formula for systematic process of maintaining power for the long run. Another concern of Van de Walle is that some of these new parties are re-constituted remnants of old single party regimes, which win immense support in democratic contests, and re-establish themselves as the dominant party through a number of mechanisms.

The overriding reason for this occurrence is the use of levers of state power and resources to maintain power through control of the press, radio, and television outlets, and the use of the state apparatus and state positions for legalized violence. Lastly, the ruling party would be able to use state resources to marginalise dissent and opposition parties.

Van de Walle emphasizes the use of resources. It is an overriding factor in determining the atmosphere of party systems. It ultimately determines the mode of rule with the society, especially pertaining to the behaviour of the leadership. The overwhelming power of the president is confirmed and by a dominant party holding a majority in the legislative branch. Van de Walle refers to this phenomenon as "presidentialism". Such favourable circumstances allow the ruling party to rule in a manner which might or might not conform to the national constitution. Common constitutional amendments are presidential term limits, like in Namibia and Zimbabwe but failed in Zambia.

The dominance within the legislature is not the only manipulation of state

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Van de Walle argues that one large problem with African political parties is their relatively young ages. The average age of African parties is roughly about 50-60 years, while more established Latin American parties are 100+ years old.

Van de Walle maintains that the vast majority of political parties that emerged during the 1980’s and in the lead-up to the 1990’s swarm of democratic transitions were founded as extensions of civil society, labour unions and business associations during the eras of authoritarian rule. These parties enjoyed the first advantages of a liberalised democratic system in the 1990’s.

Democracy fostered the formation of an enormous number of political parties in African countries. With more parties competing for support, the more formidable opposition parties could not receive an optimum amount of votes. Instead many of these parties won only one or two seats in the legislature. This diffusion of support around more parties instead of fewer parties consolidating their support to emerge as formidable opposition provides the parties a greater social contract.

Van de Walle says that African political systems seem to defy mainstream political science which posits a transitional phenomenon of consolidation of opposition parties as electoral systems progress. In Africa, he notes, more parties contested the second round of elections than did the first round.

These opposition parties do not take an ideological line. Van de Walle argues the electorate have therefore no real choice among a variety of political stances, because parties generally campaign along similar lines. Partly because of their weak nature, the opposition parties, whom try to maintain the little support they have and have immense difficulty gain further support outside their established networks. He states that the political cleavages defined by party ideology have shifted in Africa from being concerned with social indicators to ethnic and linguistic cleavages.
They opposition parties do not conform to the models of the mass parties so prevalent in the North American and European democracies. The intrinsic shifts in political cleavages which favour ethnic and linguistic promote the appearance of ethnically based parties as opposed to socially and economically based parties as predicted in classic democratic theory. In a dominant party political environment, opposition political parties are frustrated in their attempts to counter the ruling authority. Thus the African opposition parties’ effectiveness is hindered vis-a-vis the dominant party by the lack of a mass base and the narrowness of their ethnic appeal.

Van de Walle argues that the appearance of single dominant party in national politics creates an environment in which ruling party officials and opposition party members do not communicate with one another in a democratic space. Presidentialism is another feature that has emerged a personalisation of rule since the 1990’s. In countries that have not had a turnover of presidents in office, their rule and their authority begin to resemble their personality and their own personal outcomes as opposed to outcomes that were defined by national demands.

Weakened political parties and presidentialism come together with clientelism. Patronage and kinship connections give access to political power and state resources. Van de Walle argues that these relationships are based on loyalty from the state level to its patronage and are often defined by ethnicity. These relationships are directed towards ethnic group’s rural home areas. He maintains that the relationships are reciprocal because the state would gain incredible support and legitimacy from the beneficiaries of this patronage.

Van de Walle proposes an analytical distinction, that African political parties abide by a different set of social cleavages that ultimately determine the character, policy and stance of power; and infers that the cleavages are based on ethnic linguistic terms instead. However, he does not examine this hypothesis, an absence being a testament to the broader lack of exact parameters and definitions of African political parties. Inherent Western biases in the criteria and typology of Western scholarship are partly to blame.
Gero Erdmann\textsuperscript{19} furthers Carothers’ \textit{Weakest Link} statement by accounting the follies in western understanding of past African political party research. In the 1960’s when the first African countries were emerging into independent sovereign countries, Western scholarship applied the European mass party system to emerging African parties, to no avail. One significant difficulty in applying this model was the lack of formal party institutions which are crucial in Europe. With the re-emergence of democratic systems in Africa during the 1990’s, interest in African political parties reappeared as well. There was little to build upon. African party research was still trying to grapple with the theories surrounding African political parties in the 1970s. That same decade saw the emergence of authoritarian and military rule. The potential case studies for research were therefore seriously limited. This absence of work persisted throughout the 1980’s as well. The new interest in political parties is kind of a reaction of the theoretical defiance of the 1970’s studies, thus much of the research surrounds party systems, rather than the character and nature of parties. It is this central precept that Erdmann wishes to address in his article.

Erdmann’s article presents a series of his observations over time since democratisation

- \textit{Barely distinguishable programmes}; It is generally accepted that campaigning political parties adopt alternate positions depending on social and ideological conditions. In order to present these to public, parties generally provide policy statements and manifestos to the public. Erdmann expresses concern that African parties are barely distinguishable, and really offer no differences between each other. But due to logistical reasons the access and distribution ultimately limits public access, i.e., potential usage of the internet both in terms of public’s access and parties’ utilisation of a webpage or news letter, blog etc. is very poor.

- \textit{Weak bureaucratic organisation}; Erdmann questions the permanence of party structures. Generally there is no central administration unifying and guiding the party, thus allowing the perception and fact of a weak party.

- \textit{Informal Relations}; Erdmann refers mostly to the clientelistic and patrimonial

\textsuperscript{19} Erdmann, Gero ‘Party Research: Western European Bias and the ‘African Labyrinth’’ Gero; Basedau, Matthias; Mehler, Andreas (eds.) \textit{“Votes, money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”} Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and University of Kwazulu Natal Press, Uppsala and Scottsville, 2007
networks behind the party structures. The party leadership surround themselves with not only their own kin but also relatives of persons of interest to the party.

- **Strong personalism dominating the party:** A party is a representation of a personality and reflect that ego’s beliefs, visions, and reactions, which are then party policy. Party stability is truly tested when someone else in the party contests or questions the leadership, which would and could polarise the party and create rift within the party. This could have detrimental results, because exposing the internal dynamics to the public would invite public judgment not only on the party but especially on the actors involved in the struggle. This could damage the leaders’ credibility in national politics and affect future possibilities in politics.

- **High degree of factionalism:** This relates very much to the personalism of the party but it also depends on the nature of the party, for example if the party is high centralised with a central committee who ultimately decide the party’s direction and allocate positions within the state or party. Dissent or challenging the decisions of these parties could aggravate or create schisms when groups within the party surround a central figure who would seek to advance such opinions in the party. Ultimately such factionalism is resolved by chasing away the weaker factions from the party.

- **Lack of internal democracy:** This is one of the most important features of political parties when referring to public opinion. One of most pivotal tenants of a democracy is the transparency of the decision making process. Much of the same could be said for the internal dynamics of a political party. How are decisions made? How are manifestos and policy statements decided upon and how broad was the participation in their production? How are the leaders chosen and who chooses them? In many African countries these decisions are normally made behind closed doors by small groups of people who might or might not reflect the demands of the party support base. Party conventions or congresses provide mere lip service or whitewash with their democratic credentials. Lastly, if parties do not provide due process and transparency when dealing with internal decisions, like internal inquiries that could ultimately determine the fate of key figures and policies of the party, for example expulsions and or manifestos. Not only could
the lack of internal democracy detract support from inside the party, but it also could alienate public support for the party.

- **Unreliable membership figures;** This refers to the credibility of the party, and its potential for recording creating perceptions of the strength of their support. If the party has no idea on how many people actually support them and have no idea how determine who is in fact a member of the party, it is very difficult a.) to know the exact amount of support, and b.) to know whom to approach and where to campaign for further support.

- **Membership predominantly regional or ethnically based:** Political parties have failed to provide a legitimate sense of national belonging, instead opting to garner support from home regions or ethnic allegiances. The popularity of these parties is generally contingent on a strong ethnic or regional bias of the central government.

- **Weak funding and financial resources:** Financing ultimately determines the failure of political parties if parties are not able to meet their full potential or to achieve their goals. One reason is a poor relationship with the public, which has no sense of political representation. A relationship of trust is necessary so that parties may seek private monetary contributions. The private sector might not feel that supporting an opposition party is a viable investment, because of the likely lack of a return. Opposition parties do not have access to state power and political repercussions from the state are possible. Ruling parties may have access to state resources, but opposition parties usually do not.

- **Weak links with civil society;** Civil society refers to the space between the government and society. Civil society is supposed to fill the gap by representing the liberal characteristics of democracy such as human rights. They are an integral part of a democracy. Opposition parties could utilise the information and advocacy of civil society NGO’s to generate political capital.

The African political parties are not are not similar to conventional their North American or European counterparts. A crucial difference is that in Africa there are few or no formal institutions to help interact with society. African parties do therefore not represent social issues as dictated by social cleavages, such as the centre vs. periphery.
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(nation state), church (religion) vs. state (secularism), rural agrarian vs., urban (primary vs. secondary economies) and capital vs. labour (as a result of the industrial revolution). Erdmann argues that African political parties are personal vehicles for politicians to gain power. If parties exist merely for the benefit of politicians’ acceding to power, then what is their relevance for representing society.

Contextualizing theory to fact:

The two articles above presented emerging analyses of the quality of African democratic political systems and political parties. They explored the condition of both political systems and parties, highlighted single party dominance and the marginal presence of opposition parties. They may lead donors to amend this democratic reality. But both Erdmann’s and van de Walle’s conclusions are based on trends viewed at a continental level, and are not necessarily particular to national case studies.

Two authors provide an account to the Namibian reality, and answers van de Walle’s and Erdmann’s models. The first article by André du Pisani and Williams Lindeke, presents the emergence of the Namibian political system characterized by dominance of a ruling party, and the correlation of state resources in the marginal reality of opposition parties in Namibia. The second article, by Henning Melber, presents an account of the Namibian political party culture and examines the democratic merits of the ruling party, the electorate, and the judiciary.

Ultimately these three authors present a Namibian case study of why donors support opposition political parties using the generic models provided above.

André du Pisani and Williams Lindeke20, address both the Namibian political system and the political parties that react to single party dominance of South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) in both the executive and the legislative branches. They state that the political opposition in Namibia emerged through the space provided first by the German occupation and then by the succeeding South African one.

During the pre-independence era, oppositional politics were characterized by pro-

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independence messages, and ultimately SWAPO engaged in a military conflict as the ultimate form of opposition against the Apartheid authority. Whereas more passive opposition without military confrontation was prominent with the Herero-dominated SWANU. Even the collaborationist DTA, though a creation of the South African authority, still represented the ideal of a Namibian reality devoid of Apartheid. South Africa’s relaxing of certain social racial laws like mixed marriages not only bolstered the DTA’s public image, but also more strategically provided an outlet for opposition even if it was controlled.

Du Pisani’s and Lindeke’s article stresses the importance of post-independence oppositional politics. The authors basically detail the emergence of the SWAPO party as the dominant party in Namibia, through legitimate overwhelming national support, which led to the most crucial characteristic of Namibian politics, the two thirds majority achieved in the National Assembly in 1994 which it has maintained ever since. This supermajority allows SWAPO to amend the constitution. It is not only emblematic of the consolidation of SWAPO’s power over the state but it also defined the opposition, because their voice in the decision making process was pushed aside by SWAPO’s policies.

Essentially this article supported both van de Walle and Erdmann’s assertions. First as stated above, they provided an account of a weak opposition under the current conditions of dominance, and seem to stress the use of state resources to marginalize the opposition further, for example, through electoral legislation that was part of a broader Southern African Development Community (SADC) policy which SWAPO helped negotiate. A second example is the regional proportions of female representation, i.e., that a certain proportion of elected representatives (local, regional and national) must be women. This is easier for the larger parties like SWAPO and the DTA which have a larger base of support to float more female candidates, but detrimental to the smaller parties with smaller support bases. SWAPO uses affirmative-action laws to favour SWAPO supporters and accommodate members with state jobs. Du Pisani and Lindeke maintain that vocal opposition supporters are shut out from such job opportunities, thus taming and subduing public support for the opposition parties. Lastly, their article touches on the use of state media, especially the Namibian Broadcasting
cooperation (NBC), the television service which has 80% national coverage, and which SWAPO uses to their advantage through preferred access for itself and little or no access for the opposition parties.

Du Pisani and Lindeke present the opposition parties as weak. The parties are characterized by internal power struggles and factionalism which are incredibly detrimental to their standings in national politics. The article’s authors also try to parse party stances in an attempt to discern differences between the parties. In addition, they extend their analysis to political associations which are groupings that do not have any representations in the National Assembly, based on their influence in Namibian society.

Ultimately du Pisani’s and Lindeke’s article is an adequate application of both van de Walle’s and Erdmann’s political theory of the emergence of a single party dominance and the character of the political parties participating in such an political system. But this work is an account of how they perceive the condition of Namibian political parties and systems, and even though it is a well educated account it is still debatable whether it is reflective of reality. For example, is the weakness of opposition parties the mere fault of the state machinery’s marginalizing the opposition, or are the opposition parties more to blame?

In a discussion paper Henning Melber outlines Namibian political culture. It is very clear from the start of his paper that SWAPO has been at the centre of Namibian political culture since the start its armed anti-colonial campaign against the South African regime in the mid-1960’s. Much of SWAPO’s effort was not only physically on the ground, but also politically on the international scene where SWAPO’s resolute determination to gain recognition as the sole authority in the Namibian territory provided international legitimacy for their cause and right to rule. International acknowledgement came in 1978 with the adoption of UN resolution 435, which terminated South African rule.

Melber stresses that the foundations of a post independence political culture emerged from the liberation struggle, SWAPO could rely on an enormous segment of the population sympathetic to the anti-colonial cause and more importantly people

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marginalised under the Apartheid system. Some of the non-SWAPO groups, there were political blocs that were tolerated or created by the South African authorities, most notably the DTA, a political alliance based on parties from different ethnic and racial parties determined to find an alternate solution to the Namibian question that did not involve SWAPO. Melber stresses that much of the territory’s elite supported this political bloc.

Though these two political blocs were at opposite ends of the struggle, Melber maintains that when these two parties came together during the transitional phase after the 1989 constituent assembly elections, SWAPO and the DTA negotiated with each other and with other smaller political parties to settle the future Republic of Namibia. In March 1990, SWAPO emerged as the ruling party with its leader, Sam Nujoma, as first president and the DTA was the main opposition party.

Melber points out that the most defining characteristic of Namibian politics is the continuous political domination of SWAPO. SWAPO’s policy determined the political culture, especially after 1994 when SWAPO won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. Melber infers that the first defining moment in the evolution of the political culture was founding Presidents Samual Nujoma’s third-term debate in the late 1998, which evolved around the debate of giving Nujoma a third term in office. SWAPO argued that that the first term in office was decided by a vote in the constituent assembly and not by the popular vote. The opposition and SWAPO’s critics argued that, since the constituent assembly was popularly chosen which SWAPO turned out to be dominant party the outcome determined by elections would not have changed the result. Nujoma’s third term bid was accepted in time for him to run in the 1999 presidential elections. The second defining event was Namibia’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the late 1990’s, which violated the constitutional provision of Namibian neutrality.

These events highlighted the weakness of Namibian political party culture. The lack of effective response from the DTA and other parties highlighted, not only marginality of the Namibian opposition, but more crucially the ineffectiveness of the opposition parties and politicians. But opposition from within the ruling party was also growing as well, and in 1999 former SWAPO official Ben Ulenga created a new political
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party, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), due to disagreement he had with policies and the ruling party path.

Melber describes a more engaged opposition in the 2004 national and presidential contests. Along with CoD, there were two other parties vying for political support: NUDO and the Republican Party (RP) split off from the DTA. Melber describes how in December 2004 the CoD and RP exercised their legal rights and contested the results provided by the electoral commission of Namibia (hereafter ECN). By the time the suit went to court other parties joined the original plaintiffs. They won their suit, and a recount followed (More in Chapter 4).

In conclusion, Melber discussed the aspects of limited democracy among former settler colonies in Southern Africa, were during the liberation struggles against white unjust rile were oconcluded He maintains that the undemocratic nature of liberation movements did not internally promote ideals of justice and human rights. Thus when these movements came to power they formed authoritarian and autocratic regimes. And with messages of national reconciliation, it marginalised any resolution of past human rights violation that occurred during the liberation struggle, indicating the lack of investigation into human rights violations during the occupation.

By using evidence drawn from studies conducted at the Southern African regional level, Melber shows Namibia is the only country in the region where a majority of the population would not accept the loss of power by the ruling party. Another study that he cited indicated that Namibia has not consolidate democracy among its public and institutions. Thus he concludes with a quote from the Namibia summary of the Afro barometer 2006 survey, describing the country as a “Democracy without Democrats”

Conclusion:

The recent transition to democracy has allowed the emergence of a dominant single party, which uses state resources to marginalize parties. In addition this chapter has presented the character and party culture on the African continent. The last section introduced the Namibian variable into the project by examining two articles that are in a response to the van de Walle and Erdmann studies.
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In relation to the main research question, this chapter describes Namibia’s domestic and political situation, which ultimately determines the political ambiguities perceived by donors as hindering or harming the democratic process. The focus of this paper will concentrate on the effects of internationally supported Namibian political parties on the democratic political system.
3. Political Parties and Personalities
In Namibia:

The history of Namibia opposition is fundamental to understanding the emergence of a single party system. As we saw in the last section, van de Walle discussed the emergence of dominant party systems through budding presidentialism since the *third wave* of democracy in the 1990’s. Du Pisani and Lindeke countered this assertion by maintaining that the emergence of both the political system and single party dominance was historical through the space allowed by the German and South African authorities, and the subsequent resistance that followed. In addition du Pisani and Lindeke argued that single party dominance was enhanced and maintained through the ballot box, even though some indications support van de Walle’s assertion that state resources were used to weaken and isolate the opposition. Du Pisani and Lindeke still asserts that SWAPO’s dominance was upheld and confirmed through popular electoral support.

Last section also maintained the character of political system. Du Pisani and Lindeke maintained seemingly constant presence of the same political characters in Namibian political parties. Erdmann confirmed with observation by arguing that political parties are defined by personalism, i.e., political parties are becoming ever more centred on the aging leader or leadership. Du Pisani, Lindeke and Erdmann thus present a key fundamental issue: the steadfast strong egos in the political party space do not permit the ascent of ambitious, usually younger politicians to those parties’ upper echelons. This
blockage inside the existing parties leaves these ambitious politicians with only one option, to create their own party as a vehicle to power.

By presenting the historical context of opposition in Namibia, this section will provide the necessary material to show the single party dominance emerged. More crucially this section will shed light on the political environment by which donors justify their support.

Thus, the first section considers Melber’s point of two core political groupings through which the Namibian political culture interaction evolved. Thus the initial section will look at the histories of the two core parties of which the current opposition heralds in contemporary Namibian politics. The second section will examine these offshoot parties that resulted from rifts among the two core party blocs. The third section will examine the ethnic parties which have generally remained outside of the greenhouses of the core parties. Lastly, this chapter will look at the history of the white parties that were previously possessed absolute power in the territory.

**Original Party Blocs:**

*SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE’S ORGANISATION (SWAPO):*

SWAPO was founded in February 1960 through the amalgamation of Owambo groupings: the Owamboland People’s Organization (OPO) led by Samuel ‘Sam’ Nujoma, and the Owamboland People’s Congress (OPC) led by founder Andimba Toivo ya Toivo. The Old Location shootings of 1959, which Sam Nujoma was accused of orchestrating, caused him to flee into exile before he could stand trial. While in exile he was nominated SWAPO’s president.

SWAPO’s leadership fled to Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika. There SWAPO found not only security but a regime friendly to the cause through shared ideology. The Tanganyikans allowed the party to set up its headquarters there. The party started to take shape, and new members, such as Hage Geingob and Hildipo Homogeny, constantly arrived from Namibia. As the Namibian population in Tanganyika grew, so the party
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grew in size. The party framework started to emerge, and the consultative congress in Tanga addressed the need to define the institutional parameters. There were made the party departments and party groups to represent other demographic groups in the territory, including the SWAPO youth league, women’s league and the elders’ council.

Many of the party activities while in Tanganyika were aimed at securing international support and legitimacy. SWAPO worked all over the world, lobbying powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the United Nations and other African countries. In 1965, the OAU recognized SWAPO as the sole liberation movement in Namibia, and other African leaders drew close to the SWAPO’s leadership of. People like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were strong supporters at the outset, and SWAPO later developed ever closer ties and relationships with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Agostinho Neto of Angola. These last two relationships were vital to the success of the actual guerrilla campaign inside Namibian territory, because SWAPO used both countries as future bases.

In latter part of March 1966, SWAPO’s armed wing the People Liberation Army of Namibia (Hereafter PLAN) commenced military operations. SWAPO’s priorities changed, because not only were the defending their political entitlement to rule, but also defend the actions of a legitimate military liberation movement. In addition, SWAPO moved its headquarters to Lusaka, Zambia, in 1970. In Zambia, SWAPO was not a smoothly running, cohesive movement. Rather, its defining moment was the 1978 mutiny, which was a result of the Youth League’s attempt to gain more influence and power within SWAPO’s central committee. The mutiny in Zambia was resolved with the help of the Zambian police. It also allowed SWAPO to clean house a little, and the central committee to get rid dissenters and to tame the Youth League. As a result Misheke and his Caprivi National Union (CANU), SWAPO’s regional partner left SWAPO.

The dual frontlines of SWAPO’s liberation struggle evolved after the Zambian mutiny. Not only had SWAPO won the recognition of the United Nations in 1974 through Security Council Resolution 435. SWAPO’s international aims shifted from seeking legitimacy to building momentum for eventual independence. On the combat front, the front line moved from the Caprivi Strip to Kavango and border regions with
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Angola. As a result SWAPO moved their headquarters away from Lusaka to Lubango in southern Angola. Here in the 1980’s SWAPO had another internal purge, detaining 2,000 SWAPO supporters accused of spying for the South Africans, in dungeons in the city of Lubango, where they were tortured during interrogations\textsuperscript{22}.

In 1989, SWAPO returned to Namibia as a political party and participated in the Constituent Assembly (CA), a body which was supposed to negotiate and ratify a future constitution, and which was also seen as a transitional authority. SWAPO received the majority of the vote, and elected SWAPO president Sam Nujoma as the president of the Assembly, a position that would automatically transfer to the Presidency of the Republic upon independence in 1990.

The year 1994 overwhelmingly confirmed SWAPO’s popularity when it won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (hereafter NA).

The fears were only realised four years later in the lead-up to the national election of 1998. The first recognition was when SWAPO pushed through the NA the first constitutional amendment, which allowed a third term for Nujoma. There was no debate in SWAPO’s central committee, and the subsequent debate in the NA was short and full of theatrics. Lastly, the question of constitutional legality of the Namibian intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo did not resonate through society; the more pressing concern was the safety of the deployed troops.

In 2004, Sam Nujoma stepped down, and it was left to the party to choose the next presidential candidate and subsequent president. The party chose Hifikepunya Pohamba, a long time SWAPO leader and Nujoma’s handpicked successor. Though the success of Nujoma’s man was never questioned either within the party or with the public, the process of his appointment was heated. Hildipo Hamutenya also put himself up as SWAPO candidate, his dissent against the Nujoma was rewarded with a subsequent expulsion from the ruling party.

Since Pohamba’s election a growing rift within the party has characterized the SWAPO party. Within in the government Pohamba has created a new network of supporters which is competing with Nujoma’s pre-existing networks, including the

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SWAPO Youth League (Hereafter SWYL). The letters show concern that Nujoma’s network was being shut out of the government apparatus. Calls for resignations of both the president and prime minister are in common place at the central committee meetings, coupled with calls for Sam Nujoma’s son Utoni to be groomed as a future president.

Samuel ‘Sam’ Nujoma:

Born in 1929 into humble beginnings in Etunda in Omusati region, Nujoma spent his childhood rearing cattle and taking care of his siblings. His education was very characteristic of the era, the Finnish Missionary School in Okahao. In 1946 (then aged 17), he moved to Walvis Bay, where he lived with an aunt and worked at first a general store and then a whaling station. In 1949, he moved to Windhoek, where he gained employment as a cleaner for the South African Railways while at the same time attending night classes and taking a correspondence course in order to improve his English.

Nujoma founded the Owambo People’s Organization in 1959, and was its first leader. The party advocated an end to the contract labour system, and removing rule of Namibia from the South African authorities and placing it in the hands of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Nujoma spread this message through highly secretive trips to spread the word.

In 1959, Nujoma joined the executive committee of the SWANU party where he was at the forefront of a campaign against moving the black population away from the old location to the newly constructed township of Katatura23. The South Africans implicated Nujoma as one of the masterminds of the opposition campaign and issued a warrant for his arrest, but before Nujoma could be detained, he went into exile. While outside of the territory, Nujoma left SWANU and accepted the presidency of the newly formed OPO known as the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1960.

Nujoma’s first year in exile was characterized by a vigorous travel schedule, initially in Africa. And in April 1960 found himself in Ghana meeting then Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and other African leaders, in particular, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

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23 A strategy of urban planning of the city of Windhoek to expand vastly towards the old location township, in order to meet the need of a growing white middle class.
Shortly after this meeting, Nujoma went to Liberia, where he decided to make re-brand SWAPO as a national party, before leaving for New York. While there with much trepidation to lobby UN to act for South West Africa’s independence in three short years. Nujoma returned to Dar es Salaam, which would be Nujoma’s base, but continue an intensive travel schedule.

The most important reason for Nujoma’s absence was that SWAPO was engaged in a long lobbying campaign in the UN. In 1971, Nujoma become the first leader of a liberation movement to address the UN Security Council. In 1973 the UN General Assembly acknowledged SWAPO as the authority of Namibia, a public relations coup for the movement. Unfortunately, this recognition represented an only superficial blow to the South African authorities, because it was merely a reprimand and did not have any legal consequences. In fact it probably had great implications for SWANU, which was trying to get the same recognition. Nujoma led the Namibian delegation to the Western Contact group, a committee of North American and European capitalist nations. The negotiation between Namibia and this group determined the content of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 that basically terminated the legitimacy of South Africa’s rule of Namibia and called for Namibia’s independence. This document was what was needed to guarantee eventual Namibian independence.

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24 United States, Canada, United Kingdom, West Germany and France
In 1989, Nujoma returned to Namibia, not only to stay, but also to take political control of the territory. He was a near-mythical persona. His exile had lasted for so long, and his physical visibility in the armed struggle had been minimal, but he had remained for nearly thirty years the illustrious leader of revolution. Independence was no different. His image was not only as the distinguished, respected first president, but also the man who singlehandedly led the liberation on the ground, contradicting the historical record. In the Hero’s Arch overlooking Windhoek, the main monument to the Namibian liberation, a figure of a man dressed in military fatigues who is throwing a Molotov cocktail in his right hand while holding a Kalashnikov in his left bears a striking resemblance to Nujoma.

Since leaving office in 2004, Nujoma has remained rather silent on national politics. Instead, he has more exposure to regional issues, mainly acting as a negotiator for SADC. His public image is mainly confined to national symbolic events and openings of civic institutions. Though his name is used in the SWAPO rift, he has not made any public indications of any intent to return to office. In any case the state provides him with the option of influencing power by maintaining an office in the State House (executive) next to the president’s, as but there is no indication that he takes advantage of this privilege.

*Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA)*

Founded in 1977, the DTA of Namibia was the result of the Turnhalle Conference, an attempt by the South Africa to create a political party to counteract the growing support of SWAPO. The multiracial party drew membership from several regional parties including a faction of the ruling National Party. The other members consisted of the Bushman Alliance, the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Turnhalle Party of Namibia (successor to the Nama Alliance), the National Democratic Party, the National Democratic Unity Party, NUDO, the Rehoboth DTA Party, the Republican Party (RP), Seoposengwe (former Tswana alliance), the South West Africa People’s Democratic United Front (SWADUF), the United Democratic Party and the United Party of Namibia.

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From the DTA’s creation, the South African authorities tried to prop it up and to build legitimacy for it among the public. The constituent congress in 1978 saw the DTA and the National Party come to loggerheads over the abolition of certain Apartheid laws including the mixed marriage restrictions. The South African administration pushed through the repeal of these laws and credited the DTA with the successful outcome.

Even though several attempts to find a political solution to the Namibian conflict and fell through, the DTA was the essential to the outcomes. In 1983 there was a series of mass resignations, after the Administrative General (AG), under pressure from rightwing white groups, rejected a bill banning the Day of the Vow (sacred to the Afrikaner culture). The South Africans took some measures to advance the DTA’s international standing and to undermine the UN’s recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate authority of Namibia. The DTA participated in the Multi-Party Congress of 1983 and in 1985 the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in which the DTA held three cabinet posts. The DTA held these posts until the Transitional Government was dissolved in 1989 in the transition to independence.

The first eight years of independence were characterized by DTA’s unthreatened and unthreatening position as the official opposition. As SWAPO’s support grew, the DTA’s fell gradually. In 1998, the DTA welcomed the new Congress of Democrats (CoD) into the oppositional space. Their welcome was short-lived, after the 1999 national contests, the DTA proportion of seats was cut down significantly and in 2004 the DTA lost their official opposition to the CoD.

In 1998, rumours started to emerge from the DTA of an emerging internal power struggle. There were signals from the party that DTA founders Johan De Waal and Katuutire Kaura were vying for top party job. But the emergence of Kaura as the leader of the DTA was not achieved through a resulting struggle, but rather through rumours of then DTA president Misheke Muyongo’s sympathies for Caprivian secessionism, which caused him and his party to be thrown out of the DTA.

Since the election of Kaura as its president, the party has been trying to win back public support. But after the Caprivian secessionist movement and the emergence of the CoD, both Kaura and De Waal have had an uphill struggle. Finally, with two founding members of the DTA still at the helm of the party, De Waal and Kaura have had a hard
time shaking off their collaborationist image, and have experienced grave difficulties in enabling and winning back support.

Misheke Muyongo:

Born in 1940 in the Caprivi region, Misheke Muyongo entered the political field in 1964 when he co-founded the Caprivi African National Union (CANU). Shortly thereafter he went into exile. In November 1964 he negotiated the merger of CANU and SWAPO, which he would subsequently become vice president. Initially he played a key international role by representing SWAPO at an international conference on Namibia in Brussels in 1972.

In the 1970’s Muyongo was based in Zambia, where his connections and with the Zambian authorities helped him to put down the internal mutiny. When SWAPO’s leadership moved to their new headquarters in Lusaka, Muyongo’s importance within the party was diminished and subsequently left in the party in 1978 on his own grounds.

In 1980, Muyongo was thrown out of the party by SWAPO decree, hereby severing any future contact, after he was accused of trying to restart the CANU party while he was in Zambia. After a subsequent two-week imprisonment by the Zambian authorities he moved to Senegal, where he spent a year before returning to Namibia. In 1985 he founded the United Democratic Party (UDP), which merged that same year with the DTA of Namibia, which was represented in TGNU. In 1987 the DTA made him vice president of the party, and in 1991 he became its president.

For the first eight years of independence Misheke Muyongo was the face of the opposition. The DTA remained the only formidable opposition bloc in the country, and for the first presidential election in 1994 ran the only contender against Sam Nujoma. By the run up to the 1999 presidential electoral contest, however, Muyongo’s position as both candidate and party representative was in doubt.

Rumours began to emerge of Muyongo’s support for the secession of his native Caprivi Strip from the rest of Namibia. In response to such claims, the DTA on Monday September 24, 1998, in an extraordinary congress suspended Muyongo from the DTA. His supporters called this in effect an internal party coup to sideline Muyongo so that
Kuaima Riurako and Katuutire Kaura could vie for his position. On September 5-6, 1998, the DTA officially threw Muyongo out of the party and chose Kaura to be his successor.

Muyongo tried to retreat into obscurity after being thrown out of the party. But a month later Muyongo would hit the international news when he was arrested with a Caprivian chief in Botswana on October 28, 1998, for illegal entry into the country and illegal weapons charges. In response the DTA met in early November to discuss whether to suspend the UDP from the Alliance. The DTA feared that keeping the UDP within the party would in fact reflect badly on the DTA as a party. The two UDP parliamentarians protested their party’s innocence and argued it would be unfair for them to be punished for their leadership’s sins.

Muyongo’s and Caprivian secessionism did not cease with Muyongo’s and the UDP’s departure from the DTA. On August 2, 1999, the hitherto unknown Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) carried out several attacks in Katima Mulilo and the surrounding areas with the loss of eight lives. Following the attacks Muyongo took to the airwaves guaranteeing that these attacks were “just the beginning…struggle will be long, it will get bigger and it will be victorious.”

The conflict did not achieve much, despite several small engagements between the CLA and the Namibian Defence Force.

After the fighting in Caprivian ended, Botswana gave asylum to Muyongo, but constantly searched for a permanent country for political asylum. Denmark offered him asylum where he currently lives in relative silence, a condition of his stay. His escapades have affected not only him; many of his close immediate family also live in Europe, but a daughter is a nurse living in Katima Malilo.

**Rift parties:**

The more formidable opposition in Namibia has come from always within the core political parties. What becomes abundantly clear is that these parties are not modules of new personalities and blood but are the retention of the same politicians under new party banners,

Congress of Democrats (CoD):

The creation of a new party was announced on Tuesday, March 22, 1999, by Ben Ulenga, a SWAPO backbencher; former member of the Constitutional Assembly; former Deputy Minister of Conservation, Wildlife and Tourism; and former Namibian High Commissioner to the UK. He resigned from his post due to an alleged lack of transparency in the SWAPO regime, the blatant disregard for the constitution by the third term amendment, the intervention of Namibian soldiers in Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the government’s actions in the Caprivi conflict.

The DTA welcomed the CoD. SWAPO on the other hand reacted with fear and a defensive campaign against the CoD. Rhetoric from the ruling party made it sound like SWAPO was on a witch hunt for other SWAPO officials with sympathies towards the new party. Secretary General Hifikepunya Pohamba of SWAPO at first welcomed the new party. He issued a complaint in The Namibian. On the March 24, The Namibian published an interview with Pohamba in which he angrily denounced the article of his comment, in particular the use of the word that he ‘Welcomed’ the party’s creation.

The electoral results of the CoD did not draw any support away from SWAPO as had been hoped by politicians. Instead the CoD took most of their support from the DTA in 1999. In 2004, The CoD tried to consolidate its support even further, but was only able to capitalize on the falling support of the DTA. The CoD did, however, achieve the status of the official opposition party.

A rift formed within the CoD in 2007. The incumbent president of the party, Ben Ulenga, was trying to retain his post. Nora Schiming-Chase was challenging him. At the party’s extraordinary congress in Keetmanshoop, the rift came to the fore, and a legal battle ensued. As will be seen later in this paper, the power struggle jeopardized the relationship between the party and its donors. Ultimately the court ordered that the congress be held, which occurred a year later outside of Windhoek, with the result of Ben Ulenga’s and many of his followers’ being re-elected to the party echelon, while both Schiming-Chase and many of her supporters were voted out of the party’s offices.
Ben Ulenga:

Born on June 22, 1952, in Ontanga, Omusati region, a young Ben Ulenga joined his fellow comrades in exile in 1974. He was sent to the Soviet Union to receive military training in 1976. He joined an advanced unit of the People’s Liberation Army for Namibia (PLAN) operating within the Tsumeb-Grootfontein-Otavi triangle. There he was wounded and captured by the South African Army, and sentenced to 15 years on Robben Island.

Upon his release from prison in 1985 he became involved with the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), and was a member of the steering committee until his election as the General Secretary of the Miners’ Union of Namibia (MUN) in 1986.

Ulenga became a backbencher of SWAPO in a newly independent National Assembly (NA), after being a member of the Constituent Assembly. In March 1991, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Wildlife and Conservation, a post for which he left his union position. In 1995, he was named minister of Local Government; the following year he was appointed the Namibian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, a post he held until 1998.

Ulenga’s position within the party seemed rather confusing, because although he was suspended (November 1998) from the central committee of SWAPO (the party’s main decision-making body), he had not been expelled from the party. But it was already reported that he had doubts about the feasibility and success of SWAPO as the main hegemonic party in Namibia, was debating whether he would continue within the party or not. He finally resigned in March 1999.

He founded the CoD that same month to a fanfare of supporters disenchanted with SWAPO. His first news conference was before a packed audience in a central Windhoek hotel. At the same time, as mentioned above, he provoked considerable fear within SWAPO regarding its internal support network, and prompted the party to threaten to purge CoD supporters.

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27 While keeping his union post.
Currently Ulenga has stepped back from political representation of the party, and has instead concentrated on running the party. He left his seat in the NA but remains president of the party. Concentrating on his future competition for president and re-enforcing his party structure with his supporters.

National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO):

On September 25, 1964, after the South West Africa Union (SWANU) fell out of favour with the traditional leaders over their radical agenda, the Herero Chiefs Council (HCC) founded NUDO. Founders of this party were Chief-designate Clemens Kapuuo and Mburumba Kerina, who left the US in 1966 and returned to Namibia. Kapuuo became paramount chief of the Herero after the death Hosea Kutako in 1970 and served until 1978’s when he himself was assassinated. Chief Kuaima Riruako succeeded Kapuuo as paramount chief and de facto leader of NUDO.

The international recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate authority left NUDO in search of other ways to exert its influence within the immoral political space dominated by the South Africans. It even turned towards the South African attempt to reach a political settlement excluding SWAPO. Hence in 1975 it entered the Turnhalle constitution and became a member of the DTA, of which Kapuuo became the first president until his assassination six months later. NUDO was active in several attempts to find a political solution, like the MPC in 1983 which formed the Transitional Government of national unity (TGNU).

NUDO representatives helped form the DTA representation within the first National Assembly. This did not prevent the party’s breakaway from the Alliance. Appearances were deceptive, and attempts to show the unity within the DTA failed. In 2003 the NUDO left the DTA, claiming that it always had an autonomous identity as a party. The DTA relied heavily on Herero support. Thus the departure of NUDO was a serious blow to the DTA’s support. After a series of objections from leading DTA leaders who were alliance members through NUDO (Katuutire Kaura and Chief Whip McHenry) expressed their grievances with Riruako taking the f NUDO with him out of the alliance. Subsequently the Directorate of Elections allowed faction using NUDO to
run as a separate party. Its status was furthered weakened when the DTA lost its court case to block NUDO from taking part in the Grootfontien by-election.

This has not stopped the flurry of accusations from the DTA that NUDO and SWAPO are bedfellows and that NUDO’s departure was an effort hatched by the ruling party to discredit the opposition. Such rhetoric is in general not substantiated by hard facts. For example, NUDO’s campaign for a more federal system has been markedly different from SWAPO, which in turn has condemned NUDO for its increased discussion of the matter.

Though NUDO enjoys the support of the Herero chiefs, the DTA still has some support among them as well. So it is difficult for NUDO to be presented as a party for the Herero tribe. A core issue for NUDO is the status of many Herero chiefs, especially for those who are not recognized by state as traditional leaders, this is a battle in which Riruako has personally and actively campaigned on their behalf. He also wants to create a government of national unity, indicating his willingness to work with SWAPO. This also depends on SWAPO, its ambitions of capturing the Herero vote, and its willingness to share state resources and networks. However, any indications of potential mergers were moot after 2005.

Kuaima Riruako:

Riruako was a founding member of NUDO in 1964. He is a paramount chief of the Herero, though his traditional leadership has not been recognized by the state. In 2001 he led a group of other unrecognized chiefs in filing a court case against the government’s decision to not recognize them as traditional leaders. The court put aside the government’s decision. Subsequent negotiations between Riruako and the government on a possible settlement of the issue have not yet reached a conclusion. From 1986-1987 Riruako was a member of the Constitutional Assembly. Then he took the reins of the DTA from 1987 until independence in 1990.

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29 An important distinction, because he is not in fact the hereditary chief of the Herero, meaning that this title was not passed on by the complicated hereditary tradition of the Herero (refer to Gewald). He is more the acting chief, or chief in absence of a hereditary one.
When he was elected into the National Assembly in 1995, Riruako was the spokesperson for land and resettlement, an issue very near and dear to the Herero, because of their ongoing quest to get their land back from the German farmers who still occupy the land. He held this central party position until he left the party in September 2003.

In the 2004 election he came in fourth out of seventh candidates on NUDO’s party list, receiving roughly 4% of the vote. He heads NUDO in Parliament after the party received three seats in legislature.

Riruako is one of the most vocal politicians advocating federalism for Namibia. Though NUDO and he have been accused of connections with the Caprivian secessionists, he does not advocate the breakup of Namibia. Instead he says that all groups would be better represented in a federal system where their views and desires would have a more adequate voice and more effective development would come to the masses.

Riruako is also at the forefront of the campaign for reparations from Germany for the Herero Genocide. He is taking the case through the court system in the US (where he was in exile for some time), not the German courts. He is looking for a sum of 3 billion dollars in reparations.

*Republican Party (RP):*

The Republican Party owes its creation to a split in the then National Party (NP) which was one of the main parties of the South African regime, and which had a pro-Apartheid agenda. In October 1977, Dirk Mudge, who was a member of the NP, left the party with a faction of his supporters in disagreement over Apartheid laws that the NP was refusing to revoke.

No sooner had they formed their party than they joined the DTA of Namibia. The RP was quite a pivotal member, bringing in a white support base to the Alliance. Unfortunately, the party suffered from alienation of not only supporters but also partners within the party. This saw a faction of party officials mandate a re-emergence of an
alliance partner. When the DTA emerged at independence as a re-branded single party, the RP seemed to take a back seat in the party structure.

A growing sentiment of concern over the failings of the DTA to promote reconciliation and effective opposition to the SWAPO-led government led members to hold a congress in April 2003 which voted in favour of the re-creation of the RP, in the hands of Henk Mudge, son of Dirk.

When the RP broke away from the DTA, it was unable to bring most of its representatives along. People like Johan de Waal decided to continue the DTA experiment. Though it was a blow to the RP’s fortunes, the party has consistently shown strong results in local authority elections; in 2004 the RP picked up seats in 7 of the 9 elections contested, Katima Malilo, Grootfontein, Windhoek, Keetmenshoop, Koës, Otjoo and Aranos. Further successes came in the National Assembly elections, when the RP saw an increase of two seats. These positive results are credited to the RP’s initiative to broaden its support base, and efforts to abandon its racial image, and campaign on Christianity and more social conservative ideals. Lastly, the party joined the CoD in contesting the presidential election results in 2004. Although there were more political parties in the suit when it hit the courtroom in January 2005, it was primarily an RP/CoD initiative.

The Mudges:

The Mudge family is probably one of the most prominent dynasties in Namibia, in not only politics but also economics and the media as well. The family has been a player in national politics since 1955.

*Dirk* was born in 1928 on a farm near Otijowarongo. In 1955 he joined the NP, and subsequently became a member of the all white Legislative Assembly in 1961. In 1965 he became a member of the Executive Committee, which as the ruling body in the territory of South West Africa oversaw most governmental functions in the area with the exception of defence and foreign policy, which were controlled directly from Pretoria. Upon the then leader of the National Party A. H. du Plessis became a minister in the in the South African cabinet in Pretoria, Dirk was appointed as caretaker of the NP.
Mudge’s perceptions of the future of Namibia became clouded when he did not see eye to eye on the future of the territory with either the NP or the South African authorities. Consequently he started to distance himself from the racially charged culture of the NP, and started a friendship with Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, a friendship that lasted until Kapuuo’s death in 1978, an event which Dirk took hard.

In 1973, Mudge held meetings with then South African Prime Minister John Vorster over the future of the territory and the possibilities in Namibia’s right to self-determination. This meeting launched a series of further meetings that led up to the Turnhalle Conference in 1975-77.

This conference laid open the abundantly clear the rift between Mudge and the rest of the party, mainly over the NP’s insistence on maintaining certain Apartheid laws. In October of 1977 Mudge broke away from the NP and created his own Republican Party, which joined the DTA of Namibia. He remained chairperson of the DTA until 1995. He was elected to the CA, and agreed with SWAPO to deliberate the future constitution, a document which he accepted.

Throughout his whole time in politics Dirk Mudge was the chairperson of Democratic Media Holdings (DMH), which publishes daily newspapers like the Republikein (Afrikaner) and Allgemeine Zeitung (German), papers with very large readerships. More recently the group has expanded to include the English-language weekly The Sun of Namibia. Officially out of politics and retired to the farm, Dirk has left the running of these media holdings to his daughter, while his son Henk is runs the RP.

Henk was born in 1952, the son of Dirk Mudge. Henk was an active member in his father’s party from the onset as a member of the party’s youth committee and several other committees within the DTA. Henk resigned from the DTA in 2003 with other former members of RP re-started his father’s old party. He is the RP’s sole representative in National Assembly and also president of the party.

Rally for Democratic Progress (RDP):
Founded in waning months of 2007, the Rally for Democratic Progress is the newest Namibian party. Like the CoD, this party was founded by Hidipo Hamutenya, Jessya Nayamu, and other former SWAPO leaders. These two figures have had an enormous bearing on SWAPO’s approach this party.

The RDP’s persistent campaigning in the SWAPO heartlands in the north and Katutura has persuaded disillusioned SWAPO supporters to their side. As will be seen below, the ex-SWAPO cadre who founded this party were most likely to attract quite a lot of support in their home regions. Regardless, the RDP’s support base is rather impressive, and much speculation still persists on how well the party will do in the 2009 elections, how it will alter the opposition dynamics, and, most importantly, how successfully it will poach SWAPO support and in turn SWAPO seats.

Hidipo Hamutenya:

Son of Aaron Hamutenya, a founder of the SWAPO struggle, Hidipo left home at the age of 22 with the blessing of his parents for exile in Tanzania. He became one of SWAPO’s representatives in the Americas, where he graduated from Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and McGill University in Canada. In 1973 he was called back to Africa to represent SWAPO. He became the head of education and a year later became the member of the SWAPO and central committee, two positions that he would retain until 2007.

In 1990 he was named Minister of Information and Broadcasting, a position he had carried over from exile. In 1993, he received the portfolio of Trade and Industry, but his administration was shrouded by scandal. But successes were to follow, such as meeting the terms of the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and overseeing Anglo-American’s enormous investment in the Scorpion mining project. These achievements led to the honour by the global media community with Financial Times Magazine (owned by *The Financial Times*), calling him the African Personality of the Year in 2003.  

There is some questionable action while he held this position in exile, over the video-taping of tortured confessions of detainees in Lubango, Angola.
Hamutenya was not stranger to the international community when he took the reins of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002-2004. He was in fact part of the initial team which courted the UN and the international community in New York and was part of the negotiations that led to UN Security Council Resolution 435. He was also the chairperson of the South African Development Community (SADC) Council of Ministers in 2001. Hamutenya’s career was cut short in 2004, when he was summarily dismissed from his position by President Sam Nujoma, because of his attempt to compete against the chosen candidate, Pohamba to become the SWAPO presidential candidate. His sacking ruined his campaign, and during the SWAPO congress he came second to Pohamba. Delivering further blows to Hamutenya’s credentials in the party, Nujoma accused him of spreading discontent within the party, and of trying to influence the choice of regional council candidates in Omaheke. The SWAPO Electoral College placed him at 57th on the list, eliminating any chances of his winning a NA seat outright. In 2005 Paulus Kapia,\(^3\) resigned his parliamentary seat after his involvement in the Avid investment scandal emerged. Hamutenya was given Kapia’s seat, and held it until 2007. In November of 2007 he formally left the SWAPO party to take the reins of the newly emerged opposition party, the RDP.

Jessaya Nayamu:

After joining SWAPO in 1962 going into exile in Tanganyika in the same year, Nayamu completed his secondary education at Temple High School in Philadelphia. Afterwards he became a SWAPO representative in Zambia, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Angola before returning to Namibia in 1989. He initially worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then became a member of the National Assembly. Afterwards he was appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy in 1991, becoming Minister of that same Ministry eight years later. In 2002 he was made Minister of Trade and industry after the departure of Geingob from that portfolio.

Nayamu has always been a strong supporter of his close friend Hamutenya (They were in high school together in the United States.), and at the Central Committee

\(^3\) A dedicated Nujoma and Pohamba supporter.
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congress he nominated Hamutenya as presidential candidate for the party in opposition to Sam Nujoma’s pick, Hifikepunya Pohamba. He weathered the political risk of supporting Hamutenya, and was voted into the Politburo at the 2002 congress.

However, his fortunes would turn when Hanutenya was sacked as Foreign Minister. Nyamu’s continued support of Hamutenya would eventually leave him excluded from SWAPO’s candidate list for the National Assembly, with the final straw of conceding that he had made private notes detailing how Hamutenya supporters could form their own party. Nayamu was expelled from the SWAPO party in 2005, remaining under the political radar screen until November 2007, when he emerged as the acting chairperson of the RDP.

Ethnic based Parties:

Ethnic democracies are usually termed through the remnants of the colonial governmental systems in which colonial authorities favoured one group of subjects in order to help govern through an indirect rule system or administrate within the colonial apparatus, like clerks and bus boys etc. Regardless, at the turn of independence these favoured groups were normally seen as the new elites of a country through their favoured historical connections, and thus proceeded as the best qualified to rule. These groups have been able to stay in power through the support of their groups, through either election or civil single party rule, while constantly politicking for their political survival.

The paragraph above is an incredibly strong generic quick sketch of the backbone of an ethnic democracy, and is not meant to argue a reality for the entire continent. Namibia, like every single African country, has a series of ethnic parties, which are both dominated by a certain ethnic groups, and most crucially have been outside the base political groups.

South West Africa National Union (SWANU):

SWANU is Namibia’s oldest political party, founded in September 29. 1959. With the blessing of the Herero Chiefs council, SWANU emerged as a movement that consisted of the Who’s Who of national independence-minded people, including Hosea Kotako, Clemens Kapuuo and Sam Nujoma, the last the founder of the Owamboland People's Organization (OPO), precursor to SWAPO.

SWANU’s honeymoon in national politics was short lived for three central reasons: first, internal friction in Herero council of Chiefs; second, the emergence of SWAPO in 1960; and, third, a slowing growth in support, mainly due to the domination of Herero intellectuals in the party ranks.33.

After the shootings in the Old Location34 on December 18, 1959, the Herero Council of Chiefs officially cut themselves away from the party. Furthermore, SWANU became to question the authority of the UN. It tamped its efforts to achieve authority status over the Namibia, a cause for which they were in competition with SWAPO. As SWAPO was far more aggressive in courting the global body, SWANU turned its attention to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), European nations and others.

Rather than taking a more cohesive military role as SWAPO did, SWANU opted to concentrate most of its party activities in the territory, joining a handful of independence initiatives, National Convention and Namibian National Convention in the 1970’s, and the Ai/Gans35 initiative in the 1980’s.

The party fractured in the 1980’s when then-President Moses Katjiuongua decided to lead the party into the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), an attempted political solution by the South African Administrative General to solve the Territories problems without SWAPO. Nora Schminning-Chase and Kazeeko Kangueehi took the reins of SWANU, whereas Katjiuongua formed his own party, the Namibian National Front, which took one seat in the Constituent Assembly, along with SWANU’s one seat.

United Democratic front (UDF):

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34 Was Windhoek first township
35 An initiative set and encouraged by Council of Churches Namibia (CCN)
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

The UDF was an alliance of smaller political parties founded in 1989. It was created just before the elections to the Constituent Assembly and has been an active member of National Assembly ever since. The leading party in the grouping is the Damara Council (DC) led by Justus Garoëb, thus the UDF’s core support is the Damara ethnic group.

Though the UDF’s history is as long as free electoral contests, their roots lie further back with the establishment of the Damara Council in 1971. With the permission of the South African authorities, who were planning to create a Damara homeland, which would place the DC at the centre of political life in the region. But the relationship turned sour with the DC’s insistence on not taking part in most of the South African attempts to solve the Namibian crisis.36.

Justus Garoëb, who was anointed chief of the Damara in 1987, had already been leader of the DC since 1980, was the founding president of the UDF in 1989. A melody of tribal and political interests created the UDF. Other than the leading DC party the new alliance consisted of, the Labour Party, Caprivi Alliance Party, Original People’s Party of Namibia, Namibian National Independence Part, the Caprivi African National Union, and the Workers Revolutionary Party comprised the UDF. This combination means its interests must fluctuate between the socialists and the Caprivian politicians.

The results of the CA 89, gave the UDF 4 seats, which were in turn divided up among the 4 of the parties, one of which was Caprivan. But even a smooth division of seats could not prevent a rift with the parties that were not allocated seats. Thus in 1990, the Worker’s Revolutionary Party left the alliance of protest that Reggie Diergraadt of the Labour Party got the position of Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry. After the rift, the UDF reformed itself into a ‘unified’ party, in the 1994 national and regional elections noticeably improved its overall results, taking good percentages in Damara areas. These trends continued in subsequent contests too. And in 1999 Presidential election, Justus Garoëb trailed Nujoma, Kaura and Ulenga.

In 1989 Justus Garoëb, who had become chief the Damara as well as being the leader of the DC since 1980, brought together a motley group of parties, consisting of two Caprivian-based parties, the Caprivi Alliance Party, Caprivi African National Union;

36 The DC did initially take part in the 1983 MPC initiative. But left to explore further links with SWAPO.
two strong workers’ parties, the Labour Party and the Worker’s Revolutionary Party; and more obscure parties like Original People’s Party of Namibia, the National Independence Party of Namibia, and the Patriotic Movement of Namibia.

Special care was necessary for keeping such a disparate grouping together. The results of the CA 89, gave the UDF 4 seats, which were allocated to the different parties in the union. A rift occurred, however, when the Worker’s Revolutionary Party, which was not given one of the seats, pulled out when it was decided that Reggie Diergraadt (Labour), who had already been given a seat in the CA, would be Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry. As a result, in 1993 the UDF abandoned its union, and transformed itself into a unified party. This ultimately had positive effects at the ballot box, with the party’s strong support in the Damara community.

It is difficult to see how this party will fare in the future. Although it has seen a growth in its support over time, it has heavily concentrated in Damara areas of the country with little support in other areas. The UDF’s heavy Damara narrative ultimately places an ethnic party seal on it.

**Former Apartheid party:**

*Monitor Action Group (MAG):*

MAG was formed in 1991 as the reformed Nationalist Party. Under the leadership of Kosie Pretorius, MAG has won one seat in the National Assembly. Unlike the RP, MAG has not made any attempt to shift itself away from its racial past and focuses on the Afrikaner Christian culture. Due to the pure PR system in Namibia, MAG is a classic example of smaller party representation.

Recently, MAG has committed itself to advocating greater government transparency and particularly party transparency of public monies. This is a rare occurrence in a political culture that is shrouded in secrecy, especially when it comes to public monies. The parties ideas are based on the enormous persona of Jacobius ‘Kosie’ Pretorius in parliamentary speeches as well as his weekly newspaper column in the *Windhoek Observer.*
MAG’s future is in doubt. Though there is a niche in the public for MAG’s message, it is growing smaller and smaller. The party is not making any moves to try to create a more youthful image. In addition it has not been having the same successes as the RP, and its Christian message is steeped in dogma and broadcasted mainly in Afrikaans. In addition, without published manifestos, it is difficult to really know what the party represents. Thus MAG gives the impression of representing a by-gone era, and of having the support of a particular age group that is rapidly dying out.

Jacobius Willem Francais (Kosie) Pretorius

Born in 1935 in Swakopmund, Kosie went to South Africa to study theology with the idea of becoming a preacher. While studying he realized that there was a space for Christian values and ethics in political life. Ditching his aspirations of becoming a priest and going into politics instead, Kosie was a representative of the NP in the Legislative assembly during the South African regime, and from 1981-1991 Kosie was the deputy Chairperson of the NP. Upon independence he represented the Action Christian National and Aktie Christelik National (ACN) in the National Assembly and had support from the NP. The ACN campaigned for the protection of white conservative rights. A main theme of Pretorius’ political activities in post-independence Namibia was the Private Member’s Bill to protect the Afrikaans language.

When Kosie left his parliamentary seat in 2005, Jurie Viljoens, a school teacher 10 years his junior, took his place. Although officially out of the legislature, Kosie still runs the party headquarters, which is essentially a one-man show, with a part-time secretary.

Conclusion:

As was seen above, most political opposition parties emerged from factionalism and internal strife from within two core political parties and personalities at the helms of these parties are the same since the late 1960’s. Lastly that non ethnic parties fair a lot better and have remained the most prominent opposition parties since independence.
By providing histories and biographies of parties and personalities, provides an insight into the political parties that are entitled to support by donors. But how do these parties fare in electoral contests, it is through elections that indicate the extent of marginalisation. The next chapter will show how the current proportional representation system allows for greater opposition party access to political power, and how Namibian opposition parties have fared in the country's electoral history.
4. Namibian Electoral Systems
And Elections:

The historical support for opposition parties was key in understanding the electoral results in contemporary Namibia. As we saw in the last chapter, most of the opposition were born from factionalism from both SWAPO and the DTA, or ethnic parties. The smorgasbord of political parties depend on not only their primordial historical and ethnic support, but also depend on disenfranchised voters from essentially SWAPO supporters and other dissatisfied voters from other opposition parties.

Elections are the ultimate public opinionated expression on leadership in every country. In Namibia’s case it is evermore proof that the marginality of the opposition is not based on a reaction from SWAPO’s access to state resources, but from support from the bottom up, highlighted by SWAPO’s constant success through the ballot box and the opposition's failure to capture support, from egoism which results in increased factionalism.

The ultimate question is the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Namibia maximise the opposition's potential or is it a hinderence? As will be analysed below, the PR system counteracts absolute legislative dominance. Thus the first section of this chapter will examine the merits of the PR system in Namibia. The second and last section will examine
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

*Abbreviations:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Action Christian National (Aksie Christelik Nasional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNF</td>
<td>Namibian National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Action for Social Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoD</td>
<td>Congress of Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUDO</td>
<td>National Unity Democratic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCN</td>
<td>Democratic Coalition of Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Democratic Movement for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>South West Africa National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa Peoples Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCN</td>
<td>Federal Convention of Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Monitor Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRP</td>
<td>Workers Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Namibia’s Proportional Representation System:*

As it stands, Namibian democratic system is that of proportional representation, which in theory allows greater representation to be awarded to the smaller parties, in Namibia if a party receives at least 1.39% of the vote (Hopwood, 33), it will receive one seat in the National Assembly. PR, is a highly centralized system, that counts votes at the national level as opposed to a local or regional counts. Thus the national representatives are chosen from party-lists, in which each party generates a list of people to represent the party at the national level. Voters cast ballots for the party instead the candidate or regional representative, in the national assembly. One core question is, how would the political system look if electoral systems were decentralized and national ultimately determined by constituent or regional outcomes?

How would the results look if the results were based on a plurality system? How would the results change? What would the national assembly look like? In order to answer these questions, one has to look at the regions, the population densities of each region, and then ultimately the parties’ support. It is important to note that this paper is not supposing any mechanism, on how a plurality “first past the post” system would work, i.e., proportions received for seats, or how many seats would allocated to each region. Nonetheless, for this analysis’ sake, let’s assume that each region would have
several seats, and ultimately the proportion of the vote would ultimately determine seat allocation. For the analysis, this section’s conclusion will be based on the results by region of the 2004 regional election results.  

Like all other African countries Namibia does not share the democratic reality of any other country. First, Namibia is a sparsely populated country of 2.2 million people, spread out over a total area of 824,572 km², divided into 13 regions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khomas</td>
<td>250,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omusati</td>
<td>228,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohangwena</td>
<td>228,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavango</td>
<td>202,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshana</td>
<td>161,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjizondiupa</td>
<td>135,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshikoto</td>
<td>161,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erongo</td>
<td>107,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>79,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karas</td>
<td>69,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>66,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardap</td>
<td>68,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaheke</td>
<td>68,039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures from (Hopwood, 3)

Khomas contains Windhoek plus surrounding towns and is located in Central Namibia. Windhoek is the largest city, with a population of approximately 250,000. Omasi, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto are the remnants of the seven old Owambo kingdoms in the north of the country, and roughly have about half the national population. Bordered by Kavango to the east. Otjizondiupa connects the Owambo region and Kavango with Khomas, and Erongo is to the west of Otjizondiupa and Khomas, on the central on the coast, where Walvis Bay and Swakopmund are located, hence leaving the south regions Hardap and Karas, the eastern area Omaheke, Northwest region of Omaheke, and Caprivi on the margins of the population centers.

The population density of Namibia is central to this discussion. Not only does the country have a low population spread out over a massive expanse of land, but also the bulk of the population, 67% in central and Northern Namibia, out of that 52% reside in Owamboland.

In 2004, SWAPO swept the regional elections in the Khomas region, with 64% of the vote. The closest competitor was the CoD with 10%. DTA won 6%, RP, NUDO, UDF 4% each and SWANU 1%. The result was a clear victory for SWAPO, and most

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37 All figures from Election Watch Namibia (Election Watch, 2009), [www.electionwatch.org.na](http://www.electionwatch.org.na)
likely it would have taken any seats allocated for that entire region in a first past the post contest.

In Omusati, SWAPO received 98% of the vote, while the CoD and NUDO received 1% each. Ohangwena provided SWAPO with 99% of the vote and 1% for the CoD. In Oshana, SWAPO polled 97% of the vote, CoD 2% and the DTA 1%. In Oshikoto, SWAPO received 85% of the vote, CoD, the DTA and the UDF 3% each. The results for this area are not surprising, and it would be clear that, if all these seats were awarded in a plurality system, SWAPO would receive full seats. The reason for SWAPO’s high support is that these regions are the primordial heart land of the Owambo Peoples Organisation (OPO), predecessor to SWAPO.

The other northern territories provide more interesting results, but are not has straight forward, mainly because SWAPO has dominance. And in a plurality system the opposition parties might make some headway into national representation. In Kavango, SWAPO received 89% of the vote, while the CoD received 6% and the DTA 5%. In Caprivian, SWAPO won 71% of the vote, while the CoD 17%, the Republican Party (RP) 8% and the DTA 5%. Here SWAPO would probably be awarded all seats, bit is interesting to note, and opposition parties are a little more pronounced in terms of support in these areas.

Even though Kumene is on the western borders of the Owambo heartland, SWAPO’s support is not great. SWAPO received 36%. Its closest competitor, the United Democratic Front (UDF), had 29%, the DTA 23%, National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) 8% and the RP 2%. In terms of allocation in a plural system, it would most likely be divided up among SWAPO and the UDF, and possibly the DTA as well.

Otijozondiupa is one of the more heavily populated areas and the corridor between the Owambo lands, Kavango with Khomas, Erongo and Kumene to the west and Omaheke to the east. It is an area that historically was the centre of the anti-colonial struggle during the German era, and is currently one of Namibia’s most important agrarian areas. SWAPO received 55% percent of the vote, NUDO 21%, the DTA 9%, CoD 7%, UDF 6% and RP 3%. Again a SWAPO sweep, but more activity from other parties, although none come close to threatening SWAPO’s margins.
Eroango on the coast of Namibia is economically important for the country, with not only mining but also Walvis Bay, the main port, and the urban centre of Swakopmund. SWAPO’s support is quite dominant here with 66% of the vote, the UDF 17%, DTA 5%, CoD and NUDO 4% each, RP 3% and SWANU 1%. Again in a plurality system SWAPO would receive overwhelming allocation.

Omaheke, on the central eastern fringes of the country, between Khomas and Botswana, is the least populated region of Namibia. But it is in this area, the only region in Namibia, were SWAPO did not receive the most votes. SWANU received 52%, NUDO 37%, DTA and SWAPO 20% each, DMC14% lastly CoD and UDF 5% each. This is interesting, because not only is it the only region that SWAPO did not come close to have the majority. But if this were a plurality system SWANU would most likely receive most of the seats in this region, representation that it does not even have today. NUDO would also be successful.

Hardap does not follow the same example as Omaheke, providing SWAPO with 56% of the vote, the DTA 23%, CoD 17%, DMC 2%, NUDO and independents 1% each. Again SWAPO had the overall majority in this area, and again as following most of contests, there is really not party that really seems ultimately to threaten SWAPO’s margins.

Karas has a high support rate for SWAPO of 72%, CoD 15%, DTA 10%, RP 3% and DMC 1%. Again SWAPO sweeps the vote, by large margins. What is really fascinating is that Karas is farther away from the SWAPO heartlands, and still has one of the highest support bases for the ruling party.

At a glance, any novice would be correct in assuming that SWAPO had overwhelming electoral support, winning 12 out of 13 regions, with a national average result of 70%. According to the plurality system, SWAPO would be entitled to majority of the seats in the national assembly. Although the CoD, UDF and DTA might have some representation, there would not be much difference from the current reality, excluding the RP, MAG and NUDO from the oppositional space. But in a shift from reality, SWANU would have representation in the National assembly, having won the Omaheke region. Unfortunately the exclusionary nature of this alternative model, would allow the means of success for the larger parties, and not allow the smaller ones to
energise their supporters with the potential of being represented at the national level. The PR system does just that, and capitalises on the maximum potential support for party. So even through SWAPO holds an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, it has only done so because it has the support of a broad population choice with limitations at a national level, where ultimately every vote counts, and is not discarded at the regional level.

Ultimately, a plurality system in Namibia would alienate much of the population, who still wish to have their political beliefs represented by an ethnic party, or one placated on advocacy. They might feel that their vote is not counted if they choose vote in for say MAG in Kavango, and their vote does not count at the national level, because it is ultimately counted for the regional representation. Under the PR system that one vote is one vote for MAG or other parties, and thus voters and parties are connected through national level support as opposed to regional.

### Elections in Namibia

The most notable thing about Namibian elections is the high turnout, almost all of which are above 50% and often well over 70%. Taking into account that there is no legal obligation for citizens to vote, the high degree of democratic participation in the country is quite phenomenal:

Like in all democracies elections have been the linchpin to Namibia’s success, allowing the ruling party to govern with overwhelming support from the people. Many of the strengths lie in the fact that Namibia’s PR systems allows a wider strata of the people some kind of representation in the National Assembly (NA), also local election results are determined in the same way. Presidential contests are more first past the post system, where the candidate with the most votes wins. Thus this section will concentrate on these three forms of contest.

### Regional Elections

These elections select councillors at the regional level. Although their actual power is restricted due to the highly centralised nature of the state system,

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38 All following figures taken from Hopwood, Graham “Guide to Namibian Politics” Namibian Institute for Democracy, Windhoek, 2008 pages 43-46
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

regional councillors do negotiate with the NA and the state apparatus for regional funding and projects, making them an integral part of the national structure.

_National Assembly:_ Regular elections are held for the lower house of the legislative branch of government. The nation votes for parties, which in turn choose delegates from party lists to be representatives in the chamber. The 1989 constituent assembly contest is included in this category, because the vote elected a legislative arm, which in turned elected the head of the body, who became the first president of Namibia.

_Presidential Elections:_ Are in general normally run alongside elections to the National Assembly. Here individuals run for office representing their parties. As will be seen below, the number of candidates has increased over time.

_Local Authority:_ These contests at the sub regional level do not have any national representations for two reasons: They are micro in scale and only present the support base for individual areas and the not a broader area; second, due to the highly centralised nature of the Namibian state, the regional councillors generally crowded out these individuals in national debates. Thus local authority elections will not be countral in this section.

Thus this section will analyse the nineteen years of national and presidential elections. In the paragraphs to come two crucial characteristics of Namibian elections should be inferred. First, in further discussion to the previous section, that SWAPO’s dominance among the electorate has been through the ballot box. Any doubts about SWAPO’s support that might have risen in the early years of Namibia’s political independence were quashed through the plausible scenarios in Namibia during the mid 90’s. Secondly, political parties have remained within the margins of political dignity and as will be seen below use their legal rights when they feel it is justified. These two factors advance the free and fair nature of Namibian elections, a point critical to Namibian electoral history.

The following section will then present a brief digest of all the non-local elections since 1989. Four characteristics should be noted from this section: first, as mentioned above, the large turnout of the public during these contests; second, the acknowledgement
of political parties of SWAPO’s ever growing support base; third, no party has ever bitten into SWAPO support; and lastly, there are always logical answers for problems incurred during an election, and most of the time they are centered around the Electoral Commission of Namibia not learning from its mistakes, mistakes which have never really had any substantive bearing on the results.

Constituent Assembly (CA) 1989:

The Constituent Assembly elections in April 1989, was the culmination of compliance of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 of 1978. The lead up to the contest was characterised as by the extensive voter registration drive, and then the subsequent voter turn out of 97% of registered\(^{39}\) it was the first time that the public of the territory was able to choose its first representatives. Under the watchful eye of some 6,000 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the election was past by relatively peaceful, with the exception of one person’s death (refer to Hard support).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>23,728</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>191,532</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCN</td>
<td>10,452</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNF</td>
<td>5,344</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>384,567</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>37,874</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>664,190</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures (Hopwood, 42) Please note that FCN, NNP and NPF have the value of one seat each.

\(^{39}\) Hopwood, Graham “Guide to Namibian Politics” Namibian Institute for Democracy, Windhoek, 2008
The result was no surprise to the public. SWAPO conveyed its international recognition and legitimacy as the rightful authority of the territory to the people, who in return acknowledged them as their chosen leadership, with some 57.3% of the vote. To the dismay of the South Africans, their favoured DTA party came in only second with 28.6%, rather a blow for the authorities because they had spent a lot of money and allocated a lot of logistical and material resources in an attempt to counter SWAPO’s support.

More importantly, this election showed what the political landscape of Namibia was going to be. It pretty much determined that certain parties like SWANU would have no role in the national decision making process. Lastly, the three seats gained by the remnants of the Namibian National Party (represented through the ACN) proved that the era of segregation laws and racial politics were in the past and not the future.

Lastly, this assembly was responsible for negotiating a new constitution for the country, itroves that was not solely in the hands of the dominant party. It was also the assembly that elected Sam Nujoma president of the assembly, a role which would be elevated to be the first president of the Republic of Namibia.

Post-Independence Elections:

Elections in the newly independent Namibia were met with excitement. For the first time Namibians were recognised as citizens eligible to determine their political course. Unfortunately, the ease and excitement did not interest the academia, a field that
is increasingly attracted to the violent more provocative scandal-laden contests, of which Namibia was devoid in their first 14 years of independence.

In order to understand the fortunes and follies of parties, it is important to understand that the elections of the first fourteen years ran smoothly, and on the most part without issue. Nevertheless, it still warrants an examination in order to chart not only SWAPO’s rise to dominance, but also to reveal Namibia’s surge to uphold democratic principles.

1992 Regional\(^{40}\) RC) Elections:

These were the first elections organised by the Namibian state. Not only was it important for the parties, which were finally going to have a break down of their support at a regional level, but also for the state, because it was the first ballot organised.

Parties contested council seats in thirteen regions. Though these regional seats do not come with a whole lot of power, they are still a political branch that does interact with the state apparatus, for regional development funds and issues, as opposed to the local authorities, who have a greater degree of separation from the state apparatus and are not included in this analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>256,778</td>
<td>67.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>103,359</td>
<td>27.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWANU</td>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>373,281</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures (Hopwood, 42))

As is clear, SWAPO carried the majority of the seats, with the DTA in a distant second place. All the other parties finished with small margins, with only the UDF

\(^{40}\) There were also 48 local authority contests as well
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

breaking that one percent barrier, showing that the smaller parties, many based on ethnicity for support, could not count on their support areas to carry over in the national arena. The larger (SWAPO and DTA) parties, which flaunted their multi-ethnic character, performed better and achieved greater margins of support.

Lastly, these regional elections, provided evidence of future results. SWAPO carried most of the contests by overwhelming margins, indicators of potential national results.

1994 National Assembly (NA) Election:

The 1994 National Assembly election proved to be one of the most defining in Namibian politics. Not only did SWAPO take a two-thirds majority in the legislature, but it was also the first contest where it was possible to compare and analyse trends among the parties.

The first four years on the new democracy was one of honeymoon where the mere ecstasy of an independent democratic culture tugged at the heart strings of all of who participated one way or another. But more importantly, the campaigning went “without drama”\(^\text{41}\), provided the atmosphere for a well organised election, not only for the National Assembly but also the Presidential race (see below) running simultaneously.

Though a predictable result, an analysis of the outcome turned up a worrying trend, i.e., that SWAPO won more seats with fewer votes than it did in 1989. This was observed by comparing the registered and cast votes of the CA 1989, RC 1992, NA 1994, then dissecting them by the votes attained by party, and the subsequent results:


Karl Wagner
As is noted, although SWAPO received fewer votes in the 1994 Nation Assembly elections than it did in the 1989 constituent elections, its proportion of representation far exceeded that of 1989. It would be easy to assume automatically that there was some malpractice or fraud in the balloting, but such a statement would be wrong.

The difference lies in the era in which the 1989 CA elections were held. For the most part the registration of voters was quite impressive, far exceeding the estimated eligible voter figures, though the turnout was roughly just below the estimation of eligible voters. In 1994, because fewer votes were cast and the turnout was lower, SWAPO was able to receive fewer votes but a greater margin.

This is explained in the nature of the voter registration for the CA. The UN registered voters without discrimination as long as they could prove that they residents of the territory. Thus it is estimated that more than 50,000 foreigners voted in the CA. By the 1994 ballot many of the those foreigners left Namibia. Even though the estimation of eligible voters was higher in 1994, Weiland only extrapolated from the possible upwardly trend from 1989, through population shifts and a younger population. However, it was not envisaged that a large chunk of population would leave and not vote (Weiland, 354-355), thereby allowing SWAPO greater margins with fewer votes.

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42 Estimation

Karl Wagner
Concurrently with the National Assembly elections was a presidential election as well. This was the first time the Namibian public could choose their very own leader. As was stated above, the CA 89 only chose the parties, which in turn chose the leader of the assembly, Sam Nujoma, who would then become first President of the Republic. Thus time Nujoma would be elected by a mandate from the people through popular vote, a crucial point in Namibian political debate 4 years later. His only opponent was former SWAPO member Misheke Muyongo of the DTA. The outcome was not surprising with an overwhelming victory for Nujoma.
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Percentage of vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sam Nujoma</td>
<td>370,452</td>
<td>74.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misheke Muyongo</td>
<td>114,843</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>485,295</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures (Hopwood, 42)

1999 Regional Elections:

In November 1999, the second regional election was held throughout the country. This election was worrying due to the record low turnout in any contested election in Namibia, only some 40%\(^43\). While the official line blamed the political parties for not adequately mobilizing their supporters, other reasons included the discontent of the existing parties and more logistical complaints mainly geared towards the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) due to an inherent confusion of registration cards and the lack of fervor to register.

Nonetheless, the results continued in the normal trend started by SWAPO four years before, and they pretty much swept the boards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>51,116</td>
<td>23.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCN</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>145,196</td>
<td>67.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>9,511</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>208,674</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures: (Hopwood, 43)

Comparing this to the Regional elections in 1992, although SWAPO received approximately 112,000 votes less then before, it increased its share from 67.29% to 67.9%. The DTA’s share of the vote dropped from 27% to 24%, while only the UDF increased its share from 2.44% to 4.45%. The independent candidates gained as well,

\(^43\) For the local authority elections earlier that year the turnout was 34% lower
reaching just above a percent, up from 0.11%. From the tables above it can be concluded that there was a strong apathy for the main parties which could explain the independents’ sudden rise, though not a formidable force in proportion, still a rise of about 10%. But another conclusion could be made that the one party that people might have wanted on the ballot was not campaigning. The newly formed CoD chose to opt out of this contest and to concentrate its efforts on the National and Presidential elections instead.

National Assembly Elections 1999:

This election had to be one of the most pivotal in Namibian politics. Not only did SWAPO have to defend its two-thirds majority for the first time, but, after the rift in the ruling party, it was the first campaign in which former SWAPO official Ben Ulenga and his newly created CoD stand in national politics. Amid all the excitement and the “liveliest” (Hopwood, 44) contest since the CA in 89, there was much speculation on SWAPO’s saliency and also on the position of the DTA, which had lost a lot of credibility from scandal and an internal power struggle, as the main opposition party.

The tone of this campaign was not in the holistic nature of the early 90’s. Instead there were rather harsh attacks against CoD officials from SWAPO. Such language that really reignited the debate over whether SWAPO was a ruling party or a liberation party, because never had SWAPO had worry about challenges from within. A lot of their fears were dispelled with the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Seats acquired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoD</td>
<td>53,289</td>
<td>10.05%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>50,824</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>408,174</td>
<td>76.15%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>15,685</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>531,590</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures (Hopwood, 43)
As is seen, SWAPO gained a greater proportion of the vote, increasing its total seats from 53 to 55. The biggest loser would be the DTA, though coming in third in the polls with over 50,000 votes, behind the CoD’s over 53,000 votes. This meant a loss of 8 seats, which placed them even with the CoD, which took most of its support from the DTA. However, since the DTA was only tied with the CoD, the DTA remained the designated main opposition party.

*Presidential Election 1999:*

The Presidential contest of 1999 was held at the end of a vigorous political debate over a possible third term for Nujoma, which ultimately saw the first amendment to constitution. This aside, what distinguished this election from others was the sheer number of candidates, and for the first time most of the parties in the National Assembly offered candidates, including Ben Ulenga of then new CoD, Chief Katuudtire Kaura, new leader of the DTA, and Justus Garoëb of the UDF:
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

Karl Wagner

Regional Elections 2004:

SWAPO swept the board, winning 96 of 107 seats on offer, thus further cementing SWAPO’s dominance of the political life in the country. Interestingly, it was a broader national victory as opposed to being concentrated in one part of the country. SWAPO failed to win the most votes in only one region, Omaheke, where Herero parties fared tops: SWANU received 52%, NUDO 37%, while SWAPO tied with DTA with 20% of the vote (Election Watch, 2009). SWAPO cleared over 20% in every other region, its margins were higher in its home regions as well, in some cases grabbing 99% such as in Ohangwena (Ibid). Though these are significant results for SWAPO, turnout was only 55% percent of the eligible voters.

In comparison with 1999, the results are interesting. It is clear that among the opposition the UDF had the most gains, nearly doubling the amount of votes they received in 1999.

Figures (Hopwood, 43)
They in fact had very high margins in Kumene with 28% and in Erongo with 18%. Though they probably did lose a lot of their support to the CoD which was running at the regional level for the first time, two parties which had broken off earlier that year siphoned off an enormous amount of support, NUDO taking 3.71% of the vote and doing very well in the Herero areas, and the RP with 1.50% showed that it had weakened the DTA’s support.

National Assembly 2004:

Campaigning leading up to this election was in eventful and very subdued. In fact most of the parties’ activity came after the polls, when the opposition parties exercised their legal rights and question results (see below). The result was a forgone conclusion, with SWAPO receiving 55 seats in the National Assembly, and 17 divided up among the opposition. Though the opposition had not touched SWAPO’s two thirds majority, the CoD replaced the DTA to become the official opposition for the first time since independence, and before:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoD</td>
<td>59,467</td>
<td>7.27%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>42,070</td>
<td>5.14%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUDO</td>
<td>34,814</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>16,187</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>629,609</td>
<td>75.83%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>30,355</td>
<td>3.71%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>819,452</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The national elections of 2004 re-confirmed SWAPO’s dominance in the National Assembly for one more term. Interestingly, even though SWAPO’s vote did not increase by well over 200,000 from 1999, a staggering increase. The CoD also increased their voting share as well, receiving just over 6,000 more votes.

The DTA fared worse, not only reeling from competition with the CoD, but having to regain their their support after NUDO and RP left the alliance. The DTA lost roughly 8,000 votes, leaving it with 4 seats in the National Assembly and the loss of the designation of official opposition.

The re-emergence of the RP and NUDO as independent parties for first time since 1978 provided further evidence that DTA was not as loyal and strong; as will be eluded to later DTA support had been in the decline for years. Though it could be said that many of the DTA’s supporters did not turn out to vote, the elections had a high turnout of about 83%.

In December 2004, the RP and the CoD took the ECN to court over irregularities. More opposition parties joined the suit in January 2005. The court ordered a recount of the vote, which was carried out hastily in order to have all the ballots recounted before the presidential inauguration. The results did not change much, and the opposition parties accepted the results. This was a rare moment of cooperation among a majority of the opposition parties. Not only had they challenged the result, something unheard before 2004, but they did so as a bloc.

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Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

Presidential Elections 1999

Though the election concluded with a new a president, the victor and the result were a forgone conclusion. It was already known that the handpicked successor of Nujoma was going to win over whelming popular support. The bigger question was how the opposition was going to do? The elections results were the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justus Garoëb</td>
<td>31,354</td>
<td>3.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katuuyire</td>
<td>41,905</td>
<td>5.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaura</td>
<td>15,955</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henk Mudge</td>
<td>625,605</td>
<td>76.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hifikepunwe</td>
<td>9,378</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohamba</td>
<td>34,651</td>
<td>4.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosie Pretorius</td>
<td>9,378</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuaima</td>
<td>59,547</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>818,395</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the presidential vote from 1999, one notes a slump of about 10,000 votes. In 2004, Riruako (NUDO) received just over 34,600 votes, and Mudge (RP) received nearly 16,000 votes, which makes the combined total of votes for the newly re-established parties around 50,600, double of what Kaura (DTA) won in the 1999 contest.

After a series of elections, it became clear that there was a solid support for SWAPO, but there was no effort to increase that support. Although Ulenga’s CoD did receive 3,000 more votes then he did in 1999, it probably only detracted from the DTA support further. The UDF (Justus Garoëb) was able to nearly double its votes, making it seem incredibly progressive in their capture of Damara support. However, unfortunately much of the UDF’s support remains within the Damara tribal populations.

Reflections on the Figures:

SWAPO is dominant in electoral successes in Namibia. Not only has it had absolute majority of the political system, it has exercised its political power in such a
fashion not only to maintain its support, but to expand. With no opposition party having been able to provide an adequate countervailing force, SWAPO has enjoyed its position without worry, alone at the top.

The space of the opposition is far more exciting, because in this oppositional space is the main space of competition for political parties, and it is in this very space that determines success of the party.

It would be very hard to speculate what will happen in the next elections. Current thought is that, after the elections in October and November 2009, the whole support map will change, the greatest change being in the opposition cluster at the bottom. But certainly in 1999-2004 the election was not fought over which party will get the overall majority, but rather which will be the official opposition.

As is very evident from the graph above, the concentration for the opposition party support is really the key battleground for any Namibian election. Since SWAPO’s margins are so high, its only fear is losing its two-thirds majority, while retaining an outright majority in the assembly.

As was seen in NA 99, the CoD emerged and cut the lead of the DTA considerably. The internal struggles going once inside the DTA, which had broader implications for the parties reputation throughout the country, helped its cause. The picture is not as rosy for the CoD. It has not yet been able to attract new support, and to a certain extent its support has roughly just stabilized. Even though its support base is
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pretty much spread throughout the country, it has no really intense concentrations. In recent local authority elections, mainly in the Tobias Hainyeko constituency, its boycott along with other parties including the breakaway RDP did not provide any iota of actual support for these parties.

![Voter turnout chart](chart.png)

Figures: (Hopwood, 39-41)

What ever does happen, SWAPO majority will not waiver in absolute proportions. Instead its dominance of the political system is set to be maintained over the next couple of elections. Without speculating, if SWAPO were able to maintain the grip on power it has had since 1999, then there is no reason for SWAPO to follow the path of other liberation parties like in Zimbabwe. The formation of a united opposition is far more impractical, because, as we see in the chapters about political parties in Namibia, the parties are still personal vehicles dominated by figures whose ultimate goal in a long career is to gain power. If they were all clumped together in a unified opposition, serious rifts would form and possible fracture any unity.
5.) Support, Past and Present

As was clear in the last chapter, SWAPO continued dominance in power was confirmed by popular choice from regular national elections. At the same time the electoral results not only show the marginal situation of opposition parties, but also the true electoral contest for Namibia’s opposition as always among the opposition parties. They have never been able to attract large proportions of SWAPO support.

Instead opposition parties are competing for the designation as official opposition in the National Assembly. This leads to broader observations. First, it indicates the continuing prevalence of a single-party dominance model. Second, illustrates that the degrees of factionalism and the entry of new parties or the re-entry of older parties into democratic contests test democratic institutions like legal systems and the electoral commission. Ultimately it shows how the political parties discussed in chapter three have performed electorally, providing the rationale for why political parties are supported in Namibia.

This chapter in turn looks at the foreign support political parties received or are receiving in Namibia. Continuing a general theme of this paper, the historic contexts are discussed, in particular the support given to SWAPO by the international community during the liberation struggle, and the aid the DTA received at the same time, concluding at the post-independent reality of support for opposition parties.

*Party to Party support in a time of Liberation:*

European political party support of Namibian parties developed during the emergence of Namibian parties with liberation agendas. For SWAPO, as for other
Donor Support of Opposition parties in Namibia

liberation movements in Southern Africa, contact was made in exile. SWAPO made contact with European powers was in Dar es Salaam, then Tanganyika. Sweden and its Social Democratic Party (SDP) then in power took particular interest in SWAPO.

In the first of a two-volume collection Tors Sellström45 documents the first interactions between SWAPO and Sweden. Initial support came through study opportunities in Sweden for SWAPO officials who were not only able to get a higher education but also were performed publicity and global propaganda work. In the attempt by SWAPO to gain global recognition not only for their struggle but also for their campaign to win for SWAPO recognition as the legitimate authority of Namibia, events such as the Oxford Conference of 1966, served to bring SWAPO into contact with other European anti-Apartheid movements and government officials.

Sweden’s first contacts with Namibian political parties, through activities with the students in South Africa, were made with Herero students belonging to SWANU. Sellström describes how these SWANU students, already participating in the anti-Apartheid movement, were brought to Sweden for study. While in Sweden SWANU along with the SDP became involved with in public campaigning. As time went by, the SWANU became an ever present fixture in the Swedish anti-Apartheid movement and politics, climaxing with their presence at a Labour Day rally at the Saltsjöbaden conference46 in 1965. External party images were deceiving, according to Sellström, several Swedish movements were questioning the relationship with SWANU, and these included the Social Democratic Party and Solidarity Movement. Sellström states that prominent Swedish organisations like Social Democratic labour association in Uppsala started collecting money for both SWANU and SWAPO.

Before SWAPO started establishing its relationship with the Swedish government, it had been campaigning heavily with African countries, and was officially acknowledged by the OAU as the only liberation movement in Namibia. Plus SWAPO had collected a sizable exiled population in need of humanitarian assistance in Tanzania. During the first visit of SWAPO party secretary General Jacob Kuhaugua to Sweden, Kuhaugua convinced the Swedish Foreign Ministry that Southern African liberalization movements

46 The first SWANU party conference hosted by the Swedish Social Democratic Party

Karl Wagner 88
like SWANU were insignificant, and in considering with SWAPO’s track record in organising international support, the Foreign Ministry seemed to agree.

In 1969 the second terrorism trial was held in Windhoek. The Swedish government’s connections with SWAPO were highly visible, as Stockholm ordered the Swedish delegation which was to be present at the trial by. According the Sellström the presence of the Swedes brought SWAPO and the Swedish government closer together. At the same time SWANU became marginalised not only politically, their shrinking near no presence in Africa meant Sweden had a weaker compulsion to support the party.

In 1967, Nujoma sent an official SWAPO representative to Sweden to act as the voice of SWAPO in Stockholm. This position would be greatly enhanced after the Tango conference when SWAPO decided to create three official offices; Stockholm would represent the liberation movement in all the Scandinavian countries, other offices were established in West Germany and Austria.

Sellström’s account continues in a second volume, at the point in 1969 when the Swedish parliament adopted a policy statement to provided official assistance and support for SWAPO. Accordingly, in some circles in the Swedish government, support for SWAPO and Namibian liberation was key to abolishing Apartheid in Southern Africa, a sentiment that was emerging in the UN as well.

Financial support was not always a sure source of support. The Swedes suspended direct financial support in 1972/73, when, instead of direct support to the liberation movement, the Swedish government along with the Swedish Lutheran Church supported the refugees who had fled the fighting in Namibia. And in 1974-1978 the period of détente, which resulted in the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial empire, sent ripples through Zambia and the liberation movements that were stationed there. The Zambian host government restricted the movements and activities of liberation movements, a move which hit SWAPO hard at just the time that its policy of self-sustainability was causing internal stress.

SWAPO’s move to Angola made SWAPO more reliant on Swedish foreign aid. It was also in the late 70’s when Swedish support was expanded, with official Swedish

development aid being allocated to the construction of SWAPO refugee camps, and equipment to sustain these centres. This support was made possible by developments at the United Nations, were SWAPO was in consultations with the world governing body over the status of Namibia as well as the conflict in Angola.

The years between 1978 and 1990 saw SWAPO work with the United Nations Transition Authority Group in pursuant to United Nations decision to end the South African rule over Namibia through Security Council resolution 435. Sweden among other countries was asked to take an active involvement in Namibia’s transition to independence. On top of Sweden existing assistance to SWAPO, the Swedish government became an active partner in the transitional process.

Upon Independence, Sweden’s support moved from the realm of supporting a liberation party to a party in national government. After some time Swedish aid shifted to a programme that was suitable to the state, although Swedish help did construct the international infrastructure of SWAPO party, such as refugee camps and facilities in Zambia.

Sellström reflects heavily on Sweden’s assistance to SWAPO. Not just on the material and financial support, even though the deconstruction of SWAPO as a liberation movement overseas. Sweden was an active participant in educating the future leaders of an independent Namibia.

Sweden efforts were part of a broader global push in support for SWAPO. The Swedish government was able to look to its neighbours for common policies, but the roles of Norway and Finland were different. For example, legal constraints limited Norway’s involvement, and the Norwegian government worked with SWAPO on their humanitarian activities. According to Bert Hagen Agøy48 recounts the Norwegians’ pleasure with SWAPO’s effective usage of Norwegian funds that allowed a relationship to grow. The extent of the relationship permitted Norway to campaign confidently on SWAPO’s behalf in the international community including the UN in the latter half of the 1970’s.

Hagen Agøy reports that there were some stumbling blocks, such as in 1979 when the Norwegian government had questions about funding SWAPO. At that time the liberation movement was broke and had used most of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) funds allocated to them that year. In addition to some internal dynamics, including internal strife and the move of headquarters to Angola, the Norwegian government re-examined their aid program to SWAPO. After the government’s re-evaluation, the Norwegian government re-instated aid to SWAPO in 1981.

Finland’s involvement in Namibia started very early through the Finnish Lutheran Church due to the large number of Finnish missionaries present in Ovamboland. The Finnish government was able to have access to northern Namibian populations to support and pro-liberation sentiment. Church involvement was a key feature in Finnish Namibian policy, as Iiona Soiri and Pekka Petola established an elaborate support network was in place with in Finnish foreign policy, not just humanitarian aid for refugees, but also the Namibia scholarship a programme were the Finnish government provided funds and study visas to Namibians to Finland. Many SWAPO members took advantage of this scholastic support.

Finland played a key role in lobbying in the United Nations. Finland’s early lobbying with members of the Security Council insured that the Namibian agenda would not wither away in the international body. Finland was instrumental in the creation of United Nations Institute for Namibia, which was based in Lusaka.

Legacy of European Support on contemporary Namibian Politics:

There is no doubt in the minds of many in Namibia about the role Nordic and other European nations played in Namibian independence. As seen above European governments gave SWAPO access to global decision-making bodies and actively lobbied a Namibian agenda in these very same organisations.

Crucially Nordic countries educated individuals who were going to take control of an independent state. In a sense donors were able to influence future political decision.
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makers. Granted this statement is difficult to defend, merely because it is ultimately impossible to determine the extent what influenced on Namibian politicians European or North American education had.

The prominence of foreign educations is in evidence on individuals biographies of SWAPO politicians. Most of SWAPO’s leading, long standing politicians like Libertina Amaphilia, Hage Geingob, Nangolo Mumba, Ngarikutuke Tiriraange, and Peter Katjavivi received higher education degrees from Western institutions during the liberation struggle. Many former SWAPO politicians who split from the ruling party also earned Western educations. As we have already seen the RDP leadership has received higher education from school is the United States, and Libolly Haufiku, the chief administrator of the RDP, has degrees from Finland.

To sum up the legacy of support for opposition parties in Namibia, Western degrees have so far determined the current political elite. Were the politicians of a newly independent Namibia were able draw on their educations in forming a government agenda. Coupled with the privileged educational possibilities from South African institutions of officials from the DTA bloc, a foreign education has always been a significant factor in the Namibian political elite, and decisive during the negotiation of a new constitution in the Constituent Assembly.

As has been shown in this paper, DTA historically collaborated with the South African authority. The mere fact that many of the upper echelon of DTA officials had education from South Africa was not an indication of South African political support, but more that these officials were part of the privileged classes of occupied Namibian society who could offered study overseas. Direct South African support came in other forms.

*Operation Heyday and Victor*:  

In the lead-up to the Constituent Assembly elections, the South African government set aside monies totalling R 185.5million to aid the DTA. This campaign

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51 An excellent source for biographies of political personalities can be found Hopwood, Graham “Guide to Namibian Politics” Namibian Institute for Democracy, Windhoek, 2008, in his chapter “A-Z of Political Personalities”

52 As presented in the following publication Truth and Reconciliation Commission “Truth and Reconciliation Report, Volume II” Truth and Reconciliation commission, South Africa, 1998
mobilized a massive amount of resources from many different government institutions, such as the South African Defence Forces (SADF), the Police, the National Intelligence Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Information. The effort was a last-minute attempt to curb the appeal and support of SWAPO in the elections. The scheme was divided into two operations: Heyday, a media campaign of disinformation, and Victor, a coercive campaign designed to discredit SWAPO and the United Nations Transition Authority Group (UNTAG).

*Heyday* received R125 million and was commanded by a Major Nico Bisson of the SADF. It was to set up an information centre known as the African Communications Project in a Windhoek hotel, which allowed the South Africans to control information and news for UNTAG and foreign press to get information, skewed by the South African government.

*Victor* was a police operation. The funding of *Victor* was more visible than it was for *Heyday*. The police in South Africa deposited funds in a series of controlled bank accounts across South Africa, which in turn sent contributions to the Namib Fund. These funds were then used to buy fifty vehicles which were driven by Koevoet personnel in Ovamboland to transport SWAPO supporters to non-SWAPO rallies, mainly those of the DTA.

Lastly, this operation supported white supremacist groups including *Aksie Kontra* 435, three members of which, Horst Klenz, Leonard Veneendal and Darryl Stopforth, killed a security guard in a grenade attack on the UNTAG office in Ovamboland. They were subsequently arrested by the police but later escaped in an ambush. They successfully fled to South Africa to escape prosecution.

The success of the South African support for the DTA did not meet the project expectations, because the DTA had to settle for being the main opposition, and the people’s overwhelming support for SWAPO was confirmed. Thus the prevailing solution to Namibian independence was determined resist South African influence.

**Post-independence support:**

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54 An elite group of Namibians who were a tactical force for the South African authorities during the liberation struggle
55 Has applied for immunity from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In 1989 it was apparent that Namibia was on the verge of independence. As we saw above, the South Africans tried their hardest to win support for a collaborationist party, the DTA. Ultimately their attempts failed with the results of the Constituent Assembly election in that year, when SWAPO won the largest number of votes.

In this year also the solidarity movement/anti-Apartheid movement wound down for Namibia, and a new age of relationships was conceived from the remains of the solidarity movement. But instead of getting behind one group as the solidarity movement did with SWAPO, groups or in this case foreign political parties could and did choose other Namibian parties.

Three German *Stiftungen* opened permanent offices in Namibia: the Friedrich Ebert (FES) of the Social Democratic Party, the Hanns Seidel (HSS) of the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), and the Konrad Adenauer (KAS) of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). With many programmes their very public activities provide assistance and opportunity to up and coming Namibian academics and political and business figures. They support civic projects and lectures for civil society organizations such as the National Institute for Democracy (NID) and the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR). All three of these German foundations have less publicized activities in support of political parties.

The assistance provided to Namibian political parties by the German *Stiftungen* is not a contract based on money, but rather structural and logistical support. Under German law, these *Stiftungen* are prohibited from giving money directly to parties; instead they are allowed to aid in functioning of the party.

Each of the three *Stiftungen* working in Namibia has a different approach to party support. There is enough contact between the parties that they tend to not tread over each other’s interests, or to counter each other’s projects. Hence, each *Stiftung* has a base of parties it works with.

*Activities based on ideology:*
The Namibian parties with which the FES and KAS are associated are based on a perceived shared political ideology. KAS finds its ideological partners in the DTA and helps provide necessary capacity-building activities like manifesto workshops and other forms of seminars in both Namibia and Germany.

FES has a relationship based on history, though its past activities have not been so prominent as those of the Swedish Social Democrats. They funded the SWAPO office in Bonn, then the capital of West Germany. Upon independence, FES opened an office in Windhoek and continued to support SWAPO internationally by aiding them in joining the Socialist International (SI). Also FES was instrumental in the creation of the SWAPO archives, and remained a symbolic supporter until it opened in 2007.

FES has taken a more hands-on approach with SWAPO, training the individual sub-groups within the party, such as the SWAPO Women’s Council. Other training programs with the SWAPO party are granted after a decision-making process in FES. It is hard to conformity the exact extent of FES’s current support to the SWAPO party beyond the workshops. But the historic connections seem to continue, and SWAPO appears to be the main partner of FES in Namibia.

This is not to say that FES is solely committed to one party. It has relationships with other parties as well, although different in nature from their relationship with SWAPO. They tend to not necessarily to deal with the upper echelons of the other parties, but instead work through the less prominent, vocal and visible members. FES’ Youth Leadership development program is mainly oriented to the members of the various party youth organizations, including SWAPO, NUDO, the RP and the DTA. This program consists of modules based on skills, knowledge and political attitudes, such as a coherent, just approach to alternative political beliefs of respective parties. With these programs, FES works together with the National Namibian Youth Forum, again a cross-political-party forum to sponsor debates and tackling issues prevailing in Namibia. Finally, FES holds capacity-building courses with individual ministries and runs the induction workshop for new parliamentarians.

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FES has enhanced SWAPO’s representation at a regional level, and could be seen as a second way of contact with political parties in southern African countries when other modes of contact fail. Having been a key supporter of other left leaning liberation movements in Southern Africa, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, FES has been able to create a dialogue group with the dominant parties of the liberation countries and non-liberation countries like Botswana, which also has a dominant party. In this group, the dominant parties are able to exchange information and experiences about dealing with opposition. Though FES supports this dialogue, its input seems limited. Instead, FES is able to gain first-hand knowledge concerning opinions of democracy in these new governments. Though this initiative is not necessarily spearheaded by FES in Namibia, they are still an active contributor along with SWAPO at this forum.

Support without ideology:

The Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS) is one of the more intriguing political organizations working in Namibia. It represents the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian conservative party. But instead of discriminating along ideological lines like the other two Stiftungen in Namibia, the HSS strives to improve the quality of Namibian democracy. Thus it works with parties who request it assistance.

With this all inclusive dynamic comes a price. HSS is very careful to monitor the nature and culture of the political parties it works with. If a political party is having a rift or going through issues that HSS feels is not conducive to the proper, healthy functioning of a political party, HSS suspends its activities until it feels the issues are rectified.

HSS is limited by the same regulations as the other German Stiftungen in Namibia. Thus its activities are very similar as well, with workshops and seminars being the norm. But instead of stopping at the functioning level of parties, HSS tries to make up the shortfall in campaign information and research. HSS does not actively participate in Namibian political campaigns. Instead it provides studies on civics and population demographics for any political party which wants them. For example, these studies research the percentage of children receiving a secondary education in, say, Omaheke.
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useful campaign information at a regional and national level. The idea is to eliminate the need for political parties to do their own research on the exact figures.

By providing this information, HSS is filling a void of information and limiting the excuses of political parties for not running on issues. There is no clear evidence that parties apply the support that is allotted? This is an interesting idea and concept, but one has to question whether anybody in the public cares.

Support from Abroad:

Unlike the German foundations, the Swedish and the British donors still remain active, but only from outside the country, continuing the traditional separation and support of opposition parties. The Olof Palme Centre is the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s foundation, and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy is the British Labour Party’s branch. The funding both provided the opposition Congress of Democrats (CoD) would eventually end when a power struggle within the party saw the funding used as a weapon.

Olof Palme Centre:

Probably no other political party in the world had such a great influence on Namibian liberation as the Swedish Social Democrats, who have continued their support through the Palme Centre. The Centre ceased its activities in the latter half of the first decade of the 21st century. As already seen in the last section, Sweden took the struggle in Namibia quite seriously and was pivotal in helping SWAPO get the international recognition that it needed to legitimize its struggle for independence in Namibia. Upon independence the Swedish Social Democratic Party shifted Namibia’s program away from the more mainstream party administration to its foundation, the Olof Palme Centre. Though Namibian affairs are still closely watched by certain strata of the Swedish Social Democrats, the relationship to SWAPO is now more detached. SWAPO remains a party of interest and friendship, as opposed to the close status it enjoyed during liberation.
The exact events leading up to the Olof Palme Centre’s withdrawal is unclear. What could be deduced is that the Palme Centre felt alienated by both the CoD leadership leading up to its split from SWAPO and the Swedes’ feeling that the CoD was not an effective opposition. This is not just case-specific to the CoD. In 1998 the Palme Centre stopped funding SWAPO because it did not like what it thought was undemocratic propaganda from the ruling party, most notably Nujoma’s third-term debate and the homophobic rhetoric prevalent in SWAPO at the time.

The Swedes gave approximately 25,000€ a year, a fair bit of money for a Namibian political party, considering that it is roughly the same amount that political parties receive per seat in the National Assembly through the state support. There is no accountability in the use of the state stipends; these funds can be used to support networks of individual politicians. The Palme Centre’s money, on the other hand, had to be accounted for, not only to the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s budget but also to the Swedish taxpayer.

The alienation that developed with the intensification of the internal power struggle fragmented CoD into two camps, one of the founders, Ben Ulenga, and the other led by Nora Schimming-Chase. The polarization was not due to access to funds, as some generic interpretation of intra-party conflict might have us believe (Amundsen, 5-6), but more a straight political contest for access to oppositional power.

The speculation as why the Palme Centre cut its ties with the CoD is very similar to the reasons why the Westminster Foundation for Democracy suspended its activities. With one overwhelming difference, as we will see below, whereas the Palme and Westminster support was used to discredit the leadership, and thus can be seen as a weapon.

Westminster Foundation for Democracy:

The Westminster Foundation rather quite actively supported the CoD at first. It is unclear when the first instalment of funds arrived. Some people inferred that it came immediately upon the creation of the party in the late 1999, but other accounts hold that the first monies came around 2003, in the lead-up to the 2004 campaigns.
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What happened to the first instalment of the monies is unclear, because of the emergence of the leadership struggle in the CoD. In 2007, as has already been mentioned before, Nora Schmining-Chase contested Ben Ulenga’s leadership of the party. He countered, and the party congress of Keetmenshopp in 2007 was declared invalid, thus triggering a lengthy legal battle.

The party was split down the middle. The Swedish noted this and monitored the situation within the party with concern. But seemingly the Westminster Foundation did not. The late Reinhard Gertze, the former party treasurer, was in the Schmining-Chase camp. He was responsible for providing the relevant reports on funds to the donors. Before his death, he had requested more funds from the Westminster Foundation. They gave him what is believed to have been a total of 25,000€. One can merely speculate what happened to the money for two reasons. First, the struggle within the party was so great that people in the different factions had stopped speaking to each other. The funds could have gotten lost in the silence. Second, Gertze died, and the budget books are still missing. His widow presumably still has them, but the party cannot get a hold of them.

The assumption is that Nora Schmining-Chase used the Westminster Foundation’s funds to mount her legal case against Ulenga. And it is clear that Ulenga really had not known that the Westminster Foundation had given the monies until the Foundation asked for the accounts and receipts. Currently now that the struggle is over and the Ulenga camp has maintained their control of the party, there is a scramble for both contact for potential future funds within the CoD., In order to reconciliation with the donors the party must get a hold of Gertz’s books in order to account for past funding/

Success of Support:

The central question for this entire project is what effect foreign support of opposition parties has had on Namibian political parties and democracy. As we have seen throughout, SWAPO has dominated the Namibian political system. But popular support as registered through the ballot box, and not through usage of state resources has brought about SWAPO’s dominance. The Namibians state’s efforts ease the financial

57 1960-2008, cause of death was asthma related
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constraints of opposing political parties. Leaves political parties to their own devices, their destructive nature is not necessarily influenced by SWAPO. Thus we have to ask what would happen to the political parties if foreign support were to disappear. The conclusive point is that if foreign support were withdrawn from the Namibian opposition, would not have any effect on party behaviour. As was seen with the CoD above, the reasons behind the struggle is for access to power and party resources and potentially foreign funds, the loss of support was a consequence of the power struggle, and even after the absence of support the CoD’s power struggle continued and was ultimately solved with the help of an external adjudicator (in this case a judge) and not pressured from overseas. For if the ruling party’s if foreign support were to dry up, SWAPO’s future would be secure due to their access to party subsidy guaranteed by their presence in the National Assembly.
6.) Conclusion:

This paper was designed as an exploration of the effects of foreign donor support of opposition parties in Namibia. It examined two principal aspects of support and democratic political system in Africa and particularly in Namibia. Contextualizing Namibia into this discussion, this paper presented a concise history of the country’s political parties as well as the personality’s activity within these parties. Besides providing an overview of Namibia’s electoral history, the paper analyzed the effectiveness of the prevailing proportional representation system, which, as has been demonstrated, provides access to opposition parties and limits SWAPO dominance. Ultimately the paper concludes that international support has not had any visible effect on either the democratic process or the supported political parties. In fact, using the example of the main opposition, the CoD, its self-destructive nature is not as Amundsen argued an outcome of foreign support, but rather stems from the personalism and high degree of factionalism prevalent in the party leadership.

Although this paper has concentrated on foreign support, it also critiqued the Namibian opposition, such as seen in high degree of factionalism and immense personalism of parties. How the opposition parties interact with the single-party dominance of the ruling SWAPO party is incredibly interesting. But how does Namibia conform to the presented theories?

Conclusion about the cited literature:
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The literature chosen for discussion in this project was not selected for its concurrence with the Namibian reality of support for opposition parties. Its importance for this work was the specific questions they asked to further debate about donor support of political parties in Namibia.

John Haberson examined the political economy of democracy and the World Bank’s ability to utilize the theory of democracy to lift marginalised poverty-stricken labourers from poverty, and especially in Africa. But Haberson’s study is mute in this project because Namibia never needed to sign up to the conditions of World Bank structural adjustment.

Thomas Carothers identified political parties in new democracies as one of the weakest variables in a successful, strong, established democratic system. He is cautious approach about support for opposition parties. Recognizing a key dilemma, he asks sceptically whether it is really the responsibility of foreign parties to prop up ineffectual opposition parties both financially or logistically. Though his work is a critical examination of support, he concentrates on the consequences to the party and not necessarily so much on the political culture. He maintains that a vital ingredient in a democracy’s success is a single robust opposition party. He says little about the benefits to the broader oppositional political culture.

Inge Amundsen presented foreign support of opposition parties as an alternative to democratic imposition. His scope is not confined to any theoretical political debate, like a proxy issue derived from the Cold War or a broader neo-liberal agenda. He emphasizes three problems: intervention, polarisation and fragmentation.

Amundsen’s problems are difficult to apply and analyse. Regading Intervention presents a full paradigm. First, how can one examine or observe pressure on sovereign decision making by receiving parties? Would parties in Namibia openly confirm interventions? Second, as we have seen through the CoD, the support provided to this party is seemingly voluntary, and the commitments and obligations are simple accounting of support. There are no apparent consequences if agreements are broken, nor in Amundsen's analysis are there any indications of the nature of legal obligations regarding agreements made between parties. It is easy to assume that these agreements do not entail enormous commitments from the receiving party. Since Namibia allows foreign
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support of opposition parties as long as the parties declare any overseas assistance, there is no question of legality, and no punishment in place to enforce any failure to comply. Finally, domestic circumstances might not be appropriate for an open partnership between the local party and its foreign supporter. The mere presence of foreign political foundations might only fuel rumours of foreign interference and feed conspiracy theories. Most importantly, in less stable democratic societies these foreign foundations would not want to intervene in local politics. In Namibia on the other hand, the activities of political foundations are apparently unknown to the general public, not due to secrecy and covertness, but more seemingly due to public indifference towards support for Namibian parties.

*Polarisation* is puzzling, because it is not clear to what extent polarising the political spectrum is a problem. For example, in an environment where most parties follow ideologies to the left or right of centre, could increased polarization of a political system stimulate new attitudes in the political environment and culture? If polarisation is such a problem, then is Amundsen claiming that highly polarised democratic societies are seemingly less democratic? If so, how can one view democratic systems in the donor countries that have clear divisions of political ideologies?

These questions ring true in Namibia, where, although it can be inferred that Nudo, MAG, RP and the DTA are right of centre, there are very few differences between their manifestos and those of the opposition to the left of centre such as CoD and RDP, which also do not differ very much from those of SWAPO. In fact most of the parties do not deviate materially from SWAPO’s social democratic development agenda. Returning to Erdmann’s informative nugget that parties lack policy differences, surely polarization of the political party culture might be beneficial.

Also, the Amundsen article postulates a generic notion of both support and the effects foreign support has on political cultures in each and every receiving country. Without any cases or examples, Amundsen’s argument is very difficult to conceptualise or to observe through research. Still he asks the crucial question: What effects does donor support of opposition parties in developing countries have? He provides a coherent introduction to the political party organisations divided amongst many other
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countries and political ideologies along with brief lists of regions and countries were there are current activities. This paper is thus a Namibian answer to Amundsen’s queries.  

Unfortunately, Amundsen does not provide a background on how this form of support started, though he does touch on mere mention of solidarity as a part of the foundations of support to liberation movements which turned into the political authorities of independent countries. But he provides only a handful of examples; he presents no clear idea of why donors would have active programs in countries that were not active objects of any social movements in the donor countries. And with Amundsen’s lack of nuanced divisions and indications of the different motivations of different donor countries, only further analytical interests of activities by these political foundations overseas, would provide a more concise understanding to donors motives. If the idea of support of parties on the basis of donors contemporary activities, then a greater presence by all the organizations in every democracy around the world would be expected, and the selective nature of political foundations would be excluded. This rings true in Namibia’s case where, as was demonstrated, there has been a long history of foreign support through solidarity social movements in Europe.  

Nicolas van de Walle’s analysis of the condition of African democracies brought up troubling undemocratic concerns, most importantly that the elected parties were at the time of his writing still in power and, having successfully captured state resources, able to marginalize opposition parties and to boost their own position within in national political space. Though at first glance his description of African democracies reflects the prevailing condition in Namibia, where SWAPO dominates with a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and, as we saw in chapter 4, an enormous support base throughout the country. Du Pisani and Lindeke agree that state support for political parties in Namibia seems to benefit the ruling party. However, the state also provides desperately needed funds for opposition parties that would not normally receive funds from other places. As seen in van de Walle and complemented by this project’s presentation of the Namibian reality, the emergence of single party dominance is confined to a specific time space since the start of 1990’s. In the Namibian case SWAPO strove for dominance already as a liberation movement, for example, in SWAPO’s search for international legitimacy as the sole legitimate authority of the territory. The domestic support during
the liberation struggle translated into electoral success only at the onset of elections in 1989 and has remained constant ever since.

Importantly, van de Walle’s argument presumes that most of the countries which made democratic transitions in 1990 did so from domestic authoritarianism, and not from the end of over a hundred years of foreign occupation. The simple fact is that, although Namibia’s transition was gaining independence, it also experienced a revolution in political representation, and the former strongmen in fact became marginalised in political life, as was confirmed in with the history of MAG and the RP. Lastly, van de Walle assumes that most of these countries that experienced these transitions had already had some memory of political emancipation. In Namibia’s case, on the other hand, the single party dominance in Africa of foreign powers has always been constant, without any break or political autonomy, and the commencement of independence also initiated the memory of political emancipation.

Erdmann presented the analytical problems of examining African political parties. He posited that the history of political science scholarship has always been defective because it always related African parties to European mass party models. But his idea of making an African party typology is risky. Every country in Africa has a different party culture and history. Though appearing very appropriate for Namibian realities, he places a strong emphasis on party membership as defined by ethnic support, providing the image that most of these political parties in Africa are ethnic support groups. Although some Namibian parties represent or have majority representation of particular ethnic groups, most of the popular political parties in Namibia claim a non-ethnocentric agenda and support. Even though the ruling party, SWAPO, has a deep-seated Ovambo bias, it still draws support from many other groups around the country, including whites. The larger opposition parties like the DTA, the CoD, the RDP, and to a certain extent the UDF draw reliable support from all over the country, while in more regional parties or ethnic parties like Nudo, MAG, SWANU, and other smaller regional parties like those from the Kavango, Caprivi and Southern Regions whose proportional support is marginal. Lastly, party membership is a very important political tool in Namibia, especially for the ruling party. SWAPO’s party membership card distribution ceremonies are very big events and receive coverage in both the print and broadcast media. The very vocal reactions to
defections from the ruling to opposition parties, receive not only a media blitz through state outlets but also intense public condemnation from the ruling party. Such reactions can be extreme and not limited to, the destruction of personal property, as experienced by Erasmus ‘Kaptein’ Hendjala, a former councilman in the Tobias Hainyeko (Katatura is located here) constituency in Khomas region, who was thrown out of the ruling party when he was believed to have been seen at an RDP rally, and the rumored attempted murder by Minister of Mines and Energy Erkki Nghimlima of his nephew who expressed loyalty to newly created RDP.

Thus du Pisani and Lindeke indicate the need to examine the history of opposition in Namibia. As they correctly point out, the opposition was ultimately defined by the space constructed by colonial powers, which permitted the first labour unions and liberation oriented organisations. Fast forward past independence and the independent opposition parties have ultimately determined their own fates in a dominant system through the way they operate in the political system.

Du Pisani and Lindeke are pessimistic in their approach to state resources; they use the example of gender regulation for party representation which benefits the ruling party with a larger representation base and access to the state press. They are fair in their approach, but ultimately the state funding of represented parties determines that public resources are used to promote the political party without any legal parameters regulating the use of these funds. This system allows the parties to determine the financial situation.

Secondly, as indicated, the opposition parties underutilize the rather vibrant independent media and only really rely on the free publicity they receive from their confrontation with SWAPO.

Du Pisani and Lindeke introduced Namibia as their answer to political systems as a particular case study. A crucial piece for this argument is the introduction opinions on key areas of Namibian political culture overshadowed by the dominance of the SWAPO party.

As already seen in Chapter 4, Namibia’s proportional representation (PR) system magnifies the opposition in the legislature. As already emphasized, more first-past-the-post, winner-take-all results in constituencies would give SWAPO nearly complete control since that party’s support is spread equally over twelve out of thirteen regions.
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The local authority’s results were used, simply because they represented the dominance that SWAPO has at the micro level. Thus the Proportional Representation allows for greater say of opposition in political debate.

Ramifications:

This paper explored aspects of the foreign support of political parties, and as a Namibian contribution to a more global debate. Ultimately there is no clear evidence of the effect of foreign support on Namibian political parties. This paper could only conclude that the support regime does not have any visible outcomes, but has been used as a tool in party factionalism.

Thus this paper presents three notions: First, foreign support of political parties in Namibia continues. Even after Independence, foreign support for opposition parties begun during the liberation struggle helped create and foster a democratic political environment where opposition parties operate. Second, it challenges and disproves Du Pisano’s and Lindeke statement that political parties are off limits to foreign support. Instead showing that SWAPO allows foreign support, but their motives are questionable if they are based on the legacy of their own experience rather than creating a competitive political space. The effectiveness of past support of opposition parties during liberation struggle has not shown the same results after independence, because a ruling party can maintain popular support and dominance through the ballot box rather than fraud and self-destructive nature of opposition parties.
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