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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,

The topic I have chosen for my lecture today is a big one: the reasons for the divergence in economic performance between Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa over the last 50 years. Why have most Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, achieved spectacular economic development, while almost all African countries have not?

My choice for such an ambitious subject is inspired partly by the hope that it will at least be of interest to a greater number of you than a more specialized topic would have been. But it is also inspired by the knowledge that as an academic, it is all too easy to get bogged down in detail. In the 1990s I spent the best part of seven years buried in archives in The Hague and Jakarta, researching the population history and environmental history of one Indonesian region, North Sulawesi, from 1600 to 1930. The archives were voluminous and the really relevant data scarce, hard to locate, and mostly unreliable. The resulting book, eventually published in 2005, is in my opinion not a bad one and at more than 600 pages, certainly authoritative in its field. But unfortunately the field is so narrow, the book so long, and the conclusions so nuanced, that even I can hardly recommend it as bedside reading - except perhaps to insomniacs.

The truth is that rather than sifting through mountains of handwritten documents in the equivalent of panning river mud for gold, it is much more efficient to use the vast amount of material that has already been published on most subjects to produce new interpretations of existing knowledge. So in 2002, I swore a solemn oath never again to enter an archive building. I must say that since then not only have I been more productive, but my career has gone a lot better too. In fact if I had not made that decision, I'd say it is very unlikely that we would all be here today.

Not long after I renounced the archives I began thinking about an ambitious research project comparing the development histories of Africa and Asia, with a view to identifying practical lessons from Asian success for development policy and development aid in Africa. Thanks to the sponsorship of Roel van der Veen of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to the Ministry's generous funding, this project got underway in 2006 under the name Tracking Development. What I have to say this afternoon is based on some of the findings of Tracking Development and owes something to many of my colleagues in that project.

Although this Asia-Africa research was a new direction for me, it also harked back in some ways to my own earliest experiences in Southeast Asia. I became an Indonesianist (and I know I am not alone in this) by coincidence, following a holiday I spent in Southeast Asia in 1984 during which I became fascinated by the region. Among the things that most struck me about the countries I visited were their unexpected modernity, their rapid development, and the sense of optimism and progress which pervaded them. The economies of Indonesia and Malaysia were growing at the unprecedented rate of seven percent each year, and it showed. Almost from day to day, new skyscrapers, motorways, factories, hospitals and schools were springing up from the ricefields.

I was impressed, and surprised. At school and even at university, I realized, I had been told a great deal more about the problems of the developing countries than about their achievements. I was not blind to the negative aspects of the changes I saw, or the political regimes which directed them, and I was disturbed by the juxtapositions of wealth and poverty. But unlike many visitors I felt no aesthetic revulsion for the Southeast Asian idealization of progress. I admired the high modernism of Singapore and Malaysia and the optimistic aspirations of Indonesia and Thailand. Their orientation toward the future and their acceptance of rapid change made my own country, Britain, where in many places even the cracks in the pavement had not changed for generations, seem a tired, slow old place, weighed down by the past. In Southeast Asia I saw something of the confidence and excitement, as well as the problems and confusion, which Britain had known in its own great era of progress and transformation in the nineteenth century.

It is true that in the West, as in Southeast Asia, the later part of the twentieth century was a time of economic growth. But the growth here was much slower and because the initial level of development was higher, the results were less dramatically visible. In many Western countries, furthermore, the benefits of growth in recent decades have been enjoyed disproportionately by a rich few. The greatest glory of Southeast Asia's development miracle is that in that part of the world, it is definitely not only the rich who have benefited. When I first went to Indonesia in the 1980s, it was in the process of achieving what was at that time the biggest, fastest poverty reduction in all of human history. In the 20 years between 1970 and 1990 the proportion of the Indonesian population living in absolute poverty - at least as defined by the national poverty line, which was admittedly set very low - fell from around 60 percent to just 15 percent. In that period more than 50 million people escaped for the first time from the most abject poverty. At the same time the average life expectancy at birth rose from 47 to 65 years as countless Indonesians survived who would previously have died at birth, or in infancy, or later of disease and malnutrition. In Malaysia and Thailand, advances of similarly epic proportions had been achieved at slightly earlier dates; in Vietnam and Cambodia, they are being achieved right now as I speak.

It has been a great privilege for me to witness something of this miracle with my own eyes, and a privilege too, as part of my recent research, to speak in person with a few of the people, now old men, who were directly responsible for bringing it about. For the miracle did not happen spontaneously, or by some kind of historical accident. At the level of individuals and households, of course, it owed much to the hard work, resilience, and ambition - so often underestimated - of ordinary Southeast Asian people. But it also depended on opportunities being available for people to seize, and this would not have been the case if their governments, the privileged few who had power over them, had made the wrong rather than the right decisions. Successful development in Asia has always begun with the emergence of a developmental *state*.

Now this is not a universal view. There are those who believe that aspects of Southeast Asia's geography - its agricultural fertility, for instance, or its proximity to international trade routes - predestined it for success. But if that is true, then how to explain Burma and the Philippines, which share these advantages yet have not been able to translate them into anything like the same rates of growth or poverty reduction as in Indonesia or Thailand? Other writers stress the industriousness and business skills - supposedly more or less innate - of the 30 million people of Chinese descent who live in Southeast Asia. But it is important to note what is now glibly called

the 'Chinese spirit of capitalism' did not do China itself much good until the Chinese government made the right policy choices in the late 1980s. And it is less than 100 years since the great sociologist Max Weber wrote a learned treatise arguing that Chinese culture was inherently incompatible with capitalism. Other writers again try to explain Southeast Asia's success in terms of its strategic importance during the Cold War, which enabled its non-Communist countries, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, to benefit from large amounts of Western aid. But if aid was so important, then how can it be that Africa, as every newspaper reader knows, has swallowed billions of dollars of Western aid over the years, with very little to show for it?

In 1960 Africans, according to the best statistics we have, were on average considerably richer than Southeast Asians. Southeast Asia however overtook Africa in 1982 and now has more than twice Africa's income per head. The Asian economic miracle has its antithesis in an African economic tragedy. Whereas Southeast Asia has changed beyond recognition, most of Africa today still looks how the whole of the Third World looked in the schoolbooks of the 1970s: rural poverty and malnutrition, cities of slums, miserable life expectancy, high population growth, no modern industry to speak of, and here and there small enclaves of wealth based mostly on oil and mining. Since the 1990s, it is true, there has been some sustained growth in national incomes in Africa due to improved macroeconomic policies and increased world demand for minerals, coffee, cotton, and other primary products. But according to most observers there is little sign yet of this aggregate growth translating into sustained poverty reduction.

Many Africans, and scholars of Africa, put all this failure down to corruption and 'weak institutions', which in practice is usually not much more than another term for corruption. But anyone who knows Southeast Asia must be sceptical of this explanation. Indonesia, during the period of its greatest developmental triumphs in the 1970s and 80s, ran neck-and-neck with Nigeria for the title of the world's most corrupt country, with Thailand as a close runner-up. Some scholars try to deny the validity of this comparison by arguing that Indonesia and Thailand at least enjoyed systems of 'organized corruption' which were predictable enough not to deter investment. African corruption, by contrast, has been a chaotic free-for-all in which incumbent officials steal everything they can on the assumption that they will not be incumbent for long. On close inspection, though, this argument does not really stand up either. Some African countries have actually enjoyed long periods of political stability, and even quite effective economic planning, under regimes whose development performance nevertheless fell far short of Indonesia's. Examples include Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta in the 1960s and 70s, and under Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s and 90s. In Nigeria the period from 1960 to 1975, although it included a brief civil war in the south of the country, was also one of systematic development planning. This planning took place under the direction of a group of non-political experts comparable in many ways to the so-called 'technocrats' who made economic policy in Indonesia from 1965 onward. Furthermore, in the 1960s, newly-independent Nigeria still possessed a civil service that was, if anything, *more* competent to implement development plans than was Indonesia's bureaucracy, which by that stage had been weakened by decades of conflict and instability.

Here we come to the crux of the matter. The reason for Africa's failure, I want to argue, is not the inadequate implementation of potentially successful development policy. Rather, it lies in the fact that African governments have simply never tried to implement the kinds of policy which

have proved successful in Asia. African development strategies have always differed in fundamental ways from those which caused the transition from stagnation to sustained growth in Indonesia and its neighbours. In order to appreciate this we must look at the situation of the Southeast Asian countries not as they are today, with decades of growth behind them, but as they were at the moment in history when their economic fortunes began to turn.

In Indonesia that turning point took place in 1967, and it coincided with the adoption of what would nowadays be called a pro-poor, pro-rural development strategy. This strategy was directed above all at raising the productivity of smallholder agriculture, the economic activity on which the majority of the population depended. The investments made by the Indonesian government to achieve this were paid for at first by foreign aid, and later by oil revenues. Devoting almost one third of its whole development budget to the agricultural sector, the government rapidly improved the country's irrigation systems and made available to farmers new high-yielding, fertilizer-responsive varieties of rice. Fertilizer was heavily subsidized, as was credit with which to buy it. The state also guaranteed a minimum rice price to all producers. Between 1968 and 1985, per hectare yields of rice rose by almost 80 percent. In the 1960s, Indonesia was the largest rice importer in the world; by 1984, it was self-sufficient. The new farming technology was labour-intensive, and did not result in small farmers being forced off their land. Tens of millions of peasants and farm labourers benefited directly, and the whole of the rural economy was catapulted out of stagnation.

The rural development effort did not end with agriculture. Most of the simultaneous public spending on roads, electrification, schools, and public health also took place in rural areas, where more than 70 percent of the Indonesian population lived. The new rural infrastructure was built using labour-intensive techniques, creating employment for the poor. Indonesian development spending, in short, was focused on agriculture, the countryside, and the rural poor. The industrialization which so impresses visitors today was a later development, beginning only in the mid-1980s when the economy had already been growing for almost 20 years and the back of the problem of rural poverty had already been broken.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia it was a remarkably similar story. In Thailand, where income growth began in the early 1950s after more than a century of stagnation, the turning point coincided with a huge surge of public spending on rural infrastructure. As in Indonesia, this was paid for largely by American aid. Between 1950 and 1970 the area under irrigation in Thailand tripled, causing average rice yields to rise by almost 50 percent, and the length of surfaced roads grew almost tenfold, enabling the total area under cultivation to expand by more than 50 percent. In Malaysia sustained growth began in 1958 when the government of the newly independent Federation of Malaya announced its intention 'to give top priority to the task of improving the lot of the rural inhabitants'. Within 15 years national rice production was doubled by means of huge new irrigation projects, and two-thirds of all smallholder rubber plantations in the country were replanted with new high-yielding rubber trees thanks to state replanting grants. In Vietnam, rice production doubled between 1975 and 1990. Most of this increase, contrary to common belief, was due not to deregulation of the economy, but rather to a rapid expansion of the area under technical irrigation, which allowed two crops instead of one to be harvested each year from the same land. Everywhere in the region, then, sustained growth and poverty reduction began with an agricultural revolution based on small peasant farms but made possible by large public

investments. Exactly how this agricultural revolution prepared the ground for the later industrial development is not fully clear, but we do know that the agricultural revolution always came first.

The policy interventions which triggered that revolution were inspired by an awareness among Southeast Asian policy-makers of two crucial principles of successful development planning. The first principle is that development is mainly a matter of numbers, and that the most effective policies are those which provide direct benefit to the greatest number of people. The leader of the Indonesian technocrats was economist Widjojo Nitisastro, who now lies gravely ill in Jakarta and who will in time be recognized as a key figure of the twentieth century. In 1969, Widjojo explained that the main reason for concentrating on agriculture was simply that 'the greater part of the Indonesian people lives in this sector, working either as farmer producers or as farm laborers'. Widjojo and his colleagues believed in what the World Bank would later call 'shared growth': a 'broad-based' pattern of development in which the mass of the population participates from the beginning rather than waiting for benefits to 'trickle down' from the activities of a rich few.

The second principle shared by the successful Southeast Asian development planners was a powerful sense of urgency. They realized that what mattered in the early stages of development was not long-term planning, but the single-minded pursuit of short-term goals. It is often assumed that the economic success of Southeast Asia is due to meticulous planning based on a far-sighted vision of the future. But this is not true: asked to describe the 'Thai vision of development', a senior Dutch diplomat in Thailand once replied drily, 'I have never met a Thai with vision'. The Indonesian technocrats, for their part, were hardly concerned with the future beyond the current five-year plan, and their crucial first plan was so sketchy that it contained not a single projection of economic growth, savings, or investment even over the plan period. But they were very much concerned with sticking to priorities and their first priority was agriculture, described by Widjojo as 'the central arena in which all efforts are concentrated and all results expected'.

In Africa, development priorities have been both more ambitious in their ultimate aims, and less ambitious in the scale of their immediate outreach. African governments have seen the challenge of development as one of transcending agriculture and transforming the economy through industrialization. While Indonesia was spending its oil windfall on labour-intensive peasant agriculture in the 1970s, Nigeria, also a giant oil producer, was spending its windfall on capital-intensive industrial projects, including a massive steelworks that never produced any steel. Even when they did produce things, the new Nigerian industries employed very few people. In theory they were eventually supposed to give rise to broader growth by stimulating other sectors of the economy, but in practice nobody expected this to happen any time soon. Meanwhile the widening gap between rich and poor was accepted, in the words of the leading Nigerian planner of the period, Allison Ayida, 'as part of the price of rapid development'. This model, then, was one of 'trickle down' rather than 'shared growth'.

Kenya was one of the few African countries where the agricultural sector was not neglected to the same extent as in Nigeria. But in Kenya too, development efforts were hampered by an elitist vision of the development process. A small group of 'progressive' well-to-do farmers was distinguished by the planners from a much larger group of poorer 'laggards', whose conservatism

supposedly made them slow to adopt innovations. When it came to spending choices, the Kenyan policy-makers put their money on the few already prosperous farmers, who they believed would make the best use of it, not on the mass of poor farmers who had the greatest need of it. In the 1960s almost all subsidized farm credit went to an elite three percent of Kenya's smallholders, and almost all subsidized fertilizer to fewer than 3,000 large-scale farms.

In so far as the Kenyan government had any development priority which involved mass outreach, it was not agriculture, but education, the expansion of which in the first years of independence was impressive. Almost everywhere in Africa we find a strong belief in the transformative power of knowledge and education. Education is consistently the area of development in which Africa lags least far behind Southeast Asia. Like the African interest in industry, cities, and 'progressive' elites, this emphasis on education reflects a vision of the development process which is quite different from the one which informed successful planning in Southeast Asia. The essence of this difference, I would argue, is that whereas Southeast Asian planners have seen development as an incremental process - albeit a potentially rapid one - whereby poor people become richer, African planners have seen development more as a transformative process whereby poor countries acquire various things which rich countries have, and poor ones do not.

At the risk of oversimplification, we can say that heavy industry was favoured in Nigeria in the 1970s essentially because Nigerians saw that it was one of those things - others included higher education - which their country did not yet have, but which developed countries did have. Their reference point, in other words, was an idealized state of industrial modernity, the desired *end point* of the development process. In Indonesia in the 1970s, by contrast, the reference point was an immediate and grim reality of rural poverty, the *undesired starting point* of the development process. This could only be changed by tackling the problems at root using whatever resources lay immediately to hand: not by planning for the future, but by establishing immediate priorities and acting on them.

Today in Africa, steelworks and universities have been replaced as hallmarks of development by new symbols of modernity: computers, supermarkets, good governance, human rights. But the underlying vision of development as a matter of acquiring certain attributes of developed status is still pervasive. Kenya's current long-term national plan *Kenya Vision 2030* is a striking example of a fantasy of modernity masquerading as a development plan. Its pages gleam with flyovers and skyscrapers and its economic platform begins not with agriculture, the sector which employs 60 percent of the nation's workforce, but with international tourism - in relation to which the plan, reading more like a travel brochure, promises that Kenya will provide 'a high-end, diverse, and distinctive visitor experience'. How little the rural poor can expect to benefit is revealed by the miniscule ambitions of the plan with respect to rural infrastructure: for 2012, for example, the target rate of access to mains electricity in the countryside is just 12 percent. While Nairobi prepares for the information age, nine-tenths of the Kenyan countryside still descends at nightfall into medieval darkness.

There are those who argue that the most recent developments in African agriculture have at least been positive, and that the policy errors of the past are now being corrected. In 2003 the governments of the African Union did undertake to devote at least 10 percent of total public spending in their countries to agriculture. However today, eight years later, only a handful of

African countries have actually done so and the 10 percent target is in any case much too low. In Indonesia the equivalent figure, at its peak in 1979, was 22 percent, and Africa, with its more challenging physical conditions for agriculture, will need to spend more still. Yet political commitment to rural development remains weak even in the most enlightened African circles. President Kagame of Rwanda, one of the most admired and effective leaders in Africa today, talks of a 'short cut' to development, based on information technology, which bypasses agriculture entirely. Kagame's preferred Asian model is not Indonesia - where the island of Java offers credible parallels with the fertile but overpopulated landscape of Rwanda - but rather Singapore, for almost two centuries one of the world's great seaports, and about as absurd a comparison with Rwanda as it is possible to imagine.

Why should the Asian model of development be inclusive, incremental, and economic, whereas the African model is elitist, transformational, and technological? Part of the answer is that political realities have forced Asian elites to take the interests of peasant farmers seriously. Thailand and Malaysia experienced rural communist insurgencies in the decades after the Second World War, and the Communist Party of Indonesia, which drew its mass support from the poor of rural Java, was close to achieving national political dominance before its destruction by the military in 1965. The rural development programmes in these countries served to neutralize the appeal of political radicalism in the countryside, and thereby safeguard the power of established elites. In Vietnam, where the communists succeeded in coming to power, they were ultimately obliged to deliver some of the benefits they had so loudly promised to the poor, even if this meant abandoning their original anti-capitalist ideology. In fact we can almost say that in Southeast Asia there are just two kinds of successful developmental state: the counter-revolutionary state, and the liberalizing post-revolutionary state. This does not bode well for Africa, where in most countries socialism has been either completely absent, as in Nigeria, or present only in nationalist rhetoric, as in the case of Kenya.

On closer inspection, however, communism and anti-communism are not the whole story behind the contrast between African and Southeast Asian visions of development. Communism in Malaysia was almost entirely an affair of the ethnic Chinese minority, whereas the beneficiaries of the rural development effort were Malays who showed few signs of being attracted to communism anyway. And by the time Indonesia adopted its pro-poor, pro-rural development policies under president Suharto, the Communist Party of Indonesia had already been bloodily destroyed during Suharto's rise to power in 1965. In interviews with myself and my Tracking Development colleagues, senior Indonesian technocrats of that time have strenuously denied that political considerations affected their policy choices, which they insist were based purely upon economic logic and on common sense.

What does emerge from these interviews and from other personal testimonies, on the other hand, is a rather consistent difference between Asian and African policy-makers in terms of their personal evaluation of rural ways of life. In Southeast Asia, elite attitudes to village life, although condescending, are often also marked by nostalgia and a degree of admiration. The best example is Suharto himself, ruler of Indonesia for more than 30 years from 1965 to 1998. Suharto was brought up in a small village near Yogyakarta in Java. His autobiography opens with an emotional account of the ceremony in 1985 at which he was honoured by the international community for Indonesia's achievement in doubling its rice production. Reflecting on the pride

he felt on this occasion, Suharto fondly recalls a boyhood spent 'playing in the fields among the farmers' and developing 'a distinct feeling of sympathy for them'. Abdul Razak, the driving force behind Malaysian rural development efforts in the 1960s and 70s, was the son of a civil servant but was raised largely by his farming grandparents. Razak's biography attributes his concern for the welfare of the rural masses to the fact that 'his early years had been spent working with the ordinary village people in the rice fields'.

Africa too has had no lack of rulers with rural origins, yet their attitudes to rural life have been markedly less positive. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's head of state in the late 1970s and again from 1999 to 2007, is the son of a farmer, and just as much a village boy as Suharto. But in his biography he displays none of Suharto's romantic nostalgia for his rural childhood. Instead he recounts how his parents urged him 'to escape the drudgery that was peasant farming in Africa'. 'Olu', his father once asked him, 'is it this toilsome farming you would want to continue with in life?' Small wonder that having escaped from the village themselves, people like Obasanjo should seek to improve their nation's future by providing others too with avenues for escape to the comfort and modernity of the city, rather than by trying to make village life itself better and more attractive.

Why should Asian and African leaders evaluate their own rural origins so differently? The first point to note here is that historically speaking, the contrast between city and countryside has been sharper in Africa than in Asia. In Southeast Asia there is a long tradition of indigenous urbanism, and colonial rule did not wipe out the old political and cultural links between the towns and their hinterlands. In Africa, by contrast, many of today's cities are colonial foundations and for a long time they retained their original character as alien, European enclaves. For Africans of the early twentieth century, to move from the countryside to the city was not just to come closer to the centre of power and wealth; it was to cross a cultural and civilizational divide. In Allison Ayida's biography the Nigerian capital, Lagos, where Ayida attended boarding school in the 1940s, is described as the place where one had to go if one wished 'to learn the white man's ways, and to be completely transformed into an educated and civilized man'.

In Kenya, where colonization by Europeans came later than in Nigeria, the antithesis between urban and rural, modern and traditional, and European and African was sharper still. It also coincided with a dramatic religious divide. In colonial Kenya, education for Africans was offered almost exclusively by Christian missionary groups at residential schools where children were fully encapsulated in an alien cultural environment. Kenya's first and second presidents, Kenyatta and Moi, were both first-generation Christian converts who, as boys, deliberately rejected their parents' way of life in favour of the faith and civilization of their European teachers. This act has been described by one of Kenyatta's biographers as a 'total break with the past' and 'a great leap in the dark'. With it the future leaders cut themselves off from their origins and caused themselves to be ostracized, at least at first, by their communities of birth.

African attitudes to development, then, have been shaped by both historical processes and personal experiences in which the encounter with the advanced economies of Europe was bound up with a dramatic social and cultural transformation. The intellectual legacy of this transformation has been a pervasive assumption of dualism, a conviction that economic progress can only be achieved by means of a quantum leap from backwardness into modernity. In

Southeast Asia, by comparison, the colonial experience was less radically transformative and involved less of a rupture with the past. One major country, Thailand, was not colonized at all, and elsewhere it was only in the Philippines that the religion and language of the colonizing power were widely adopted by its subjects. Even when they received Western education, Southeast Asian intellectual and political elites remained culturally closer than their African counterparts to the uneducated rural masses, identified more closely with them, and placed more faith in their abilities. This predisposed the Southeast Asian elites to believe in a development strategy based on the improvement of peasant farming, rather than on a structural transformation of the economy whereby peasant farming would disappear to make way for more modern activities.

In Africa, even members of the elite who are themselves of rural origin find it difficult to believe in a strategy that focuses on improving rural life *in situ*, by means of agricultural development, rather than on accelerating the transition to urban modernity of which their own lives have been a microcosm. Yet it remains a fact that in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, development of a type which ultimately benefits all sections of the population, including elites and city-dwellers, has demonstrably been based on precisely such a pro-poor, pro-rural strategy. Much is potentially to be gained for Africa's poor by drawing this fact emphatically to the attention of Africa's present and future leaders.

This then is an educational and research priority for the future. For now I would like to conclude with some words of thanks, which I can assure you are heartfelt. First of all, to all of you for being here. Some of you have come a long way, and all of you have given up precious time; I'm grateful for that. And it is a pleasure to see some of my students here; without students, after all, there is no point in having professors. During the year I've already spent teaching at Leiden part-time I've been impressed by the commitment and enthusiasm of many of them, particularly as manifest in our active student association for South and Southeast Asian Studies.

Second, to some particular people who over the years have given me the big breaks without which I would not be here today. Harold Brookfield, who long ago had the faith to take me on in Canberra to write a PhD about Indonesia without my knowing anything to speak of about Indonesia beforehand. Harold cannot be here due to ill health but is represented this afternoon by his close colleague Lesley Potter. My friend and former boss Peter Boomgaard, who took me on at the KITLV in 1993 after a year of increasing desperation on the dole in England. And Roel van der Veen, who supported Tracking Development through thick and thin and without whom that project would never have got off the ground.

Then there are those who have been sources of intellectual inspiration. They include all my teachers in Canberra, especially Tony Reid, unfortunately not here today, the one true living pathfinder and pioneer in the study of Southeast Asian history. Also my Tracking Development colleagues Jan Kees van Donge, now in Papua New Guinea, Ahmad Helmy Fuady, now in Indonesia, and, once again, Roel, who I'm pleased to say is here today. Roel's thinking on development issues has so closely paralleled my own that sometimes I'm not sure any more whether it was me or him that came up with a particular phrase or idea.

Lastly and most importantly to my family. Above all to my parents: to them I owe a debt which can never be repaid, and my greatest regret right now is that they did not live to see this day. And to my children, Daniel and Ann, who have taught me that in the end, all this academic stuff doesn't really matter that much.

Ik heb gezegd.